THE SRI LANKAN NAVY: A COLLECTIVE BLIND EYE

OCT 2019
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our heartfelt thanks go out to the survivors of the Gun Site dungeons who bravely spoke to us, as well as to the other victims of violations committed by members of the Sri Lankan Navy. This report has taken six years and required enormous patience on the part of the victims.

We couldn’t have done this work without the invaluable contribution of many Sinhalese – extraordinary researchers, translators, interpreters and the insider witnesses. Among them decent military officers who would like to see their country’s security establishment reformed so that it is something of which they can be proud.

“I WANT THOSE WHO DID THIS TO ME BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.”

(GUN SITE TORTURE SURVIVOR)
NAVY COMMANDERS

ADIMRAL WASANTHA KUMAR
JAYADEWA KARANNAGODA
2 September 2005 – 14 July 2009
(also see dossier)

1971
Joined the Navy.

JUL 2009
Adviser to the President on National Security.

MAR 2011 – 2015
Ambassador to Japan.

5 AUG 2019
Promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.

TRAINED:
UK, US, Pakistan.

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ADIMRAL THISARA S. G. SAMARASINGHE
15 July 2009 – 14 January 2011

2002
Commander, Southern Naval Area.

DEC 2005
Acting Commander, Northern Naval Area.

2006
Director General Operations – Naval HQ.

2007
Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

2008
Commander, Northern Naval Area.

7 JUN 2008-15 MAY 2009
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.

16 MAY-14 JUL 2009
Chief of Staff of the Navy.

15 JUL 2009-14 JAN 2011
Navy Commander.

2011-2015
High Commissioner to Australia.

2017
Colombo International Nautical and Engineering College.

TRAINED:
UK, India, USA.

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ADIMRAL DISSANAYAKE WDESINGHE
ARATCHILAGE SOMATILAKE DISSANAYAKE
15 January 2011 – 26 September 2012

1 JUN 1977
Joined Navy.

1998-2001
Defence Attaché, India.

8 JAN 2008-6 JAN 2009
Director General Operations

FINAL WAR:
Spearheaded Naval operations in the North.

JUL 2009
Chief of Staff.

2012
Retired.

2016
Accused in Avant Garde case.

SEP 2019
Released from the Avant Garde case.

TRAINED:
India, UK, USA.

Initially accused in Avant Garde corruption case before being released because of the manner in which the case was filed was found to be against the law.
The CID yesterday told Colombo Additional Magistrate Shehani Perera that the Navy Hierarchy including former Navy Commander Jayantha Perera and Intelligence Division Director Ananda Guruge had knowledge about the abductions that took place in Colombo and suburbs during 2009.

1978: Joined the Navy.
2002: Commander of Southern Naval Area.
2004 ONWARDS: Director General Services; Director Naval Projects & Plans; Naval Assistant to Commander of the Navy; Principal Staff Officer of the Joint Operations Headquarters under Chief of Defence Staff.
1 JAN 2010 - 26 SEP 2012: Commander, Eastern Naval Area.
29 OCT 2013: Chairman of Ceylon Shipping Corporation while Navy Commander.
JUL 2014: Adviser to Maritime Group; Adviser to the President on Maritime and Naval Hub.
2016: Accused in Avant Garde case.
APR 2019: Among Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s inner circle of senior military advisors.
SEP 2019: Released from the Avant Garde case.
TRAINED: UK, India and China.

"The CID yesterday told Colombo Additional Magistrate Shehani Perera that the Navy Hierarchy including former Navy Commander Jayantha Perera and Intelligence Division Director Ananda Guruge had knowledge about the abductions that took place in Colombo and suburbs during 2009."

1978: Joined the Navy.
2006: Deputy Area Commander, Eastern Naval Area.
2007: Commander, Southern Naval Area.
2008: Commander, Naval Areas.
2011: Naval Operations Director General.
2016: Accused in Avant Garde case.
SEP 2019: Released from the Avant Garde case.
TRAINED: India, Pakistan, UK, USA.

TRAINED: UK, India, Pakistan, USA.

1980: Joined the Navy.
1993: Established the Special Boat Squadron.
UNKNOWN: Defence Adviser to the Sri Lanka High Commission in India.
3 APR 2006-28 JUL 2007: Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.
27 JUL 2007: Director, Naval Operations.
1 JAN-30 JUL 2008: Director Naval Operations; Director Naval Foreign Co-operation; Director Naval Marine Special Forces.
8 OCT-31 DEC 2012: Commander, Eastern Naval Area.
7 JUL 2014-11 JUL 2015: Chief of Staff.
22 AUG 2017: Chief of Defence Staff.
27 NOV 2018: Arrested in court case B9527/18 for assisting an absconding suspect; released on bail.
22 AUG 2019: Term extended as Chief of Defence Staff until year end.
TRAINED: UK (Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth), Pakistan, India, USA.
ADMIRAL TRAVIS JEREMY LIYANDURU SINNIAH
22 August 2017 - 26 Oct 2017

1982
Joined the Navy.

27 JUL 2007-4 APR 2009
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.

2008-9
Deputy Area Commander.

5 APR 2009-8 AUG 2009
Director Naval Project and Plans.

22 SEP 2009-13 FEB 2010
Naval Assistant.

JUL 2011
US Embassy Defence Co-operation Officer.

1 JAN 2016-26 MAY 2016
Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

16 AUG 2016-31 DEC 2016
Flag Officer.

1 JAN 2016-30 MAY 2016
Volunteer Naval Force.

26 OCT 2017
Retired.

TRAINED:
UK (Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth), US, India.

ADMIRAL SIRIMEVAN SARATHCHANDRA RANASINGHE
20 October 2017 – 31 December 2018

1982
Joined the Navy.

2002-2004
Commanded Fast Attack Squadron.

22 JAN 2007-26 JUL 2007
Director, Naval Operations.

2008
Deputy Area Commander, Southern Naval Area.

31 JUL-31 DEC 2008
Director Naval Operations; Director Naval Foreign Cooperation; Director Naval Marine Special Forces.

1 JAN-1 APR 2009
Director Naval Operations, Director Naval Weapons, Director Special Boat Squadron & Rapid Action Boat Squadron; Director, Eastern Naval Area.

5 APR 2009-13 AUG 2010
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee

14 AUG 2010-END 2011
Director Naval Project & Plans

2012
Southern Naval Command

25 MAR 2013-UNKNOWN DATE IN 2014
Commander, Western Naval Area; Commandant, Volunteer Naval Force.

23 JUL 2014-END 2014
Director General, Coast Guard.

11 JUL 2015-25 OCT 2017
Chief of Staff.

MAR 2019
Secretary to the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Southern Development.

TRAINED:
India, Pakistan, UK (Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth).

REAR ADMIRAL KKV PIYAL HARISCHANDRA DE SILVA
1 January 2019 - present

1984
Joined the Navy.

Commanded Special Boat Squadron.

30 SEP 2012
Deputy Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

2015-16
Commander, Northern Naval area.

2018
Director General, Operations.

27 JUL 2018-31 DEC 2018
Chief of Staff.

1 JAN 2019
Navy Commander (given 1-year extension July 2019).

TRAINED:
US, China
"THE GENERAL RESPONSE WAS THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE AND THAT A COLLECTIVE BLIND EYE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED".

(NAVAL OFFICER AT TRINCOMALEE)

This report examines the complicity of the Sri Lankan Navy in illegal detentions, torture and enforced disappearances over many years. It finds a large swathe of the naval high command was complicit in the violations or directly responsible for them. On 28 Nov 2018, former Navy Commander and current Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne - the highest-ranking military officer in the Sri Lankan Armed Forces - was arrested and remanded into custody for obstructing a high-profile investigation into some of these violations. This is just one example of political interference in the investigative process at the highest level. Most shocking perhaps is that these violations were part of a wider pattern of systemic torture that occurred over many years and in multiple sites, perpetrated by the Sri Lankan Navy and other units of the security forces.

The focus of this report is on the country’s premier naval base in Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka. For at least five years, during and after the civil war, an underground torture complex operated in the hills of the naval base in which scores of people were illegally detained. There is no doubt that senior naval commanders knew or should have known of the existence of this illegal detention site – perimeter security for the Trincomalee naval base was extremely tight and even junior officers knew of the existence of the torture chambers which were discussed in hushed tones in the officers’ mess.

Trincomalee is yet another example of torture chambers in one of the most strategic security sites in the country. The International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) has already extensively documented endemic torture during and after the war, in “Joseph Camp”, the main army garrison for the north, situated in the heart of Vavuniya Town.

The existence of an underground torture complex in the naval base in Trincomalee was first revealed in 2015 by the ITJP, based on information from Tamil survivors who had been detained there for three and a half years and were brutally tortured and then fled the country. Until then, the Sri Lankan Navy had managed to maintain the relatively clean facade that it continues to use in order to secure international engagement, funding and support. These survivors gave the GPS coordinates of the site and the United Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance (WGEID) corroborated its existence after visiting the location in November 2015.

The change of government in Sri Lanka in 2015, resulted in the Sri Lankan police revitalising their investigation into the enforced disappearance of eleven men abducted by the Navy in 2008 and 2009. The men had been illegally detained first in naval headquarters in Colombo and then in the Trincomalee naval base’s underground torture site. Bizarrely this investigation had first begun in 2009 when then Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda ordered his Aide de Camp (ADC) Sampath Munasinghe to be investigated, after he reportedly received an allegation - denied by all parties - that the ADC had been having an affair with his wife Ashoka Karannagoda. Investigators found four of the identity cards of the eleven disappeared men in the room of the ADC. The ADC was arrested, which triggered a police investigation which subsequently boomeranged to include the Navy Commander (the original complainant) as a suspect.
Over the years, hundreds of witnesses have been interviewed by the Criminal Investigation Department of the police (CID) — often betraying one another, some testifying and then recanting their testimony on the basis that they had been pressurised — while others absconded or were sent abroad by Navy high command to avoid questioning by the police. An in-depth study of the Sinhala language court documents reveals that the investigation over the last ten years has been fraught with problems, ranging from suspects refusing to show up, to actually hiding in Naval headquarters while Interpol notices for them are issued. In 2017, the case took a new twist when the chief investigating police officer Nishantha de Silva reported that a key suspect — Naval Intelligence officer RPS Ranasinghe — had been plotting to kill him from within the jail hospital; the suspect was nevertheless released on bail and promoted.

Unfortunately, the remit of the police investigation has been narrowly focused on the eleven victims who disappeared in the Trincomalee site rather than on torture victims who survived detention there and either are in Sri Lanka or abroad. This is in spite of the fact that survivors could provide crucial evidence about individual perpetrators and commanders, as well as the systematic nature of the violations, were they able to testify in safety. This report is unique because it cross-references and analyses information from Sri Lankan court documents with testimony from Tamil survivors abroad and the evidence of Sinhalese insiders, including naval officials, and eyewitnesses.

Political support for the police investigation has waned. Nevertheless, important information has emerged that, when combined with evidence gathered by the ITJP, paints a sordid picture of criminal conduct by the Navy. What was initially thought to be an abduction for ransom case by a few “rotten apples” in Naval Intelligence has unravelled into something much more systematic that implicates a wide range of senior naval officials, including the current Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne in serious violations of human rights.
METHODOLOGY

PERIOD COVERED

The cases of illegal detention, torture and disappearances documented in this report occurred between 2008 and 2012 in Colombo or Trincomalee. The ITJP gathered further evidence of similar abuses in a Navy-run detention facility in Welisara as late as 2014. The ITJP’s Navy investigation was conducted over a period of six years starting in 2014, but also draws on documentation and material collected previously such as court documents from the Trincomalee 11 abduction case which has been ongoing since 2009.

COURT DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED

The ITJP conducted a thorough review of the Sinhala court documents relating to the Trincomalee 11 abduction case before the Colombo Fort Magistrate Court. The case of the eleven victims who allegedly disappeared in the Trincomalee detention site after being abducted by Navy personnel in 2008-2009 is currently being investigated by the Criminal Investigation Department of the police (CID).

References to ‘B reports’ are to reports of the case, together with a summary of the statements, given to the Magistrate by the police and constitutes an investigation report according to articles 115 (1), (20), (3), (4) and 120 (1), (2), (3) of Chapter XI of 1979 No 15, code of criminal procedure act. The case is still at the investigation stage with the magistrate. Once the magistrate’s court is satisfied it will direct the Attorney General to serve indictments and file the case in the High Court. Both processes are generally referred as the ‘case’ in the press.

Though limited in scope, the findings of the case corroborate the accounts of victims and other witnesses documented by the ITJP. Witnesses also expose the involvement of Navy personnel in illegal detention, torture and disappearance beyond the facts of this particular case.

The ITJP has examined and documented the command structure of the Navy and has identified the large number of Navy Commanders who would have had knowledge of the existence of the Trincomalee secret naval detention and torture site. The information on postings of naval officers has largely come from reports to parliament or where that is not available from official biographies, court documents or media sources. The ITJP has also examined the extent and scope of the decade-long investigation by the CID into the abduction for ransom and disappearance of the eleven individuals and whether this has been consistent in questioning all potential suspects and witnesses. It also scrutinised the involvement of high-level Navy officials in obstructing the investigation, through threats and intimidation of key witnesses.

The profiles on alleged perpetrators are based on court documents, parliamentary reports, official Navy and Chief of Defence’s websites, official career histories, the testimony of victims and open-source material from Fundamental Rights applications brought in Sri Lanka, media reports, NGO (non-governmental organisation) reports and the social media profiles of alleged perpetrators.

INTERVIEWS

Over six years, six ITJP investigators conducted confidential interviews with 15 Sri Lankan Sinhalese and Tamil witnesses based in Sri Lanka, the UK and Switzerland who worked in the Navy or had knowledge of the Trincomalee Navy secret detention and
torture site, including victims who were detained there incommunicado over several years. The testimony of the ITJP witnesses corroborates the findings of the Colombo Fort Magistrate Court case, in which more than 200 witnesses, mainly Navy personnel, were interviewed.

A key insider witness helped the ITJP to establish a detailed map of Trincomalee Naval Dockyard as it was in 2009, identifying the exact location of the detention sites in the hills of the naval base, which was further corroborated by other witnesses. Several witnesses also provided sketches of the sites. These sketches by victims and former Navy personnel provide corroboration for their own and others’ accounts especially when combined with the report of the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance which visited the Trincomalee underground torture site.

WITNESS SELECTION

The main criteria used by the ITJP to identify and select witnesses for this report was detention or work in the Trincomalee Naval Dockyard or involvement as a witness in the so-called Trincomalee 11 abduction case before the Fort Magistrate Court. Most of the witnesses were either held or worked in Trincomalee Naval Dockyard during the final phase of the war up until 2012. A few witnesses also provided useful information about illegal detention and torture by the Navy in other Navy-run detention facilities, providing emerging evidence of a wider pattern of torture over many years in multiple sites by the Navy. This evidence complements well-documented patterns of abuse by other units of the Sri Lankan security forces over several decades. Although references to these other sites are made in this report, its main focus is on the underground torture complex of Gun Site in the hills of the Trincomalee naval base.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY

The ITJP gathers information on the basis of confidentiality. Investigators, interpreters and staff are bound by confidentiality agreements; victims and other witnesses were informed about what to expect before starting the interview. The ITJP takes great care to mitigate risks to witnesses and protect their information.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Though it may not be reflected in this report for witness protection reasons, ITJP investigators did spend considerable time documenting and gathering information, where relevant, about the past roles of the victims and their families in the civil war and their current situation. Similarly, Naval insiders were questioned in detail about their career history, their role and postings during the civil war, naval command structure, any incidents that triggered their detention, resignation or departure from the Navy, any disciplinary measures or threats against them and, when relevant, their journey to escape Sri Lanka.
1. BACKGROUND

The Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) is the naval arm of the Sri Lankan armed forces and is a vital defence force given its island geography. The Navy is responsible for the maritime defence of the Sri Lankan nation and its interests. The SLN is about 50,000 members strong, including over 1500 officers, and consists of different branches. The three main branches in the Sri Lankan Navy are:

- The Executive Branch - responsible for sea operations;
- The Naval Patrolman Branch - responsible for land operations; and
- The Logistics or Supply Branch – responsible for providing supplies and logistics.

The path to command is through the Executive Branch, and only sea-going officers of the Executive Branch can command ships. The Naval Patrolman Branch was formed in the 1990s to increase the land operation capability of the SLN. As a fighting unit, it performs the role of naval infantry and is in charge of naval land operations.

Outside of its fighting role which included countering the LTTE threat at sea during the war, the SLN has more traditional responsibilities. These include providing security for the Colombo, Trincomalee, Kankesanthurai (KKS) and Galle harbours; providing security for fishing activities; escorting merchant and passenger vessels plying between different harbours; handling all harbour operations (e.g. supervising cargo unloading); providing assistance to fishermen in distress; and ensuring there is no smuggling or trafficking of people or goods in and out of Sri Lanka. In addition, during the war the SLN deployed over 12,000 naval personnel in operational areas in support of the Government’s ground strategy.

2. ORGANISATION

At the head of the Navy is the Commander of the Navy (CoN) – a list of profiles of the officers who have held this post is on Page 3.

Above the three forces commanders (Air, Army and Navy) sit the Chief of Defence Staff – a new post created after the war in 2009. This office is currently held by Ravindra Chandrasiri Wijegunaratne, who was promoted to the rank of Admiral and appointed from CoN to Chief of Defence Staff on 22 August 2017. RC Wijegunaratne has himself been implicated in witness tampering in the Trincomalee 11 case – see his profile in Annexure 1.

The CoN ultimately reports to His Excellency the President of the Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, as Commander in Chief of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. Under the Commander of the Navy comes the Chief of Staff and then the Director Generals who all hold the rank of Rear Admiral. Under them are the Directors who hold the rank of Commodore.

3. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE NAVY COMMAND STRUCTURE

The violations documented in this report were allegedly committed by Naval Intelligence which comes under the Director General of Operations. Naval Intelligence is not a separate branch of the SLN.

Under the Director General of Operations is the Director of Naval Operations (DNO) (usually from the Naval Patrolman Branch) who commands (a) the Director of Land Operations who operates in the East of Sri Lanka, (b) the Special Boat Squadron, (c) the Rapid Action Boat Squadron and (d) the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence also reports to Navy Headquarters as well as the Director Naval Operations and under him are senior staff officers and staff officers.

Intelligence gathering at the relevant period was organised according to the geographical zones (north west, north central, west, south, north and east). Each zone would have its own Area Intelligence Officer.
SRI LANKAN NAVY COMMAND STRUCTURE:
NAVY DIRECTOR GENERAL OPERATIONS

Also reports to Naval HQ

Senior Staff Officer
Staff Officer

Area East Intelligence Officer

Maritime Academy
SLNS Tissa
Navdoc
(SBS here)
Mahaveli
Vijayaba
(Nilaveli)
Walagamba
Parakumba
(Sampur)

Gemunu (Welisara)
Thaksila (training at Welisara)
Mahasen (Welisara)
Lanka Volunteer (Welisara)
Parakrama (admin base in HQ Colombo)
Rangalla (harbour)
Kelani (CEFAP)
SRI LANKAN NAVY COMMAND STRUCTURE: DGS AND DIRECTORS

(COMMANDER OF NAVY (CON))

(CHIEF OF STAFF)

(DIRECTOR GENERALS)

(OPERATIONS)

(ENGINEERING)

(PERSONNEL & TRAINING)

(HEALTH SERVICES)

(LOGISTICS)

(ELECTRICAL)

(SERVICES)

(LEGAL SERVICES)

(PERSONNEL & TRAINING)

(ELECTRICAL SERVICES)

(LEGAL SERVICES)

(WEAPONS)

(Intelligence

(Civil Engineering

(Personnel

(Dental Services

(Logistics

(Logistics & Project & Utility

(Health Services

(Finance

(Naval Budget

(Medical Services

(System

(Victualling & clothing

(Personnel

(Pay & pension

(Naval Admin.

(System)

(Welfare)

(ITE)
1. BACKGROUND

On 28 May 2009, then Commander of the Navy (CoN) Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda submitted a written complaint to the police against his trusted aide-de-camp (ADC) of many years Lieutenant Commander Sampath Munasinghe. The initial complaint accused him of suspected LTTE links and improper financial transactions, after four national identity cards, three mobile phones, two sim cards, a passport, 450 live ammunition and promissory notes were found in his room at naval headquarters in Colombo. Karannagoda had ordered the Naval Provost to search the room.

Earlier that year, Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe had fallen out with his boss’ Naval Adviser, Rear Admiral MUKV Bandara. A witness alleges that MUKV Bandara was the person who told Navy Commander Karannagoda that his ADC was having an affair with his wife allegedly because the ADC was blocking a private business deal Bandara was involved in. This disclosure allegedly precipitated Munasinghe’s disgrace, the search of his room and the Navy Commander’s complaint to the police.

The subsequent investigation of Munasinghe by the Criminal Investigation Department of the police (CID) as a result of Navy Commander Karannagoda’s complaint, brought to light Munasinghe’s involvement in a squad of Navy Intelligence officers implicated in the abduction in Colombo of at least eleven men between 2008-2009 and their subsequent disappearance in Trincomalee naval base. The investigation has been ongoing before the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s court since June 2009 and is generally referred to in the media as the Trincomalee 11 case.

2. ABDUCTIONS AND VICTIM PROFILES

The Magistrate’s court case focuses on 11 victims who disappeared after abduction by the Navy in Colombo in 2008 and 2009. The 11 victims were all male and included one child. Four more victims of Navy abduction were identified in the police investigation but they were not been included in the case. Investigations by the CID have found no evidence to link any of these victims to the LTTE or suspected terrorist activity.

All of the eleven victims were allegedly abducted in Colombo between 25 August 2008 and February 2009. According to court documents, HMPCK Hettiarachchi, RPS Ranasinghe and Sampath Munasinghe were directly involved in the abductions. Several naval witnesses told the CID that the abduction squad was commanded by DKP Dassanayake.

Profiles of the following key suspects can be found in Annexure 1:

- (a) RC Wijegunaratne’s profile.
- (b) WKJ Karannagoda’s profile
- (c) DKP Dassanayake’s profile
- (d) Sampath Munasinghe’s profile
- (e) HMPCK Hettiarachchi’s profile
- (f) RPS Ranasinghe’s profile.

According to the court documents, from August 2008 to March 2009 the victims were detained in “Pitti Bambuwa” which is part of naval headquarters in SLNS Parakrama, between Chaitya Road and Flagstaff Street in Colombo under the custody and control of Munasinghe, Hettiarachchi and Dassanayake. The second floor was where HMPCK Hettiarachchi operated, according to court documents, and this is corroborated by ITJP witnesses.
held in 2008 by the police in this building that was shared by the Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) at the time. The police investigation reveals that in March 2008, the victims were transferred to Trincomalee naval base by HMPCK Hettiarachchi and detained in the underground torture chambers of Gun Site under RPS Ranasinghe and DKP Dassanayake. According to court documents, “Pittu Bambuwa” and Gun Site were illegal detention sites that had not been gazetted at the time, and those held there were never produced before the police or in court. The bodies were never recovered but investigators believe that the victims may have been killed sometime in May 2009.

The media often refers to the case as the “Trincomalee 11 schoolboy case”, probably because the victims included a group of five students (Dehiwela Five Group) abducted on their way back from a party celebrating one of them going to the United Kingdom to study medicine and to highlight their “innocence”. Although six of the victims were Tamil, none of them had links with the LTTE. In addition, two of the victims were Sinhalese and three were Muslim.

A timeline of the abductions of the 11 victims is included on page 15. Two fathers and their sons are among the victims and their ages range from 17 to 50 at the time of abduction.

3. THE POLICE INVESTIGATION

The CID investigation into the abduction and disappearance of the 11 individuals in Trincomalee has been going on since June 2009. The case is registered with the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s court under number 732/09 and has been extensively reported on in the Sri Lankan press since 2015. After a slow start, the appointment of Inspector of Police (IP) Nishantha de Silva and officer in charge of the Organised Crime Investigation Unit of the CID as new chief investigator in January 2015 revitalised the case.

To date, based on the testimony of more than two hundred naval and other witnesses, 15 naval officials and one civilian have been named as suspects by the CID. In addition, the current Chief of Defence Staff, RC Wijeungarathne, was arrested on 28 Nov 2018 for obstructing the investigation by hiding a key suspect and intimidating witnesses in this case. As of October 2019, only one suspect, RPS Ranasinghe, is still in custody. All other suspects have been released on bail.

State witness, KC Welagedara, RPS Ranasinghe’s deputy at Gun Site in Trincomalee naval base, confirmed to the CID that he saw three of the victims at Gun Site on 25 March 2009. He later heard that several people had been killed at Gun Site and one night saw what looked like bodies wrapped in polythene being loaded in the car of Navy driver Gamin.

4. AN EMBLEMATIC CASE?

The Trincomalee 11 case has been presented to the international community as Sri Lanka’s one emblematic “white van” case. [Sri Lanka’s security forces use unmarked “white vans” to abduct people and the vehicle has become a shorthand for the violation.] The ITJP has studied hundreds of “white van” cases that occurred over the last decade, but this abduction case is the most atypical we have encountered. Typically, victims of abduction by members of the security forces are suspected of links to the LTTE, they do not call home and send text messages and the ransom is paid just before or at the time of release.

The 11 victims in this case were never suspected of LTTE links – the five young Tamil and Muslim men abducted from the Dehiwela area of Colombo appear to have been targeted for ransoms. According to court documents, the Lyon father and son were already informers working for the Navy, as was Ali Anver, but it is not clear why they were detained and disappeared. Thiyagaraja Jegan, another victim, was not wealthy and appears unconnected to the Navy; he seems to have been separately detained in Pettah, possibly in a security sweep after a bomb blast.

This group of 11 victims has inaccurately been dubbed the “innocent schoolboys” by the press but in fact includes at least three naval informers and two middle aged men. The press, human rights activists and the police have studiously ignored the “national security detainees” held at the same site, many of whom are still alive in Sri Lanka and abroad who could testify regarding the perpetrators, unlike the victims who have disappeared or died. This lack of acknowledgement of the surviving victims stems from an ongoing stigmatization of LTTE members and a perception that they should not enjoy the same human rights as civilians or members of the state security forces, even while hors de combat and in detention.
ABDUCTION TIMELINE

FATHER AND SON: STANLEY LEON
ROSHAN LEON (BORN 1987)
SOOSAI PILLAI LEON STANLEY LYON
(BORN 1958)

1 + 2: The Lyons are described in the court documents as “sources” known to naval intelligence providing information. They were abducted by five men in camouflage and two in plain clothes who took them in a white van saying they were going to Fort police station. They were taken from the house of Aloysius Balasingham in Kotahena, Colombo - he said he could identify the perpetrators but by the time a line-up was organised in 2017 he was dead. They were there to get UK visas accompanied by a UK citizen called Mike Hogan.

Both their National Identity Cards were found in the room of Sampath Munasinghe, aide-de-camp (AOC) to Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda.

NOTE * Two different months for the abduction are given in the court documents. 26 May 2010 B report says August; 13 March 2017 B report says May. Name sometimes spelt Lyon.

Naval officer KPLP Wickremesuriya has stated that Hettiarachchi and team abducted the Lyons, robbed their belongings and put them in a cell with iron bars.

KASTHURI ARAACHCHIGE JOHN REED
(SON OF 10)

3: Reed is from Kotahena in Colombo. Court documents say he was abducted by armed men wearing camouflage uniforms in Hendala while travelling in a van with his girlfriend. The van was taken to a Naval dockyard where they changed the body paint. A new navy license number was given and it is used for navy work in the Naval and Maritime Academy which is located within the Trincomalee naval base.

DEHIWELA FIVE: GROUP RETURNING FROM PARTY IN COLOMBO

4: Rajeev Naganathan is from Kotahena in Colombo. He was celebrating going to the UK to study medicine and was abducted with his friends in Dehiwala.

5: Pradeep Wishwanath

6: Thilakeshwaran Ramalingam

7: Mohamed Saajith - his friend Ahmed Younis Intiyias introduces them to Ali Anver (11) who asks about Rajeev Naganathan’s (4) financial status.

8: Mohamed Jamaldeen Dilan

Court documents allege that Aulthgedera Upul Bandara, Lt. Cmndr. Hettiarachchi, Udayakumarage Lakshman Udayakumara, Chandrakumar, Dharmadasa, Kumara Kottegoda, Chandrakumara, Kithsiri and PO Hettiarachchi were responsible for the abduction and detention.
VICTIMS WHO EMERGED DURING THE INVESTIGATION BUT NOT INCLUDED IN THE CASE:

11 JAN 2009
12: Vadivel Palanasami Loganathan (cousins)
13: Ratnasami Paramanathan (cousins)
The dismembered vehicle they travelled in was later found in Welisara navy camp in 2016.

2010
14: Gale Ralalage Shantha Samaraweera* (also written as Samarawickrama) of Kegalle. Arrested on 22 July 2010.
Naval officer BM Wjayakantha (alias Podi Malli) has said that Shantha Samaraweera (different spelling) (Missing since 23 July 2010) and Pradeep from Ibbagamuwa were held in Gun Site.
15: Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi

THIYAGARAJA JEGAN
9: Jegan is from Trincomalee and he was working in his uncle’s jewellery shop in Pettah in Colombo. He was abducted on his way to work. On this date there was a bomb blast in Pettah and there was a round up and after that the family could not get hold of Jegan. He has no link to the group of five abducted on the same day.

His National Identity Card, passport and mobile sim card were found in room of ADC to Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda.

KASTHURI ARAACHCHIGE ANTHONY (FATHER OF JOHN (3))
10: Abducted by men in camouflage and in plain clothes who his wife said identified themselves as CID.
His National Identity Card was found in the room of Sampath Munasinghe, ADC to Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda.

MOHAMMED ALI ANVER (ALIAS HAJJIAR)
11: According to his brother Ali Anver knew Sampath Munasinghe and was an informer. He is alleged to have lured Rajeev (4) to a house rented by Hewahendige Hemamali Dias as instructed by naval intelligence officer Hettiaraachchi and Sampath Munasinghe, the ADC to the Navy Commander. His phone was used to negotiate ransoms.

Court documents allege this abduction and detention was carried out by Lt. Cmndr. Hettiaraachchi, Cmndr. Ranasinghe, CPO Mendis, Able Seaman Gamin, Able Seaman Kottage, Able Seaman Kithsiri and Able Seaman Chandrakumara.
PROOF OF LIFE, EYEWITNESSES AND CONTACTS FOR RANSOM

WHILE DETAINED IN SLNS PARAKRAMA, COLOMBO

SEEKING INFORMATION
Rajeev Naganathan’s (4) father, Govindasamy Naganathan, meets Ali Anver (11) in Colombo to inquire about his son.

RANSOM DEMAND
The wife of Kasthuri Araachchige Anthony (10) receives a call from someone speaking in Tamil and she hears her husband and son John Reed (3) in the background.

RANSOM DEMAND
Ali Anver (11) visits the Naganathan’s (4) residence and requests Sri Lankan Rupees 10m as ransom. He is offered Rupees 7.5m to release Rajeev. Ali says he will check with Lt. Cmdr. Hettiarachchi and Sampath Mussinghe. A Navy officer (Beramulle Kumudu), who was introduced by Rajeev’s father’s friend Anura, claims the boys are in Welisara naval base. Someone else who introduces himself as Chaminda has called and said in Tamil that the boys are with them and they need money for their release.

PROOF OF LIFE
Rajeev Naganathan calls his father and says Ali Anver (11) was brought to Navy HQ located on Chaitya Road, Colombo and Lt. Cmdr. Hettiarachchi hung him up and beat him.

RANSOM DEMAND
The wife of Kasthuri Araachchige Anthony (10) receives a call requesting money from a caller identifying himself as Annachchi*. Later she takes Rupees 500,000 to Kurunegala. She is tricked into handing over the money. At the end of November she is also asked for a ransom of Rupees 1 million for her son (3). She manages to get 0.5 million and hands it over to Annachchi at the end of November 2008. In December 2008 Annachchi is arrested.

RANSOM DEMAND
While held in Colombo in a naval site, Annachchi* called Rajeev Naganathan’s (4) father and requested a ransom. The father prepared the money, but no one came.

*Later the Naganathans came to know that Annachchi was in fact Chaminda, a Naval guard.
EYEWITNESS

Chief Petty Officer Attanayake Mudiyanselage Ashoka Mahesh ED 26213 saw the Leon father and son alive on the second floor of Colombo naval building and blindfolded in Colombo.

"later the Naganathans came to know that Annachchi was in fact Chaminda, a Naval guard.

EYEWITNESS

Wijekoon Mudiyanselage Chandrakumar saw the five boys and the Leons in custody in Navy HQ in Colombo.

EYEWITNESS

Susantha Petty officer XC 30543 saw the five boys being handcuffed to bed stands, he also saw Ali Anver beaten by Udayakumar and saw the Leons.

EYEWITNESS

Liyanage Upul Chaminda Petty Officer XP 20746 saw detainees in Colombo and was informed that they were held under Sampath Munasinghe and Lt. Cdr. Hettiarachchi’s orders. He was also aware of detainees in Gun Site.

EYEWITNESS

Ranhavadi Durayalage Priyankara, Naval rating VA 59652 worked in intelligence under Captain Mohotti in 2008 February. He identified those held there from photos shown.

EYEWITNESS

Chief Petty Officer Attanayaka Mudiyanselage Ashoka Mahesh Kumara, ED 26213: He was aware the Leons were abducted and detained. Later saw them blindfolded in detention and being beaten. Aware of the Dehiwala 5 detentions.
MOVED TO GUN SITE IN TRINCOMALEE

CORROBORATION
The father of Rajeev Naganathan (4) receives an SMS saying Lt. Cmdr. Hettiarachchi has transferred those detained in Navy HQ on Chaitya Road, Colombo to the Trincomalee naval base.

EYEWITNESS
K. C. Welegedara says he saw three people coming out of the detention cells at Gun Site in Trincomalee to bathe and learned they were Ali Anver (11), Rajeev Naganathan (4) and John Reed (3). Ali Anver (11) was wounded.

EYEWITNESS
Wimal Ratnasiri Seneviratne, Petty Officer, who served in intelligence in Trincomalee naval base 27.03.2008-25.04.2009, confirmed he has seen Ali Anver with assault wounds on head and body. Not specified where he saw him.

RANSOM DEMAND
Heshan (alias Bandu Kumara) calls Naganathans (4) to say Lt. Cmndr. Hettiarachchi has the boys and he can arrange a call. On another call he asks for half a million rupees (unclear if in total or for each). Rajeev Naganathan (4) calls his father to say Lt. Cmndr. Ranasinghe is in charge of their detention.

PROOF OF LIFE
Rajeev Naganathan (4) makes his last call to his father.

PROOF OF LIFE
Rajeev Naganathan (4) calls his father.

RANSOM DEMAND COMPLAINT
Heshan calls father of Rajeev Naganathan (4) to complain people know he facilitated calls and that he is in trouble as a result.

Wimal Ratnasiri Seneviratne, Petty Officer, who served in intelligence in Trincomalee naval base 27.03.2008-25.04.2009, confirmed he has seen Ali Anver with assault wounds on head and body. Not specified where he saw him.
YEYWITNESS
Naval rating Wimalaweera Wickramasuriya, XP 20844 saw 11, 4 and 3.

RANSOM DEMAND
Francis Xavier Lyon has said that he made inquiries about the two Lyons and DKP Dassanayake agreed the release for Rupees 900,000. However, the deal could not be worked out in the end as DKP Dassanayake went abroad for training.

INFORMATION SEEKING
Minister Felix Perera writes to the Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda following confirmation the boys were being held in Trincomalee. No response or action was taken as a result.

YEYWITNESS
EYEWITNESS
Sailor BM Wijayakantha alias Podi Malli VAS 68653 saw many detainees at Gun Site. Also Able Seaman XS 45655 Havankumbura Gedara Saman Kumara Abayakoon.

YEYWITNESS
Sailor Ranhavadi Durayalage Priyankara, VA 59652, worked under RPS Ranasinghe from 2008.
5. UNITED NATIONS

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been monitoring and reporting on the Trincomalee 11 case since 2015 as part of its assessment of progress made by Sri Lanka under the implementation of the 2015 Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1 on promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka. The Trincomalee 11 abduction case is one of those considered by OHCHR as emblematic of human rights violations in Sri Lanka. In its February 2019 report, OHCHR noted a few positive developments with the arrest of six suspects in 2017 – subsequently released on bail on 9 Jan 2018 – while still deploring political interference in the investigative process.

The case is indeed emblematic of Sri Lanka’s unwillingness to deal with continued impunity for grave human rights violations involving state officials.

“The status of emblematic cases described below, including worrying instances of political interference in the judicial or investigative process, demonstrate the very limited progress made towards achieving accountability in Sri Lanka.”

UNITED NATIONS

6. SEPARATE BUT LINKED CASES

TAMIL MP NANDARAJA RAVIRAJ MURDER CASE:

RPS Ranasinghe and Sampath Munasinghe, who are key suspects in the Trincomalee 11 case, were also accused in the court case regarding the assassination of TNA MP Raviraj on 10 Nov 2006. In 2016, an all Sinhalese jury acquitted those on trial, a decision that is being appealed in the hope of obtaining a retrial.

VADIVEL PALANASAMI LOGANATHAN AND RATNASAMI PARAMANANTHAN ABDUCTION CASE (CASE NUMBER B 2019/2009):

On 7 March 2019, IP Nishantha de Silva reported to court that former Con Admiral Karannagoda was a suspect in another abduction case of two cousins, Vadivel Palanamasi Loganathan and Ratnasami Paramanathan. The two men were abducted on 11 Jan 2009, during the same period as the 11 men in the Trincomalee 11 case. Interestingly, Vadivel is also from Kotahena. The vehicle they travelled in was found dismantled in 2016 in Welisara Navy camp.

SHANThA SAMARAwEERA CASE:

The police investigation in the Trincomalee 11 case revealed that Shantha Samaraweera (also written as Samarawickrama) of Kegalle, was also kept in Gun Site, under the custody of RPS Ranasinghe and his Special Intelligence Unit officers. Shantha was a suspect in a crime case who fled from police custody in hospital in July 2010 and has been missing since. The case is being investigated separately in North Western province.

PRAGEETH NISANSALa VITHANARACHCHI CASE:

Similarly, the Trincomalee 11 investigation revealed that victim Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi, missing since 31 Oct 2010, was also held at Gun Site under the custody of RPS Ranasinghe and his Special Intelligence Unit officers. Again, the case is being investigated separately in North Western province.

6. SAPEATE BUT LINKED CASES

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CASE AGAINST CDS ADMIRAL WIEJEGUNARATNE FOR AIDING AND ABETTING SUSPECT HETTIARACHCHI TO FLEE THE COUNTRY AND EVADE JUSTICE:

CDS Wijeegunaratne has not been implicated in the abduction of the 11 victims in the investigation but he is suspected of aiding and abetting key suspect, HMPCK Hettiarachchi, to flee the country and evade justice. Laksiri Samarasinghe is alleged to have helped HMPCK Hettiarachchi travel to Malaysia while he was wanted for questioning by the CID. The travel ban requested against Laksiri Samarasinghe appears to have been lifted.

AVANT GARDE CASE:

Avant Garde Maritime Services (AGMS) was an extremely profitable private company set up post-war by ex-military officials and awarded a monopoly on maritime security services, full government endorsement and access to Navy weapons, staff and premises by the Ministry of Defence. In particular it operated floating armouries for private security guards combating piracy. The former Secretary of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa is alleged to have given approval for the monopoly given to AGMS which employed former naval commanders - one of whom (JSK Colombo) was the commander in Trincomalee when the illegal detention site (Gun Site) operated there, a second (SAMJ Perera) was the Director General of Operations in ultimate command of Naval Intelligence and the third (DWAS Dissanayake) was the Chief of Staff at the time. Avant Garde has been under investigation since the Government changed in 2015 and initially the former Secretary of Defence and these three Admirals were named as suspects but then dropped from a revised indictment filed in Sep 2019. (For more see Annexure 3).
C. THE TRINCOMALEE TORTURE SITE
1. THE TRINCOMALEE NAVAL COMPLEX

Trincomalee is the largest naval base of the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and a major shipyard. It falls under the Eastern Naval Command and is home to the prestigious Naval and Maritime Academy of the SLN. Due to its position in the heart of the Indian Ocean, the base is of strategic importance.

At the peak of the civil war, the Trincomalee naval base was a large, well-resourced facility and a prime target for an attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had their own sophisticated naval wing. Security protocol was therefore strict in 2008-2009, when the eleven victims of the Magistrate’s court case were first taken there.

There were different zones within the Trincomalee naval base, each with its own security duty officers and command. The security of the main gate and hills fell under SLNS Tissa, which is the administrative hub of the base. In 2008-2009 in SLNS Tissa alone, there were 108 security and surveillance checkpoints across the main base and peninsula, with hi-tech Israeli cameras providing panoramic surveillance capacity, manned by about 300 sailors, calling in every 30 minutes to a team of about 15 sailors in the security office.

Trincomalee was not only the largest naval complex – covering over 800-900 acres of land and home to 6,000-8,000 Navy personnel and their families – but it was also the most secure naval base of the island. Vehicle movements in and out of the base were systematically recorded.

“It is fully secure and there is only one entrance/exit from the land manned by about 30 sentries and naval police officers at any given time. There are 7 cameras at the entrance/exit monitored by the Senior Staff Security Officer (SSSO). Everybody living on the complex is registered and there is a log of vehicles and people getting in and out.”

Security at SLNS Tissa was further maintained by sectors corresponding to physical locations. Each sector, including Gun Site – where the secret detention and torture sites were located – had a senior sailor in charge and kept detailed physical records, including of the deployment of sailors, weapons and special equipment, security incidents, movement of vehicles and distribution of food rations, which were preserved for several months before being destroyed.

Three different security logs recorded vehicle access to the base, one held with the Provost Marshal, one with Dockyard administration and another with the security officer. Five or six categories of details of both the vehicle and the people entering and exiting were captured in the logs. It is our understanding these logs were not preserved.

2. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AT TRINCOMALEE

According to ITJP witnesses, Naval Intelligence benefited from a special exemption in which their vehicles were allegedly not checked or logged entering the Trincomalee base:

“Only Naval Intelligence was the exception and had ‘free access’ with no details taken down.”

White vans were witnessed going in and out but the security staff were not allowed to log them. Detainees were aware of Tamil men being taken out in vehicles as informants to identify people and places and then returning to the base. This would have required repeatedly crossing the perimeter security in one of the most high-security bases in the country.

The special status of naval intelligence vehicles within the base is corroborated by court documents. Former CoN Admiral Travis Sinniah, who then headed the Naval and Maritime Academy, told the CID that then CoN Karannagoda had advised him not to monitor Gun Site, which was controlled by RPS Ranasinghe under DKP Dassanayake:

“Vehicles came and went without being checked under DKP’s supervision.”

3. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT OF NAVY

According to official reports included in the court documents and other sources, the Special Intelligence Unit was established by Commander of the Navy, Wasantha Karannagoda, in mid 2008. Karannagoda had raised the alarm that during the Norwegian mediated ceasefire the LTTE had increased its presence around the Trincomalee Dockyard and Harbour.

Naval sources say the Special Intelligence Unit divided the island into three divisions for operational purposes - Trincomalee [under RPS Ranasinghe (see profile Annexure 1)], Talaimannar [under SDSS Dayananda who was found with one of the Kotahena victim’s phones] and Colombo [under HMPCCK Hettiarachchi (see profile, Annexure 1)]. Court documents say SDSS Dayananda was second in command to RPS Ranasinghe.
The official documents submitted to court clearly state that during what they call the ‘Fourth Eelam War’ (2006-9) the Special Intelligence Unit was under the command of the Eastern Naval Command and the Navy Commander. Members of the unit were officers very close to Karannagoda and members of his security detail. The officer in charge was DKP Dassanayake (See profile, Anexure 1) who performed this role in addition to being Navy Spokesman.

Though quite small before 2008, there was an important push to build Navy Intelligence capacity driven by then CoN Admiral Karannagoda around 2008, due to an intensification of anti-terrorism activities. According to court documents, Naval Intelligence units operated by DKP Dassanayake and Sampath Munasinghe and headed by HMPCK Hettiarachchi in Colombo and RPS Ranasinghe in Trincomalee were involved in the abduction and disappearance of the 11 victims in Gun Site.

"WHEN FONSEKA SAYS THAT GOTABAYA HAD A UNIT OPERATING UNDER HIM, THIS IS THE UNIT THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT; SUMITH RANASINGHE, SAMPATH MUNASINGHE AND LT COM. HETTIARACHCHI".

**NAVAL WITNESS**

Based on naval witnesses and victim testimony, Naval Intelligence used informers to identify captured LTTE members and tortured them to gather intelligence and turn them into informers themselves. Naval Intelligence also allegedly worked closely with the Karuna group from the East and relied on a network of informers, whose the payment they had to self-finance. According to naval insiders, Naval Intelligence financed its vast network of informants through criminal activity, including the proceeds of abductions for ransoms like those of the 11 victims in the court case. These informers were important assets for the Navy and other security forces in their efforts to deconstruct the LTTE’s command and resource infrastructure. It is clear from court documents that Naval Intelligence units in Colombo and Trincomalee worked closely together.

### 4. ILLEGAL DETENTION AT GUN SITE

The existence of secret detention and torture sites run by Sri Lankan security forces, including the Navy, has long been alleged by human rights groups. The site run by Naval Intelligence and hidden in the jungle-covered hills of the Trincomalee Naval base was initially a gazetted detention site. The ITJP was the first organisation to reveal the existence of Gun Site as a secret detention and torture site in July 2015, giving the GPS coordinates for one of the Gun Site locations (GPS: 8°33′26″13 N, 81°14′32″87 E). The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) visited the site on 16 November 2015, a few months after the site was sealed by the CID, and noted that systematic torture had taken place in the underground cells in Trincomalee and that the secret detention site, which was in existence for some years, could not have operated “unnoticed” by other officials.

Though generally referred to as Gun Site, or Gunside, the site has also been referred to as ‘Gota’s camp’ in court documents. As the ITJP said in 2015, Gun Site was run by RPS Ranasinghe and in his absence by his deputy, KC Welagedara.
NAVY INTELLIGENCE
COMMAND CHART (2009)

M.A.D. SAMPATH
MUNASINGHE
ADC TO NAVY
COMMANDER

W.J.K. KARANAGODA
NAVY COMMANDER

REAR ADML T.S.G.
SAMARASINGHE
DG NAVAL OPERATIONS
(JAN-MAY)

S.M.B. WEERASEKERA
COMMANDER EASTERN
AREA

D.K.P. DASSANAYAKE
DEPUTY/DIRECTOR NAVAL
OPERATIONS

A. K. GURUGE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

H.M.P.C.K. HETTIARACHCHI
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

R.P.S. RANASINGHE
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

KRISHANTHA C. WELEGEDARA
DEPUTY TO RPS RANASINGHE

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT
MAP OF GUN SITE, TRINCOMALEE

MAP LEGEND

19 Auditorium and library – built 2008
22 Officer Training Wing
23 Sandy Bay Beach
24 Thurusewana / Beer Garden
71 Coral Cove
72 Firing range
76 Meteorological Station
77 Gun Site 1
78 Gun Site 2
79 Gun site 3
SURVIVOR SKETCHES OF GUN SITE 2
[1] SITE LAYOUT

Gun Site consists of three former colonial artillery points situated in the jungle-covered hills of Trincomalee naval base and falling under the security of SLNS Tissa. The artillery points have been mounted on fortifications and are each connected to an adjacent munitions bunker. These are marked on the Trincomalee naval base map legend as N° 77 (Gun Site 1), 78 (Gun Site 2) and 79 (Gun Site 3). There were also adjacent temporary buildings between Gun Site 1 and Gun Site 2, including a mess that housed up to 30 sailors.

A former naval officer familiar with Gun Site confirmed to the ITJP that the munitions bunkers were used by Naval Intelligence to detain and interrogate prisoners.68

“I can confirm I only saw men being detained in the bunker at Gunside I”.

At Gun Site 2, there were four cells under the guards’ room which were partially underground as well as an underground space. “There were some steps hidden by some camouflage net leading to an underground space. I could see this whenever I was going to the toilet on the other side of the road...I saw from my cell prisoners that I did not know going in and out of the toilet and I assume that they were kept in this underground space.”69

Gun Site 3 was a small camp surrounded by barbed wire next to the main road. It was comprised of two cells above ground and about six underground cells.70 This appears to be corroborated by court testimony referencing two cells in one of the locations.71

The WGEID only visited two underground complexes containing 11 cells. It referred to as many as 12 underground chambers, indicating an extensive illegal detention facility.

This description of multiple sites is corroborated by the statement given to the CID by Rear Admiral Travis Sinniah, then Commander of the Naval and Maritime Academy: “Coastal artillery guns have been placed in Gunside during British rule. Cells in Gunside artillery compound marked as 1, 2 and 3 was under former Navy commander Karannagoda. They are situation between Roney point and Parkbird Road. It was controlled by Lt Cmdr Ranasinghe under DKP.”72

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Gun Site, Trincomalee
(II) TIME PERIOD DURING WHICH THE SITE WAS IN OPERATION

The secret detention and torture site operated for a number of years. According to a former Navy officer, the site was used by Navy intelligence as a detention and torture site from around 2005/2006 and increasingly from 2007. From around 2008, entrance was restricted; the ITJP interviewed various witnesses who confirmed that the site was operational from 2008 to 2012 and possibly even before 2008.

The WGEID reported seeing a date of “25 July 2010” graffitied on a cell wall, which they believed of “25 July 2010” graffitied on a cell wall, which they believed indicated the site was still in use on that date. One detainee said, “One of my duties was to clean up a cell that was at the next level to mine when it was empty. When doing so, I saw blood and people names who had been scratched into the walls with a sharp instrument.”

(III) PROFILE OF DETAINEES

“DURING 2008-2009, THERE WAS A NEED TO DO CERTAIN THINGS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY”

(REAR ADMIRAL SMB WEEERASEKARA 2008-9 COMMANDER EASTERN NAVAL AREA)

(A) NATIONAL SECURITY DETAINEES

According to survivor testimony, scores of captured LTTE suspects were detained in the secret site from at least late April 2009 until mid-2012. These included LTTE cadres captured at sea while trying to leave the war zone on fishing boats. Initially they were transported to Point Pedro, processed and then transferred by boat and detained in the underground torture site at the Trincomalee Naval Base. Quite separately, Tamil civilians captured at sea were detained in the living quarters of the naval base for more than two years, including the wife and children of the LTTE Sea Tiger leader, Col. Soosai.

Extraordinarily the Sri Lankan court documents actually refer in passing to the national security detainees”, corroborating their existence. RPS Ranasinghe who was in charge of Gun Site said in his statement that:

“Furthermore, LTTE members who surrendered to the Navy were held in underground cells in the Maritime Academy premises known as Gun Site under his control with permission from the defence ministry. They were rehabilitated and released to the society in two stages. They were never shown to the Trincomalee Magistrate, police or a Human Rights organisation.”

The fact that “national security suspects” were also routinely abducted, tortured and disappeared seems to have been common knowledge within Navy circles. Several insiders interviewed by the ITJP matter-of-factly admitted to it, seemingly oblivious to any possible associated wrongdoing. This speaks to the perceived lack of fundamental rights of LTTE suspects.

ITJP witness accounts are further corroborated by other NGO reports from inside and outside Sri Lanka. In March 2012, Amnesty International cited the testimony of a former LTTE member detained and tortured by Naval Intelligence and used as an informer by them. He told Amnesty there was “a secret detention facility within the Navy dockyards – a secured area that includes the ruins of British and Dutch fortification.”

In addition, a Sri Lankan group, The Social Architects (TSA), interviewed a man held as part of a group of fifteen prisoners interviewed by the ITJP matter-of-factly admitted to it, seemingly oblivious to any possible associated wrongdoing. This speaks to the perceived lack of fundamental rights of LTTE suspects.

(B) TRINCOMALEE 11 ABDUCTEES AND OTHER DETAINEES

While many individuals detained at Gun Site were national security detainees (LTTE members and individuals suspected of being associated with the LTTE), detainees also included civilians. A witness who was detained incommunicado at Gun Site for more than 3 years between 2009 and 2012 confirmed that there were civilians detained both at Gun Site 3 and Gun Site 2. At Gun Site 2, the man in the cell adjacent to his was a Sinhalese man who was involved in an underground network smuggling drugs and had been abducted by the Navy.

The fact that civilians were also detained there is corroborated by the CID investigation. Based on court documents, it appears that at least three of the “11 schoolboys” abducted were detained in 2009 in Gun Site. They were kept in only their underwear and eyewitnesses say they bore the marks of beatings.

Though a few women have been detained at Gun Site, it seems that most detainees were male.

“I BELIEVE IT WAS A MIX OF LTTE PEOPLE AND CIVILIANS BASED ON THEIR AGE, LOOK AND FROM WHAT I COULD HEAR THEM SAYING.”

[GUN SITE SURVIVOR]
5. TORTURE

A former Navy officer familiar with Gun Site told the ITJP: “I knew torture was taking place here, and saw with my own eyes on a number of occasions people who had been tortured and were injured there”. 

One witness described being repeatedly interrogated and tortured during his detention at Gun Site 2 and Gun Site 3, which lasted over 3 years. At the beginning, he endured torture sessions up to four times a week. The interrogators demanded information about hidden LTTE weapons and explosives as well as names of other LTTE cadres and individuals linked to the LTTE in the Trincomalee area. Witnesses described the men who tortured them as also abusing them outside of official enquiries, on Sundays or other times when they were off work and drunk.

Methods of physical torture included kicking, beatings and hitting with a wooden plank, the leg of a chair, hard plastic pipes filled with sand or cement, cigarette burns, as well as finger nails, toe nails and teeth being forcibly removed with a plier.

"THE PAIN WAS HORRENDOUS AND I OFTEN FEARED THAT THEY WOULD KILL ME BECAUSE I COULD NOT GIVE THEM ANY OF THE INFORMATION THEY WERE AFTER. I WAS TERRIFIED WHEN THEY WOULD GET ME OUT FOR INTERROGATION".

[GUN SITE SURVIVOR]

The ITJP has also documented allegations of sexual violence taking place at Gun Site, though witnesses felt too embarrassed to provide full details and what they did disclose cannot be published for witness protection reasons.

The accounts of ITJP witnesses are corroborated by court documents from the Colombo magistrate’s case also, which refer to torture taking place at Gun Site – for example that Ali Anver had a wound on his head or other detainees who were witnessed with scars on their bodies. After its visit of the site, the WGEID also concluded that systematic torture had taken place in Gun Site.

6. DETENTION CONDITIONS

Witnesses described having been detained for years in Trincomalee secret detention sites without their families being told where they were being held, despite repeated requests to the authorities. The cells were either fully or partly underground with iron rod doors. Detainees slept on a bare cement floor. There was no natural light, toilet or access to water in the cells. Detainees were only allowed to fill one plastic bottle per day with water. They were not allowed to walk or stay outside, except for trips to the toilet twice in 24 hours.

A victim who was detained in Gun Site told the ITJP that he was only allowed to stay outside once for 30 minutes during his three years of detention.

“We were kept during our entire detention in this camp inside without natural light (the plastic sheet generally covered the door) or fresh air. We had no contact with the outside world.”
Many of them were kept in their underwear. They were constantly hungry as food rations were insufficient. They did not eat any fruit, vegetables or other fresh items; food provided was often off. Detainees did not have access to medical care or a doctor and were only occasionally given paracetamol tablets by the guards, after particularly intense torture sessions.

The chief investigating police officer in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, Nishantha de Silva, told the court while presenting photographs of the underground cells, that detaining anyone under those conditions in itself amounted to torture.

7. DISAPPEARANCES: WGEID VISIT TO SITE

“It’s likely that many more people were in that detention centre.”

(UN - WGEID93)

While only the disappearance of 11 individuals in Gun Site is being investigated, following its November 2015 visit, the WGEID noted that it was clear that many more people were detained and tortured at the secret detention site.

The police investigation also cited graffiti of four Sinhala names found on the walls of Gun Site: Sanath -Jaela (place name), Nandimithra - Kelaniya (place name), Berty-Pugoda (place name), Jayasekara 875894. It is believed these may be additional victims.

A witness who was detained at Gun Site for several years told the ITJP that the number of detainees kept reducing during his detention. From about 50 detainees in the underground cells of Gun Site 3 at the beginning of his detention, only 2-3 were left by the end of his detention.

"Sometimes a vehicle came to pick up detainees from our camp. It was generally at night but twice the vehicle came during the day and I saw that it was a dark blue van. When the van was coming, I could hear screams coming from the underground cells. It sounded as if the people were resisting to be taken away to the van. I noticed that after each visit of the van the number of detainees seemed to have decreased. My impression is that the detainees who were taken away were not returned. I do not know if those people were taken to another detention centre or what else happened to them95."
### SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT AT GUN SITE UNDER RPS RANASINGHE IN 2008 (DETAILS FROM COURT DOCUMENTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008 COMMENDED</th>
<th>2009 PROMOTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muthuwahenndige Aruna Thushara MENDIS, Master Chief Petty Officer, Staff Number XS 13961. Arrested in January 2018 and released on bail in July 2018.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was in charge of a boat allegedly used for disposing of bodies and witnesses saw him with body bags from 2008-2009. He served under Ranasinghe in the Parakrama Naval base and is alleged to have driven the vehicle that abducted the Dehiwela 5 group of victims. He is also alleged to have been involved in the abduction of naval informer Ali Anver in February 2009.</td>
<td></td>
<td>A naval official called Mendis interrogated an ITJP witness detained at Gun Site. The witness described Mendis as short and fat with dark skin, 45-50 years old and poorly groomed. He is referenced by another ITJP witness detained at Trincomalee who heard of him only as Mendis Sir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasthuriarachchihe A. GAMINI (alias Amapara Gamini), APM, Staff Number XP 243347. Arrested in January 2018 but released on bail in July 2018.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court witnesses report seeing him with body bags and say he was the driver. RPS Ranasinghe confirmed Gamini worked for him. Another witness, Wickramasuriya, names Gamini as allegedly involved in the abductions. Gamini is listed in the court documents as one of those who allegedly abducted Ali Anver in February 2009.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Two ITJP witnesses detained at Gun Site from 2009 onwards named a driver called Gamini. Another ITJP witness who was abducted in 2007 says he was abducted was by naval officials called Gamini &amp; Loku Kumara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.U.S. SENARATNE, LMP, Staff Number XP21151 (spelt Senarathne sometimes).</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two other suspects in the court case are called Senaratne (Dilantha Senaratne and Sanjeeva Prasad Ilango Senanayake (Senaratne) - the latter was arrested in December 2018 charged with abduction, unlawful detention and aiding murder and conspiracy but granted bail in June 2019.</td>
<td></td>
<td>An ITJP witness says a naval official called Senaratne tortured him at Gun Site. He describes him as short, dark, thin about 35 years old and with very short hair, and speaking broken Tamil and wearing civilian clothes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT AT GUN SITE UNDER RPS RANASINGHE IN 2008 (DETAILS FROM COURT DOCUMENTS).

1. Petty Officer, MWKC Kumara, Staff Number XP 20180 (involved in RPS Ranasinghe team in 2008 and recommended for promotion in 2009).
2. Leading Seaman, PVS(J) Kumara, Staff Number XS 30520 (part of RPS Ranasinghe’s team).
3. Chief Petty Officer, WGP/WGGGS Kumara, Staff Number XX 16920.

No more details in court documents.

Kumar alias Loku (big)
Kumar, Petty Officer.

1. Yes
2. Yes
3. Yes

An ITJP witness detained at Gun Site recalls him as a guard. He describes him as wearing spectacles, fat with a big belly, curly hair and in his forties.

One ITJP insider witness says there was a Kumar at Gun Site who had been a catering officer. A Gun Site detainee says Kumara speaks fluent Tamil and was called “lokku” which means tall/big in Sinhala. “He was tall and good-looking with fair skin. He wore a “French cut beard” (moustache and small beard). He must have been about 40 years old at the time”. The witness says he was a senior interrogator and was said to have studied in the USA. An ITJP witness detained at Gun Site references a CPO Kumara torturing him.

Bandara

RMS Bandara, Leading Patrol Man, Staff Number XP 21026

1. No
2. Yes
3. Yes

An ITJP witness detained at Gun Site references a Bandara [Guard].
D. SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMES

“The Trincomalee 11 investigation conducted by Nishantha de Silva revealed that naval officers at the highest level knew about the abduction of the 11 individuals and the fact that torture and disappearances were taking place in Gun Site.

RSP Ranasinghe, who was directly in charge of Gun Site, allegedly had a direct line of communication to then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who visited the site on a number of occasions. Eastern Naval Commander SMB Weerasekara and Deputy Eastern Area Commander, Sisira Jayakody also had access to the restricted site. Furthermore, it was widely known beyond those with access to the site, that Naval Intelligence was detaining and torturing people in Gun Site.

At least three senior naval witnesses (then Provost Marshal Captain Senaka Hanwella, Eastern Navy Commander Rear Admiral SMB Weerasekara and Intelligence Director Captain Ananda Guruge) told the CID that then Navy Commander Karannagoda had knowledge of the overall abduction operation. Former CoN Travis Sinniah, who gave evidence to the CID in 2017, also claimed that when he headed the Trincomalee Naval and Maritime Academy, based in Trincomalee naval base close to Gun Site, he told Karannagoda that people were held in Gun Site but that Karannagoda had directly forbidden him from interfering with these detentions or from searching vehicles entering or leaving the Gun Site premises. It is worth noting that the vehicle of the one of the 11 disappeared victims was later found by the police in the Trincomalee Naval and Maritime Academy. Admiral Karannagoda himself admitted to the CID that he knew of the allegations against men under his command as early as May 10, 2009.

The official investigation, corroborated by ITJP’s own investigation, reveals that other senior naval officers also knew about what was happening at Gun Site and, because of their presence in Trincomalee or position in the command structure, many others must have known about the Special Intelligence Unit’s crimes.

Naval officers who were brave enough to raise concerns about the activities of Naval Intelligence in Gun Site to their hierarchy ended up either threatened or at best demoted and paid the price with their career. By contrast, those who were directly involved in the running of Gun Site or dutifully condoned the crimes committed there by Naval Intelligence were promoted and decorated.”

(NAVAL OFFICER)
*Gave a statement to police. See Annexure 2 for Alphabetical Index of Naval Officers’ Biographies.

SUSPECT IN THE TRINCOMALEE 11 FORT MAGISTRATE’S CASE OR CONNECTED CASE: (SEE ANNEXURE 1 FOR PROFILES)

RC Wijegunaratne*
DKP Dassanayake*
RPS Ranasinghe*

CONNECTED TO AVANT GARDE MARITIME SERVICES COMPANY: (SEE ANNEXURE 3)

JSK Colombage
SAMJ Perera
DWAS Dissanayake

KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT GUN SITE (2009-12) AND/OR CRIMES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT:

WKJ Karannagoda*
Court documents and he himself admitted to the CID he knew.

Travis Sinniah*
Court documents corroborated by ITJP testimony show he knew.

SMB Weerasekera*
Court documents show he knew, corroborated by ITJP testimony saying he went up the limited access road leading to Gun Site.

Sisira Jayakody
ITJP testimony says he went up the limited access road leading to Gun Site.

SS Ranasinghe
Present in Trincomalee at the time.

DC Gunawardena
Present in Trincomalee at the time.

NBJ Rosayro
Director Naval Operations 2009-2012 - in charge of Naval Intelligence.

DNS Ulugetenna
Director Naval Operations 2011.

NPS Attygalle
Director Naval Operations 2012.

AK Guruge*
Director Naval Intelligence 2008-10. Court documents show he knew.

SWC Mohotti
Director Naval Intelligence 2010, named in court testimony.

SAMJ Perera

JSK Colombage
COMEAST 2009-12, appoints suspect RPS Ranasinghe as his Personal Security Officer when he becomes Navy Commander in 2013-2014.

DWAS Dissanayake
Chief of Staff 2009-11.

TSO Samarasinghe
Deputy chief of staff to Karannagoda in 2009.

MRU Siriwardena
Chief of staff to Karannagoda in 2009.

ABK Jinadasa
WHEN REALITY IS STRANGER THAN FICTION

Despite some progress in recent years, this case has been fraught with difficulties from the start and continues to surprise in a series of unbelievable twists worthy of the best crime novel. It would be too long to list all the issues identified but a few key points and incidents to note are mentioned below:

INVESTIGATION SHORTCOMINGS

National security detainees overlooked as victims and witnesses:

The remit of the police investigation has been a narrow focus on the eleven “innocent” victims disappeared in Trincomalee naval base’s underground torture chambers, turning a blind eye to the dozens of other victims, in particular national security suspects, illegally detained and tortured or disappeared by the Navy in the same site and other naval detention facilities. In addition, despite interviewing more than 200 witnesses, the CID did not attempt to track down and interview any of the surviving victims of Trincomalee’s torture chambers. Their crucial evidence corroborates and at times goes beyond the CID findings as testimony provided to the ITJP reveals.

Failure to identify and implicate commanders ultimately in charge:

The police investigation has unfortunately limited its focus to lower and mid-level perpetrators, failing to clarify the de facto command structure or go after the senior commanders responsible for the Special Intelligence Unit’s crimes. The role and responsibility of then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, CoN Karannagoda and other senior commanders have yet to be fully explored. The police investigation revealed that Director of Naval Intelligence A.K. Guruge (see note 102) instructed two naval witnesses to give false testimony to the CID to implicate Sampath Munasinghe and was in a position to tamper with the evidence but this was not investigated further.

Four additional Gun Site and Welisara victims investigated separately:

The police investigation revealed that two additional victims were also held at Gun Site under the custody of RPS Ranasinghe and his Special Intelligence Unit officers. The cases are allegedly investigated separately by two other courts in North Western province. The police investigation also revealed that two other victims were abducted by the Navy on 11 Jan 2009 and held in Welisara. Investigating the cases of these four additional victims separately is deliberate and prevents useful connections being made, as well as preventing the broader pattern of naval involvement in abduction, torture and disappearance and officers’ knowledge fully coming to light.

Detention sites searched only six years after start of investigation and possible evidence tampering:

The CID only requested a search warrant to investigate “Pittu Bambuwa” in SLNS Parakrama and Gun Site in 2015, six years after the start of the investigation in 2009. After its visit of the site in Nov 2015, the WGEID said that going by the dates inscribed on the wall, if a proper investigation had been launched in 2009, which was when rumours of the site’s existence started to circulate, lives could have been saved.

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Investigating officer himself an alleged torturer:

In addition, it was revealed earlier this year that the chief investigating officer in the case since 2015, IP Nishantha de Silva, has himself been allegedly implicated in torture, affecting his credibility to lead the investigation.

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, LACK OF INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY

Former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s order to exclude national security suspects:

The narrow focus and exclusion from the investigation of crimes against national security suspects stems from orders issued at the highest level. According to court documents, then CID director SSP Vijaya Adhikari had directed his team to investigate all illegal activities “apart from investigations relating to national security” under instructions from then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa112.

Conflict of interest and involvement of Deputy Solicitor General on behalf of suspects:

In 2018, former Deputy Solicitor General on behalf of suspects: was also the Navy’s chief legal representative at the time the abductions occurred

Protection and promotion of key suspects:

In 2017, key suspect HMPCK Hettiarachchi absconded for more than a year in Naval HQ under the protection of then Navy Commander Admiral Ravindra Wickramaratne, who allegedly gave him 500,000 Rupees (about US$5,000 at the time) and helped him concoct a plan to flee to Malaysia to escape justice. The protection of key suspects extended to DKP Dassanayake and RPS Ranasinghe, who have been promoted to senior surveillance roles enabling them cover up their criminal conduct and access witnesses’ communication and threaten them, as set out in the profiles in Annexure 1.

Threats to lead investigating officer’s life and attempt to transfer him:

On 10 August 2017, lead investigator IP Nishantha de Silva reported that a suspect in the case along with other police and army officers had been plotting to kill him from the hospital jail. The suspect a Navy officer was nevertheless released on bail. On 20 Dec 2018, IP Nishantha de Silva told the court again that he feared his life could be in danger118. On 18 Nov 2018, in the midst of the political crisis, the Inspector General of Police ordered the transfer, purportedly on “service requirements”, of chief investigator IP Nishantha de Silva who was however reinstated two days later further to a public outcry of witnesses117 and an appeal to the National Police Commission118. On 9 Oct 2018 the chief investigating officer again complained to the court that he was living in fear.

Supreme Court order preventing arrest of former CoN Admiral Karannagoda:

On 7 March 2019, the Supreme Court issued an order preventing the CID from arresting former Navy Commander Admiral Karannagoda over the disappearance of the 11 men in Trincomalee119.

WITNESS PROTECTION ISSUES

Threats by RPS Ranasinghe and DKP Dassanayake:

Several witnesses in the case have also reported being threatened and pressured to change their testimony after giving evidence to the CID. Court documents reveal that RPS Ranasinghe and DKP Dassanayake made death threats against Ranasinghe’s former deputy - himself responsible for the illegal detention and torture of victims in Gun Site in 2009-2010120 which the investigation failed to explore - and another naval witness after their explosive testimonies before the CID in 2015117.

Threats by CDS Admiral Wijegunaratne:

More recently, another naval officer started receiving silent calls and threats shortly after giving testimony before the CID exposing Admiral Wijegunaratne’s role in helping suspect Hettiarachchi escape justice. On 25 Nov 2018, Admiral Wijegunaratne - who had in the meantime been promoted to Armed Forces Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the highest military position in the entire armed forces - also allegedly tried to abduct and kill the witness with the help of one of his PSO’s122. The naval witness narrowly escaped and reported the incident to the Fort police station, leading to the arrest of the CDS on 28 Nov 2018 and his remand in custody for aiding a fugitive and attempts to intimidate witnesses. The CDS was released on bail a few days later on 5 Dec 2018 and the witness had to flee Sri Lanka to save his life120.
F. OTHER TORTURE SITES

There is emerging evidence that illegal detentions and torture by the SLN took place systematically in other Navy-run facilities beyond Gun Site in Trincomalee naval base. The ITJP will continue to investigate this in order to establish the scope and pattern of violations committed by the SLN as well as individuals involved.

SLNS GEMUNU IN WELISARA

TRINCOMALEE ABDUCTION LINK

The CID investigation into the Trincomalee 11 case revealed the dismantled vehicle of two additional individuals abducted in Colombo was found by police in Welisara Navy camp in February 2016\textsuperscript{124}. Parts of the vehicle allegedly used by victim John Reed and a motorcycle were also initially thought to be in the site known as “Navy intelligence home” in Welisara\textsuperscript{125}.

TORTURE AND DETENTION SITE

Reports dating back to 2004 indicate torture occurred in Welisara\textsuperscript{126}. In addition, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) leader’s wife Chitrangani Wijeweera and family are reported to have been detained in SLNS Tissa in Trincomalee Naval base from 1992-99 and then Welisara\textsuperscript{127} from 1999 to at least 2015 following the killing of the leader Rohana Wijeweera while in detention on 13 Nov 1989\textsuperscript{128}.

TORTURE SITE IN 2014

The ITJP has documented illegal detentions and torture of former LTTE members abducted as part of an extortion racket in SLNS Gemunu in Welisara naval base until at least Jan 2014\textsuperscript{129}.

“I was told by those people they had been brought there for extortion money… I noticed some people in these cells were severely beaten. On a few occasions while I was held at the detention facility, I heard screaming from the single cell area\textsuperscript{130}.”

Witnesses describe how they saw white vans bringing in people whose face were covered to the detention facility, usually at night. One detainee also witnessed the death of an LTTE detainee as a result of severe beatings and torture. They say the detention block was a “walled facility, with an outer wall and an inner wall, in which prisoners are held\textsuperscript{131}.” As in Gun Site, some detainees were kept underground behind the Navy camp. “There were three underground storage tunnels and one was used for prisoners\textsuperscript{132}.”

Interestingly, DKP Dassanayake, who has since been linked to abductions, extortion and disappearance\textsuperscript{133}, has allegedly been visiting the detention facility at night wearing civilian clothes\textsuperscript{134}.

DISASTER RELIEF HEADQUARTERS

A Disaster Response Unit was established in 2017 in SLNS Gemunu in Welisara\textsuperscript{137} despite the fact that the site has long been known for its use of torture. The chief guest at the opening was Ravindra Wijegunaratne and NPS Attygalle (Director Naval Operations 2012)\textsuperscript{138}. In 2019 bailed suspect DKP Dissanayake was seconded to the Disaster Management Centre as the tri-forces liaison officer.

DETENTION SITE IN 2019

While the use of Welisara as an illegal Navy torture and detention site has never been admitted by the Sri Lankan Government, on 27 May 2019, President Sirisena gazetted SLNS Gemunu, situated in Welisara naval base, as an official detention facility to detain suspects arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)\textsuperscript{135}. In July 2019 a Sri Lankan member of parliament alleged that the Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) were holding Easter Sunday bombing suspects in Welisara Naval Base and that members of the FBI had been allowed to visit them\textsuperscript{136}.

There is emerging evidence that illegal detentions and torture by the SLN took place systematically in other Navy-run facilities beyond Gun Site in Trincomalee naval base. The ITJP will continue to investigate this in order to establish the scope and pattern of violations committed by the SLN as well as individuals involved.
The secondment to a Disaster Management Centre may be an attempt to circumvent Leahy Laws in the US, as an exception exists if U.S. equipment or other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security emergencies. Recent US Sri Lanka Cooperation has focused extensively on disaster relief.

SWC Mohotti who was Director of Intelligence when torture occurred in the intelligence-run dungeons in Gun Site was from 2012-14 the Director of Sri Lanka’s Disaster Management Centre.

SLNS PARAKRAMA, NAVAL HEADQUARTERS

According to court documents, from August 2008 to March 2009 victims of enforced disappearances were detained in “Pittu Bambuwa” which is part of naval headquarters in SLNS Parakrama, between Chaitya Road and Flagstaff Street in Colombo. The second floor of a naval building in Chaitya Road was where HMPCK Hettiarachchi operated according to court documents and this is corroborated by other ITJP witnesses held by the police in this building that was shared by the Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) in 2008.

In late 2007 a member of a Special Task Force team interviewed by the ITJP described abducting a young Tamil man from his home in a Colombo suburb one evening in a white van with three colleagues and delivering him to Navy headquarters. He described passing the main gate and parking on the side of the road, and his superior officer calling someone to say they’d arrived. A jeep drove up shortly afterwards and the handover occurred, with a naval officer taking the young Tamil man away.

Another witness described the cells in Navy HQ that operated after the war, saying there was a row of old very small cells where Naval Intelligence detained people. He said the lock up area was opposite the naval hospital and adjacent to the medical supply area. There was a guard at the door to what are old abandoned buildings and inside British era cells that were used for detention.

BOOSSA

Detainees held post-war at the TID-run site, Boossa, in Galle in the south of the island described members of the Navy being involved in interrogation and also hearing screams.

A report by the Asian Human Rights Commission, Narratives of Justice, also described the Navy taking prisoners from TID custody for interrogation.

MANNAR NAVAL BASE

As an island, Mannar was mainly under the control of the SLN. The report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) documented the use of torture in multiple facilities operated by the Sri Lankan security forces, including a naval base near Mannar as well as Navy personnel involvement in sexual violence. OISL highlighted a number of cases of alleged abductions perpetrated mostly in 2007 and 2008 by individuals who had identified themselves as Navy personnel.

Transcripts of representations to the domestic Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) made by witnesses at public sittings in Trincomalee highlight a number of cases of alleged abductions perpetrated mostly in 2007 and 2008 by individuals who had identified themselves as Navy personnel.

In March 2001 two Tamil women — one of them pregnant — were detained by the Navy and then raped in police and Navy custody.

A naval officer interviewed by the ITJP confirmed that around the same period Gun Site secret detention facility was in operation (at least from 2008-2012). Naval Intelligence was also using a facility in Mannar where people were tortured and detained. He personally witnessed individuals held there during the relevant period.

As in Trincomalee, bodies of killed detainees were allegedly disposed of at sea from the Mannar naval base. Another witness told the ITJP that her son, who was apparently mistaken for an LTTE member, was arrested in September 2008 by the SLN in Mannar, taken to the naval base and never seen again. Based on her account, various other families in her village have experienced similar losses of family members at the hands of the SLN and have been without news of their loved ones for more than 10 years.

Further investigations are required in order to establish which Naval officers were involved in these cases of illegal detention, torture and enforced disappearances and their chain of command.
This detailed examination of just one Sri Lankan naval detention and torture site suggests a pattern of grave violations of human rights systematically committed, which were widely known about and condoned by a large number of the country’s most senior naval commanders for many years. The systemic nature of these violations emerging from this report suggests that these are not the crimes of a few “rotten apples” at the lower levels of the Navy. Rather a vast number of officers in the upper echelons of the Navy at best condoned and turned a collective blind eye to illegal detention, torture, enforced disappearance and most likely murder, and at worst were in command and control and ordered these crimes.

The narrow mandate of the official investigation and the deliberate exclusion of national security detainees from the investigation also demonstrates that the rights and voices of LTTE victims are yet again completely ignored.

In addition, it is clear the naval establishment has not cooperated fully with the police investigation, flawed as it has been by investigative shortcomings. On the contrary, it appears that naval command has deliberately interfered and obstructed the investigation to protect naval personnel directly implicated and responsible for abduction, torture and enforced disappearance. This includes the country’s most senior military official, the Chief of Defence Staff, who himself allegedly attempted to abduct a key eyewitness. This is an emblematic case, where the investigation has been botched and demonstrates what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, said in 2015 – namely that “Sri Lanka’s criminal justice system is not currently equipped to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of this breadth and magnitude, or to hold accountable those responsible for such violations”\(^1\). The situation remains unchanged as of today with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stating earlier this year that, “The criminal justice system has yet to demonstrate its capacity or willingness to address complex emblematic cases\(^2\).” This raises serious concerns about the capacity and political will of the Sri Lankan government and the criminal justice system to address impunity for serious violations of humanitarian law and for gross violations and abuses of international human rights law, resulting in a trust deficit in the justice system.

This report details the naval command structure and the number of naval commanders or other senior officers who were either directly implicated and involved or had knowledge of and condoned the violations documented in this report. This report also reveals that the entire Navy command structure appears to be seriously implicated in high levels of criminality and that the violations and crimes documented in this report were not the work of a few individuals but sanctioned and condoned at the highest level of command.

Accordingly, the entire Sri Lankan Navy should be sanctioned by the international community with the suspension of international assistance and cooperation until, at the very minimum, the navy cooperates fully with an independent police investigation and stops rewarding the suspects in this emblematic case by promoting them or making it possible for them not to face the full might of the law. International partners are now on notice and can no longer turn a blind eye to the Sri Lankan Navy’s criminality either.
International cooperation with the Sri Lankan navy, which includes financial support, the provision of special naval equipment including cutters, joint naval exercises and training and capacity building of the navy and individual naval officers, should be put on hold until these crimes and violations are fully investigated by an independent police investigation. Given the nature and scope of these crimes, it may be necessary to include international investigators to assist the Sri Lankan police in their investigations.

While the focus of this report has been mainly on the emblematic case of the Trincomalee 11, it has also highlighted how the violations committed by the Navy did not stop with the end of the civil war in 2009; illegal detention and torture in naval bases continued until at least 2014. Nor was it confined to one naval base alone. It is therefore necessary for any independent investigation to extend the scope and temporal period to go beyond 2009 so as to examine the full extent of naval complicity in a wide range of violations and crimes. The scope should also include command structures, extortion and racketeering.

The contrast between the lives of the alleged perpetrators - allowed to travel freely, awarded medals and honours, continuously promoted and comfortably accommodated in prison hospitals when detained - and the impact on the lives of victims abroad is frankly obscene. Those who were detained in Gun Site still struggle every day with the grievous physical and psychological torture they endured and the harm and consequences they continue to suffer. They are physically unable to work to provide for their families as a result of the ill-treatment they endured in Navy detention and many continue to experience the impairment of their eyesight years later because of being kept underground in the dark for so long. Worst of all they still live in fear even though they may have asylum - fear of what could happen to their families in Sri Lanka if anyone identifies them, which leads some of them to cut contact with their families in order to avoid putting them at risk.

Then there is the agony of the families of those who disappeared. They have been given false hope and let down by the Sirisena Government that promised them justice and then promoted the suspects. Far from a success story, the Trincomalee 11 investigation has been ten years of unending trauma for the families of the victims, of not knowing what happened to their loved ones, of seeing suspects being released and rewarded, of being failed by the criminal justice system, with their suffering unacknowledged and belittled.

Bags of cash, love affairs, naval command hiding suspects, death threats issued from prison to policemen, alleged perpetrators put in charge of discipline and an Admiral attempting an abduction. This would be the stuff of fiction were it not so intensely painful for the victims and their families.
H. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF
SRI LANKA

ALREADY RECOMMENDED STEPS

In 2015, the ITJP listed nine steps the Government of Sri Lanka could have taken to investigate the Trincomalee torture site when it first came to light. They were as follows:

1. Not Done: Broaden the investigation into the site beyond the current Colombo Fort Magistrate’s court case pertaining to alleged “white van” abductions of eleven individuals by naval personnel and their detention in the Trincomalee naval site.

2. Partially Done: Question the two intelligence officers allegedly in charge of the Trincomalee secret site from 2009-2012 - Lt Commander Welagedara and Lt Commander Ranasinghe.

Though both men did give statements to the CID, K.C. Welagedara has been treated as a state’s witness even though survivors allege that he was a perpetrator. K.C. Welagedara was RPS Ranasinghe’s deputy and in charge of Gun Site in the absence of Ranasinghe. He was allowed to move to Australia with his family.

3. Partially Done: In addition, question the overall commanders during the period 2009-2012 of the Trincomalee Naval base.

(i) The commanders responsible for the Trincomalee Naval base during the relevant period were:

- SMB Weerasekera (Commander Eastern Naval Area 2008 - Feb 2010).
- JSK Colombage (Commander Eastern Naval Area Feb 2010 - 25 Sep 2012).

Only SMB Weerasekera appears to have been questioned by police.

(ii) In 2009, the Deputy Commander Eastern Naval Area was (Retired) Rear Admiral Sisira Jayakody (who remains Chief Hydrographer of the SLN); he does not appear to have been questioned by the CID.

(iii) The Naval and Maritime Academy Commandants based in Trincomalee (adjacent to Gun Site) during the relevant period were:

- SS Ranasinghe - former Navy Commander and from March 2019 Secretary to the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Southern Development.
- D C Gunawardana.
- (Retired) Travis Sinniah - former Navy Commander.

Only Travis Sinniah has given a statement to the CID.

(iv) The investigation should conduct an interrogation of all senior naval officials who were based in Trincomalee naval base or in charge of Naval Intelligence during the period 2009-12 and, if possible, from 2007 as there are credible reports the torture site operated from 2007 and the Special Intelligence Unit alleged to be responsible was established in 2006. This would involve questioning inter alia: Thisara SG Samarasinghe, JSK Colombage, MTDJ Dharmasiriwardene, Sisira Jayakody, SS Ranasinghe, D C Gunawardana, U S Ruwan Perera, DWAS Dissanayake, NBJ Rosayro, DNS Ulugetenna, NPS Attygalle and SAMJ Perera.

4. Partially Done: Question the Naval Commanders in office during this period to ascertain if they knew of the existence of this secret detention site. They are Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda (Sep 2005 to Jul 2009), Admiral TSG Samarasinghe (Jul 2009 to 1 Jan 2011), Admiral D. W. A. S. Dissanayake (Jan 2011 to Sep 2012).4

Only Admiral Karannagoda was questioned by the CID.
5. **Not Done:** Question naval personnel operational at Point Pedro in April and May 2009 and seize transport records for moving detainees to Trincomalee: some detainees report being transported in naval (dvora) gunboats. ITJP has the names of Naval Intelligence officers who were involved in moving detainees from Point Pedro to the Trincomalee site.

6. **Not Done:** Make a formal request to ITJP to negotiate the release of the names and ranks of the 10 other naval members whom survivors state were involved in torture at this site, as well as the details of an officer and other guards present who were fully aware of the torture going on and the names of the Point Pedro personnel involved in transporting detainees to Trincomalee. Make a formal request for information from Sri Lankan civil society groups who have also been documenting accounts of survivors from the Trincomalee site.

7. **Not Done:** Bring in a credible international forensics team to document evidence (such as blood stains) remaining in the underground torture cells and attempt to match this with survivors in Sri Lanka and abroad.

If it is not too late, employ the services of a forensic team from the Metropolitan Police Service (a precedent for this was in the Raviraj MP killing case) to examine the Trincomalee site and take DNA samples from survivors of the site in Sri Lanka or abroad, while ensuring witness protection for survivors in line with international standards.

8. **Probably Not Done:** Seize all documentation pertaining to the interrogations, communication logs, correspondence, photographs of detainees in files that were kept, guard rotas, transport logs, and records of food and other equipment brought into the secret site. Survivors say at least 60 people were detained at this site for three years so financial and personnel accounts must have been kept.

9. **Not Done:** The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, who has denied the existence of secret detention sites, should now publicly acknowledge their existence and outline in detail what steps he intends to take to address this problem. The issue has now been brought to his attention and he has a duty to initiate prompt and full investigations. The ITJP recommends that all of the steps mentioned above should be implemented without delay.

**ADDITIONAL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN:**

10. Immediately suspend all suspects in the Trincomalee 11 Abduction Case and related criminal cases from official positions until the outcome of the trials. Alleged perpetrators promoted or still holding key positions after being named suspects in the criminal case include the Chief of Defence Staff Ravindra Wijegunaratne, DKP Dassanayake and RPS Ranasinghe.

11. Ensure that the police investigation into the Trincomalee 11 Abduction case as well as related cases is independent and transparent and properly resourced. Consider including international investigators to assist. Ensure that the investigating officers are not subjected to political interference or threats and benefit from greater protection.

12. Immediately strip the alleged perpetrators of any awards and medals they have been granted, including those awarded during the ongoing investigation. The Government should instead honour the naval whistle-blowers who have been forced to flee the country.

13. President and Prime Minister to direct the Navy to cooperate fully with the police investigation in relation to the Trincomalee 11 Abduction Case and other related cases. Ensure that all reports of previous investigations into navy conduct are handed over to the police investigation.

14. Investigate linkages between the Trincomalee 11 Abduction Case and other abduction cases involving the Navy. These include in particular the abductions of cousins Vadivel Palanasi Loganathan and Ratnasami Paramanathan held in Welisara in which Admiral Karannagoda is alleged to be a suspect and those of Generalage Shanta Samawickrama and Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi held in Gun Site under RPS Nisansala and Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi held in Gun Site under RPS Nisansala Vithanarachchi held in Gun Site under RPS Nisansala and Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi held in Gun Site under RPS Nisansala and Prageeth Nisansala Vithanarachchi held in Gun Site under RPS Nisansala.

15. Investigate further the origins of the money alleged to have been made available by Admiral Wijegunaratne to absconding suspect HMPOK Hettiarachchi via his secretary while he was in hiding in Navy headquarters.

16. Investigate the role of the navy in human smuggling and trafficking and extortion to establish whether there is a link with the Special Intelligence Unit.

17. Investigate the role of the navy in human smuggling and trafficking and extortion to establish whether there is a link with the Special Intelligence Unit.
18. Investigate links between the Avant Garde suspects and Navy torture.

TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Review international cooperation with the Sri Lankan navy which includes financial support, the provision of special naval equipment including cutters, joint naval exercises and training and capacity building of the Sri Lankan navy including navy officers given the credible allegation by WGEID in 2015 that naval personnel were involved in systematic torture over several years in Trincomalee naval base and the further evidence and analysis gathered in this report. This is in addition to multiple war witnesses who testified that the Sri Lankan Navy shelled civilians in the No-Fire safe zones in 2009 and the UN OISL 2015 report, which stated that the Sri Lankan Navy was responsible for cases of enforced disappearances in Jaffna and Mannar, among other incidents.

Deny visas to all Sri Lankan alleged perpetrators (and their families) of torture and other serious human rights violations, in particular those who were based at Trincomalee naval base.

TO THE US GOVERNMENT

Noting that the Leahy Laws provide that training should be withheld from any individual of a unit when there is credible information that such individual has committed a gross violation of human rights or has commanded a unit that has committed such gross human rights violation, training and capacity building should be withheld from the Sri Lankan Navy.

While the Leahy Laws include an exemption for disaster relief, a review should be conducted of recent assistance to the Sri Lankan Navy under the rubric of disaster relief to ensure this exemption has not been misused. Such a review should include the vetting and screening of Sri Lankan naval officials involved in the disaster relief engagement – as for example one of the main suspects, DKP Dassanayake, has been put in charge by the Navy of tri-forces cooperation for the Disaster Management Centre while out on bail.

The review should also include visa vetting of all alleged perpetrators and their immediate family members, such as DKP Dassanayake who has been issued US visas and was accepted for a course at the Naval Postgraduate School, California in Nov 2014 despite police in Sri Lanka requesting that a travel ban be placed on him on 22 June 2013, and naming him as an alleged perpetrator in 19 February 2015 and arresting him on 12 July 2017.

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Considering that one of the main alleged perpetrators RPS Ranasinghe served as a UN peacekeeper at the time that Sri Lankan military were repatriated for alleged child sexual exploitation in Haiti in 2007, screen and vet for peacekeeping all naval officers who have been named as suspects in the Trincomalee 11 Abduction Court Case or were based in or operated out of the Trincomalee naval base between 2008-2012, because of the risk that they might have been complicit in or failed to report the illegal detention and torture site. Ensure that OHCHR conducts a more detailed and nuanced assessment of the failings of the emblematic Trincomalee 11 Abduction Court Case for its report to the Human Rights Council in March 2020.

TO THE UK GOVERNMENT

Considering that a large number of the alleged perpetrators were trained by the Royal Navy at Britannia, Royal Navy College (BRNC) Dartmouth, ensure that a copy of this report is widely circulated, including inviting the authors of the report to make a presentation on the contents there.

Conduct a human rights compliance review of past training and capacity building of the Sri Lankan Navy with a view to identifying navy officials implicated in gross human rights violations given that DKP Dassanayake himself said most “senior officers have been trained in the UK during some stage in their career!”

Ensure officers named in this report in connection with allegations of torture and other gross human rights violations are vetted and screened and prevented from future engagement with the UK government, including benefiting from UK funded or delivered training inside and outside Sri Lanka, social events at the High Commission, meetings with UK diplomats and defence officials and membership of UK defence clubs.

Cease all Royal Navy engagement with officials allegedly involved in the Trincomalee 11 Abduction Court Case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Education/Training Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKP Dassanyake</td>
<td>2014 incomplete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMJ Perera</td>
<td>US Naval War College, Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------
| SMB Weerasekera | Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies Hawaii; also Fort Lauderdale in Port Security. | HMS Dryad and Dartmouth. | At INS Venduruthy; Naval Communication course. | Pakistan Naval Staff College. And PLA National defence university China. Also, Israel. | Yes. |
The torture site is commonly referred to as “Gun Site”, “Gunsie” or “Gota’s Camp”.


The site is also variously referred to as JOSOP, JOSFH and SFHQ-W.

3 Extract of statement to CID by Ramiah Kanagedaran who had been in jail for 14 days from 18 May 2017. He had been admitted to jail hospital on 19 May 2017 because of blood in his urine. DIG Vaas Gunawardena, MP Duminda Silva, Dematagoda Chaminda and Milroy (These three were suspects in the murder of ex MP Bharatha Lakshman Premachandra who were later convicted), a group from the army and the Navy were there. The name of one person was called Perera and he can be identified if seen again. There were 5 who said they were from the Navy (among them Udayakumara* and Wickramasuriya**) and their leader was Sunith Ranasinghe... At one point, Perera from the army said ‘Nishantha Silva of the CID is the one who is pushing this case. Things won’t be OK if he is not sorted out’. At another time Wickramasuriya** of the Navy said ‘Four, five of us have been caught for this. All of our others are in the open. They won’t escape from IP Nishantha (de) Silva. He is the one who is constantly pushing this case. We should get those in the open to kill him’.

*Lakshman Udaya Kumara told CID he was instructed by A K Guruge to give false evidence implicating Sampath Munasinghe in the abduction of the 11 victims (IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 13 Mar 2017).

**Petty Officer, WHSS Wickramasuriya

- not a suspect in the case though court documents say he worked under Hettiarachchi from 2008-12 (B report, 13 Jul 2016).

4 ITJP witness testimony.


7 ITJP witness testimony.


9 Ibid


11 ITJP witness:

‘It wasn’t a part of the formalised public structures, but it was integrated into the senior command structure of the SLN. Unit members were drawn primarily from the Navy Patrolman Branch and to a lesser extent the Executive Branch. The Director of Naval Intelligence in Colombo reports to the Director of Naval Operations (DNO) who in turn reports to the overall Commander of the Navy. Others, such as the Director of Navy Land Operations also reports to the DNO. Staff Intelligence Officers attached to area command structures report up to the DNO.’

12 The Special Boat Squadron is Sri Lanka’s Navy special forces unit and consists of elite naval troops trained for clandestine and special operations.

13 Speaking at a press conference, the police spokesperson was quoted by Ceylon Today as saying, “on 28 May, 2009 Former Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda submitted a written complaint against his Chief Security Officer, Lieutenant Commander Sampath Munasinghe.”


14 The identity cards found in Munasinghe’s room belonged to 1. Lyon ; 2. Leon ; 3. Kasthuri Arachchige Anthony and 4. Thiyagaraja Jegan, four of the eleven victims in the Trincomalee 11 court case. (Source: Three names in Court documents, 30 Mar 2010, when IP Ranjith Munasinghe informs court; a fourth name in 7 Jun 2010 court documents when IP Ranjith Munasinghe informs court.)


In his autobiography (in Sinhala), Karannagoda talks about the day he took office as Commander of the Navy on 1 Sep 2005 and says that Captain MUKV Bandara was to become his ADC (Page 183) but this never happened because Sampath Munasinghe took the post instead, https://pothsl.com/book-author/admiral-wasantha-karannagoda-වසන්ත-කරන්-ගෝ-නේ/)15

ITJP witness statement. The alleged affair is also referred to in the petition of 5 Mar 2019 to the Supreme Court of Sarojini Naganathan, mother of victim Rajeev Naganathan, see http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/03/10/opinion/admiral-and-case-11-missing-boys.

Thilakeshwaran Ramalingam – one of the Dehiwela Five - was 17 years old when abducted.

According to court documents, Aluthgedara Upul Bandara (not a suspect in the case) and Udayakumarage Lakshman Udaya Kumara (suspect arrested in 2017 but released on bail in 2019) admitted to the CID that they were involved in the Dehiwela Five abduction on 17 Sep 2008 alongside HKPK Hettiarachchi, Kithsiri and others under orders of Sampath Munasinghe. It also emerged from the investigation that Ali Anver was abducted on 9 Feb 2009 by HKPK Hettiarachchi, RPS Ranasinghe, CPO Mendis, Able Seaman Kottage, Able Seaman Kithsiri and Able Seaman Chandrakumara under orders from Sampath Munasinghe.

Statements by Welagedara, Upul Bandara, Mahesh Kumara and Kithsiri confirm that Hettiarachchi and his team was commanded by DKP Dassanayake.

This is the Sinhala nickname given to the site of torture after “Pittu”- a South Asian food mostly cooked in a tube shape – referring to the cylindrical shape of the building - Pittu Bambuwa.

SLNS Parakrama is a Sri Lanka Navy shore establishment sited on Flagstaff Street in Colombo, in close proximity to the Colombo Lighthouse and the President’s official residence. It functions as the headquarters of the Navy. In this capacity it has the offices of the Commander of the Navy, Chief of Staff, the Board of Management (BOM) and Board of Directors (BOD) of the Sri Lanka Navy. All naval operations are directed from SLNS Parakrama.

See ITJP report on TID, Sep 2019.

IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 19 Feb 2015.

IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 5 Jan 2016.

26 26 Feb 2015 B report.


CID investigator IP Nishantha de Silva has been the lead investigator in a number of emblematic cases where some progress has been made, including (a) the assassination of Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunge in Jan 2009; (b) the Vidhya’s rape; c) the abduction and torture of former Nation Deputy Editor Keith Noyahar; d) the abduction and alleged disappearance of cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda (later handed over to another investigator) ; e) the assault in Jan 2009 on former Rivira editor Upali Tennakoon and wife (transferred from the CID to the TID (Terrorism Investigation Division) in 2010, then back to the CID) ; f) the assassination of rugby player Wasim Thajudeen; g) gynaecologist Dr. Shaft Shihabdeen’s case in 2019, alleged to have forcibly sterilised patients.

In his Fundamental Rights application, former Col Karannagoda, Mar 2019 § 60, also cites some of the cases being managed by Nishantha de Silva.

IP Nishantha de Silva already worked as an investigator on the Navy abductions case for a few years before his appointment.


Ali Anver, Rajeev Naganathan (one of the Dehiwela Five) and John Reed. From 9 Jun 2009, 13 Jul 2016 and 13 Jul 2017 B reports.


A/HRC/40/23, para. 38.


“The indictments were filed against six accused, Palama Sani Suresh alias Sani, Prasad Chandana Kumara alias Sampath (this is Hettiarachchi), Gamini Seneviratne, Pradeep Chaminda alias Vajira, Sivakanthan Vivekanandan alias Charan and Fabian Royston Toussaint on five counts, including committing the murder of Raviraj and his security officer Lokewella Murage Laksm, under the provisions of the PTA and Penal Code.” AG’s appeal to have re-trial over
have directly participated to the abduction of Ali Anver alongside MMPCX Hettiarachchi, and the vehicle in which the Dehawila Five travelled was handed over to CPO Mendis working directly under RPS Ranasinghe, and eventually found in the Trincomalee naval base (IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 5 Jan 2017).

63 OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), A/HRC/30/CRP.2, 2015, paragraph 548 refers in particular to a Navy base near Mannar where torture was carried out on a routine basis.

64 A Still Unfinished War, ITJP, 2015, http://www.itjpsl.com/reports/a-still-unfinished-war
Also LOCKED AWAY: SRI LANKA’S SECURITY DETAINES, Amnesty International, Index: ASA 37/003/2012 , Mar 2012, “Members of the security forces have used secret places of detention to interrogate and torture detainees, some of whom have reportedly been tortured to death or extrajudicially executed.”. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/20000/asa370032012en.pdf


66 Those who went to Gun Site were: Bernard Duhaime, Ariel Dulitzky, Tae-Ung Baik, Ugo Cedrangolo, Gabriela Guzman, Pradeep Wage, M Satyanurthi (SL staff), Antony P Wijeratne (SL staff).

The WGEID delegation discussed the case with the CID and visited the Navy base in Trincomalee and the two underground complexes containing 11 cells that were used in the past as secret detention facilities. A/HRC/33/51/Add.2, 8 Jul 2016, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on its mission to Sri Lanka.

Gun Site was only sealed on 25 Apr 2015, six years after the start of the investigation by the CID into the abduction and disappearance of 11 individuals there (26 Nov 2015 B report).

67 26 Feb 2015 B report.

68 The use by the Navy of munitions storage bunkers or underground tunnels as secret detention sites is not unique to Trincomalee and has been mentioned by another witness in relation to at least one other Navy base, SLNS Welisara: “In Welisara there was another detention place. It was there in the explosive unit. There were underground tunnels to store the explosives but one was used for suspects », ITJP witness statement.

69 ITJP witness statement.

70 ITJP witness statement.

71 When CID went to Gun Site for inspection, several sailors showed two cells on the right hand side of the entrance called “Tanjana” that were used to hold detainees. They had doors with metal bars. The naval witnesses who referred to Tanjana were : Ranatunge Mudiyanelage Punchi Banda Ranatunge, Ratnayake Mudiyanelage Nimal Jayaratne, Havena Kumure Gedara Sampath Saman Kumara Abeykoon, Kimalaratna Wickramasuriya, CK Welagedara and KHVD Sandamali. (B report 22 May 2015).


73 ITJP witness statement.


75 B report, 10 August 2017.

76 On 24 Aug 2017, Inspector Nishantha Silva reported to court on a statement from RPS Ranasinghe which said this.


78 http://groundviews.org/2015/03/01/whose-democracy-is-it-anyway/

79 ITJP witness statement.

80 “I believe it was a mix of LTTE people and civilians based on their age, look and from what I could hear them saying », ITJP witness statement.

81 ITJP witness statement.

82 K C Welagedara, RPS Ranasinghe’s Second in Command, told the CID that he saw Ali Anver, Rajeev Naganathan and John Reed in Gun Site on 25 Mar 2009 (9 Jun 2009, 13 Jul 2016 and 13 Jul 2017 B reports).

83 ITJP witness statement (Gun Site 3); ITJP witness statement (Gun Site 1); ITJP witness statement.

84 ITJP witness statements (One witness was detained at Trincomalee Naval base from 2009 to 2011).

85 “When my son was in the Trinco base he said … to me – ‘mama I am sad because these people are bringing 18-20 year girls and boys shouting, I don’t know whether they will kill us all’ - so he said over the phone. Then I said ‘Don’t be scared. Do as if God is there – you pray and he will help you’. I asked him ‘how do you know this?’ and he said “oh moma when I was going to the wash room I saw these people are shouting at the girls and boys””.

On 30 Sep.2019 produced in court in B report of 09 Oct 2019. Original except was in English but in this version edited to correct spelling and punctuation.

86 ITJP witness statement.

87 ITJP witness statement.

88 ITJP witness statement.


91 ITJP witness statement.

92 Nishantha Silva to court, 10 Aug 2017. Sinhala Court documents obtained by ITJP.

93 A/HRC/33/51/Add.2,

94 Court B report 13 Mar. 2017

95 ITJP witness statement.

96 ITJP witness statements. The two men were also photographed together.

97 ITJP witness statement.

98 IP Nishantha de Silva to court.
Conducted an initial investigation director of Naval Intelligence Ananda Kumara Guruge who was investigation into Rear Admiral there are questions about the case 11 missing boys. See also http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/03/10/opinion/admiral-and-case-11-missing-boys also: 1. Fisheries and Aquatics Resources Minister Winal Felix Perera wrote to Karannagoda on 17 Jun 2009 after receiving confirmation that some of the disappeared had been held in Gun Site (13 Mar 2017 B report). He got no reply. 2. And in the last week of May 2009, Commodore (now Rear Admiral) Shemal Perera confirmed to the Naganathan family that their son and others were held in Gun Site (13 Mar 2017 B report). Karannagoda stated in his fundamental Rights application of Mar 2019 “that on or about 18th Sep 2018, Rear Admiral KJCS (Shemal) Fernando of the Navy had provided a statement to the 1st Respondent [CID] that the Petitioner had failed to take proper steps in respect of the five youths referred to by Hon. Felix Perera.” 3. Travis Sinniah who testified that Karannagoda forbade him from interfering with Gun Site. 02 Aug 2017, CID IP G Udayakumar and SI Upali inform the court based on Travis Sinniah’s statement. Police say it was a van bearing the number 56-S535 in which John Reed was travelling when abducted; the vehicle was taken to the Naval Dockyard and repainted. A new navy registration number was given: Navy (NA HA in Sinhala) 6021. The van was used for work in the Naval and Maritime Academy (12 November 2015 B report). Karannagoda’s fundamental Rights Application 2019 on file; see also http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/03/10/opinion/admiral-and-case-11-missing-boys. Note on AK Guruge: there are questions about the investigation into Rear Admiral Ananda Kumara Guruge who was director of Naval Intelligence at the time that the abductions occurred by the Special Intelligence Unit. Guruge is said to have conducted an initial investigation of Sampath Munasinghe in 2009 but he later denied this but eventually the police learned that this 2009 internal investigation concluded the victims had been killed. This appears to be a conflict of interest because Guruge was effectively asked in 2009 to investigate men from his own unit and police say Guruge was at the time aware of the existence of a detention site at Gun Site. One witness, Aluthgedara Upul Bandara, later testified to the police that Guruge asked him to give false testimony implicating Sampath Munasinghe in the abductions. For his part, Guruge however has claimed he did not supervise Hettiarachchi but he’s testified that Hettiarachchi, Sampath Munasinghe and RPS Ransinghe were responsible for the abductions and detention in Navy headquarters and in Trincomalee of the victims. However, a key suspect in this case, RPS Ransinghe, testified his commanders were the Eastern Area Commanders (COMEAST) and the then directors of Naval Intelligence, Cmdr Guruge and Cmdr Mohotti. Guruge was also implicated by K. C. Welagedara, who testified that he had informed Guruge of the activities in Gun Site; also implicated by Susantha Petty officer (XC 30543) who testified that Guruge called him and other members of the intelligence team to his office and inquired about the Dehiwala 5 detainees. By 2018 the police accused Guruge of deliberately avoiding them, after he failed to attend a number of police appointments. CID officer Udayakumar also told the court that the abducting suspect Hettiarachchi had been in Guruge’s care. Guruge did finally give the police a statement on 2 Apr 2018. IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 13 Mar 2017. Fundamental Right application filed by former CoN Karannagoda before the Supreme Court, Mar 2019. When asked in May 2009 if the victims were held at Trincomalee naval basis, SMB Weerasekara allegedly told then CoN Karannagoda that they were not. This odd response – which seems to confirm that the existence of Gun Site as an illegal detention facility and the fact that PTA detainees were held in Gun Site; also implicated by K. C. Welagedara, who testified that he had informed Guruge of the activities in Gun Site; also implicated by Susantha Petty officer (XC 30543) who testified that Guruge called him and other members of the intelligence team to his office and inquired about the Dehiwala 5 detainees. By 2018 the police accused Guruge of deliberately avoiding them, after he failed to attend a number of police appointments. CID officer Udayakumar also told the court that the abducting suspect Hettiarachchi had been in Guruge’s care. Guruge did finally give the police a statement on 2 Apr 2018. IP Nishantha de Silva to court, 13 Mar 2017. Fundamental Right application filed by former CoN Karannagoda before the Supreme Court, Mar 2019. When asked in May 2009 if the victims were held at Trincomalee naval basis, SMB Weerasekara allegedly told then CoN Karannagoda that they were not. This odd response – which seems to confirm that the existence of Gun Site as an illegal detention facility and the fact that PTA detainees were held in military camps was common knowledge in Navy circles - should have been further investigated since Gun Site was not a gazetted detention site.
Lanka’s witness protection authority asked to stand down as head of Sri against Fernando. Gamlath was later police to withdraw the B report also tried to get the www.itjpsl.com/reports/witness-Gamlath (see ITJP Profile http://www.lankanews.com/reports/1915). It seems the former deployed elsewhere and not turning up in court . Reports say the former lawyer reprimanded CID tipped to be next BASL VP, 24 Feb 2019, http://www.sundayobserver. lk/2019/02/24/news/senior-lawyer-reprimanded-cid-tipped-be-next-basl-vp

"Court is informed that one important reason for not being able to deliver justice to the affected party is the direct involvement of the Deputy Solicitor General Shavinda Fernando on behalf of those responsible for abducting people for ransom and disappearing so abducted’. Senior lawyer reprimanded by CID tipped to be next BASL VP, 24 Feb 2019, http://www.sundayobserver. lk/2019/02/24/news/senior-lawyer-reprimanded-cid-tipped-be-next-basl-vp

"114 https://navaltoday. com/2012/05/01/sri-lanka-navy-commander-opens-new-naval-legal-services-office-complex/

"115 The CID complained Fernando did not "appear for the interests of the CID or the aggrieved party in the abductions" and did not allow investigators to summon some of the accused for questioning and disrupted the investigation. He’s also alleged to have tried to pressure the investigating officer into taking leave, going to hospital, or being deployed elsewhere and not turning up in court . Reports say the former additional Solicitor General Suhada Gamlath (see ITJP Profile http://www.itjpsl.com/reports/witness-protection ) also tried to get the police to withdraw the B report against Fernando. Gamlath was later asked to stand down as head of Sri Lanka’s witness protection authority because of remarks he made saying the government had pressure-sed the AG’s department to pursue cases against former Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa; Shavinda Fernando also offered legal advice to the Government on its “rehabilitation programme” which the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention later found unlawful, and denied reports of torture. See Human Rights and Security Issues concerning Tamil in Sri Lanka Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Colombo, Sri Lanka. 19 Jun to 3 Jul 2010 https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44cc60d492.pdf Suhada Gamlath to step down after comments stir controversy, 1 Oct 2018, Colombo Gazette, https://colombogazette.com/2018/10/01/ suhada-gamlath-to-step-down-after-comments-stir-controversy/ Also Protector of victims mingling with accused, 29 Sep 2019, Sunday Observer Lanka, http://www.sundayobserver. lk/2019/09/29/news-features/ protector-victims-mingling-accused

B report not available. The police spotted two Navy intelligence sitting in court among litigants and detained them amid fears of a threat to IP Nishantha de Silva’s life. The officers were reportedly identified as N. M. W. Janaka (staff number 38190) and A.S.N. Tony (staff number 103183). The transfer was perceived as an attempt to stall progress in investigations. A/HRC/40/23, para. 47; Images of Sinhala letter on file. Admiral Karanagoda had filed a petition seeking an order to prevent his arrest on 22 Feb 2019, the same day the CID named him as suspect in the case and sought his arrest. Karanagoda was represented by Romesh de Silva, President Sirisena’s Counsel, who referred to him as a “war hero” and implied he was above the law. Supreme Court issues an order preventing arrest of Admiral Karanagoda, & Mar 2019, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2019/03/07/supreme-court-issues-an-order-preventing-the-arrest-of-admiral-karanagoda/ SC issues order preventing arrest of Karanagoda, 7 Mar 2019, Daily Mirror Lanka, http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/SC-issues-order-preventing-arrest-of-Karanagoda/108-163526. among other media reports.

ITJP witness 66.


113 Trincomalee 11 case court documents. The court was informed on 17 May 2016. Vehicle belonged to Vadivel Palananasami Loganathan, and his cousin Ratnasami Paramanathan.

112 Court documents, 9 Feb 2016.

114 "1480. L.M. Lalith Deshapriya, a Navy officer at Welisara Naval Base, was reportedly arrested on duty along with six other officers. They were reportedly brought to Kendana police station, Gampaha
district, and handed over to a captain and taken back to the Naval Base. He complained to the Supreme Court that he was blindfolded, a heated iron was placed on his back, barbed wire was reportedly inserted into his anus, and chilli powder put into his nose, penis and anus. He also alleged that he was tied up and suspended from a wooden pole which was attached to the roof (a torture method known as Dharma Chakkara method—the victim is then revolved around the pole). In his fundamental-rights violation petition, he cited several superior officers as being responsible. It is reported that in Feb 2003 the Supreme Court ordered Lalith Deshapriya to be produced before the Ragama Judicial Medical Officer for examination. At that time, Lalith Deshapriya was reportedly being held at the Navy Welisara camp. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Theo van Boven, Addendum, Summary of information, including individual cases, transmitted to Governments and replies received, E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.1 23 Mar 2003


129 ITJP witness statement.

130 ITJP witness statement.

131 ITJP witness statement.

132 ITJP witness statement.

133 Ref. ITJP Dossier on DKP Dassanayake.

134 ITJP witness statement.


138 Ibid.

139 Bilateral military and maritime cooperation have seen a significant uptick since Sri Lanka’s 2015 elections. Key activities include U.S. Navy port calls, a partnership with the Sri Lanka Navy to establish a Sri Lankan Marine Corps, and exercises with the Sri Lankan Navy and Air Force to build cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and maritime security issues toward a safe and prosperous Indo-Pacific. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sri-lanka/


141 TID detainee from 2008 confined sketches from detainee held there some years later. Also, ITJP Witness: ‘It was like a dungeon. It was across the street from the 4th floor and we entered into the Navy compound. It was very hot, all cement, and the ceilings were not high enough to stand. It was dark.’

142 ITJP Witness Statement.

143 ITJP Witness Statement.


146 OISL report, § 546.

147 OISL report, § 588.

148 OISL report, § 418.

149 https://www.omct.org/violence-against-women/urgent-interventions/sri-lanka/2001/04/d15256/ “In Mar 2001, Sinnathamby Sivamany (24) and Ehamparam Wijikala (22), two Tamil Women’s rights activists were arrested by members of the Navy in the coastal city of Mannar and taken to the office of a special police unit. There, Ehamparam Wijikala was taken inside the police station and brutally raped by two officers. In the meantime, a Navy officer climbed into the van and blindfolded Sinnathamby with a sock, aided by the driver of the van. The officer then forcibly undressed and raped her. Some time afterwards she was taken inside the office to the room in which Ehamparam Wijikala was being held. The security forces personnel beat her, then demanded she remove her clothes. When she refused, Rajah, a male police officer ordered Ehamparam Wijikala to remove Sinnathamby’s clothes. Both Women’s rights were violated and they were made to parade naked in front of the men. They were then made to sit in a crouched position; their hands and legs were tied and attached to a pole which was then placed between two tables so they were left hanging. They were in this position for about 90 minutes and were pinched and beaten with a thick wire during that time.” Amnesty International, SRI LANKA: RAPE IN CUSTODY ON THE INCREASE, 28 Jan 2002, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/sri-lanka-rape-custody-increase

150 ITJP witness statement.


The investigation revealed that both KC Welagedara NRX 1583 and RPS Ranasinghe NRP 1186 then held the rank of Lieutenant Commander (Lt Cmdr), not Lt Commodore.

From Jun 2006 to Apr 2007, Ranasinghe was appointed to “Special Duties” on the Staff of Eastern Commander Thisara SG Samarasinghe, conducting covert operations in the East.

According to his LinkedIn page Kasappa was also based in the Trincomalee site from 2010-12 as commanding officer of the dockyard and then Captain Operations Department (which should involve oversight of intelligence activities).


The Royal Navy met Rear Admiral JJ Ranasinghe who in May 2009 informed the Commander of the Navy about the abducted youth but failed to act to prevent their disappearance. They also met Rear Admiral Nishantha Udugatena who is reported to have investigated human smuggling but this has not resulted in indictments in Sri Lanka. HMS Montrose arrives in Colombo, 3 Apr 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hms-montrose-arrives-in-colombo

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1. PROFILE OF SUSPECTS
2. BIOGRAPHIES OF NAVAL OFFICERS
3. THE AVANT GARDE GROUP
4. HUMAN SMUGGLING BY SEA
5. LIST OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS WITH THE SRI LANKAN NAVY
Annexure 1: Profiles

No. 2001- Apr 2005
Defence Adviser of the Sri Lanka High Commission in India.

6 Jan 2005- 21 Mar 2006
SLNS Sayura.

3 Apr 2006 - 26 Jul 2007
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.

Director Naval Operations and Special Forces and Director Maritime Surveillance.

On the staff of the Director of General of Operations (as well as other duties) at Naval Headquarters.

31 Jul 2008 – 9 Aug 2009
Galle - Southern Naval Command. (Sep 2009: he is promoted to Admiral).

10 Aug 2009 – 19 Jan 2010
Commander Western Area.

20 Jan 2010 – 31 Jan 2011
National Defence College India 50th Course.

1 Feb 2011 – 28 Feb 2011
Director General Services.

5 Apr 2011 – 1 Apr 2011
Commander Western Area.

4 Feb 2011- 4 Oct 2012
Commander Northern Area, KKS (Kankesanthurai).

Commander Eastern Naval Area.

2 Jan 2013 – 6 Jul 2014
Director General Coast guard.
Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne is Sri Lanka’s most senior Special Forces naval officer. He is currently Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) - the highest-ranking military officer in the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, appointed directly by the President. As Chairman of the Committee of the Chief of Defence Staff, the CDS outranks the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Navy and the Commander of the Air Forces, ultimately overseeing all Navy, Army and Air Forces uniform personnel in Sri Lanka\textsuperscript{18}. As Chief of Defence Staff, Wijegunaratne is reported to have access to his own intelligence unit\textsuperscript{19}.

BACKGROUND

Admiral Wijegunaratne joined the Sri Lanka Navy on 1st November 1980 as part of the 9th intake\textsuperscript{17}. He trained in the United Kingdom at the prestigious Britannia Naval Royal College in Dartmouth (1982), in India (1983), in the United States of America (1989) and in Pakistan (1995). In 1993, he established the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), Sri Lanka Navy’s elite Special Forces unit. The SBS is one of the four naval fighting units\textsuperscript{18}, in charge of special operations, including maritime counter-terrorism, amphibious assaults and covert operations on land with regular ground combat units of the Navy or Army and autonomously.

TRINCOMALEE LINKS

Admiral Wijegunaratne was Commandant of the Naval & Maritime Academy based in Trincomalee from April 2006 - July 2007. Insider witnesses have confirmed that this coincides with the period when Gun Site was used as an illegal detention and torture site\textsuperscript{15}.

Furthermore, Wijegunaratne was Director of Naval Operations from July 2007 - July 2008, which puts him in direct command of the Director of Intelligence and who in that capacity should have been aware of a Special Intelligence Unit operating with impunity out of the country’s most secure naval base and in addition, once he became aware of it, should have taken steps to shut it down and hold those responsible accountable.

Wijegunaratne overlapped in this position with a suspect in the abduction case, DKP Dassanayake, who was his deputy Director of Operations from July 2007 - Jan 2009.

While Director of Operations, RC Wijegunaratne’s direct commander was JSK Colombage, the Director General Operations from Aug 2007 - Aug 2008. Colombage does not appear to have been interviewed by Police regarding the Trincomalee case. He was, however, promoted to Commander of the Navy in 2012.

ARREST

Admiral Wijegunaratne was appointed as the Commander of the Navy on 11 July 2015 and as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on 22 August 2017\textsuperscript{19}. On 27 November 2018\textsuperscript{15}, incumbent CDS Admiral Wijegunaratne was arrested and remanded in custody for assisting HMPCK Hettiarachchi (see HMPCK Hettiarachchi’s profile (e)) - the abscending suspect in the Trincomalee 11 case - in avoiding arrest and facing justice and for attempts to intimidate a key witness in the case\textsuperscript{22}. In a thriller-like scenario, the CDS - with the assistance of his aides - allegedly intimidated and attempted to abduct at gun point a senior naval officer. This was after news broke in an official Police B report to the court that he had testified to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) that HMPCK Hettiarachchi had been in hiding in Navy HQ for months under the protection of Admiral Wijegunaratne, who gave him 500,000 rupees (about US$ 3,000) to help him flee the country and instructed Naval Command to lie about the suspect’s whereabouts\textsuperscript{23}. The abduction attempt took place on the afternoon of 25 November 2018 at Navy HQ in Colombo.

POLICE INVESTIGATOR

According to the CID, the CDS allegedly used his position to persuade the Police Chief to get the lead investigator IP Nishantha de Silva removed from the case, a move that was later rescinded. IP de Silva faced death threats recorded in court documents\textsuperscript{24}. Three arrest warrants were issued against Admiral Wijegunaratne, but he initially refused to surrender, with President Sirisena openly criticising the CID’s move to arrest him\textsuperscript{15}. Days later, on 5 December 2018, he was released on bail.

CONTRACT RENEWAL

Despite allegedly obstructing criminal investigations and hiding a fugitive, in August 2019 Wijegunaratne’s initial two-year term of office as CDS was extended until 31 December 2019 by President Maithripala Sirisena, sparking an outcry in human rights circles.
B) WASANTHA KUMAR JAYADEWA KARANNAGODA ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET (RETIRED)

CAREER

1971
Joined the Navy aged 18²⁸.

1974
Trained at the Indian Naval Academy and again in India in 1979²⁷.

1987
Trained in the UK – at Dartmouth²⁸.

1992-1993
Commandant of the Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.

1997
International Relations and International Maritime Law course in the USA.

1999-2000
National Defence Course at the Pakistan Defence University.

2002
National Defence University in Washington.

2 Sep 2005 - 14 Jul 2009
Commander of the Navy²⁹.

Jul 2009
Advisor to the President on National Security (alleged to have 100 bodyguards and six escort vehicles after he retired³⁰).

2009-2010
Secretary to Ministry of Highways and Road Development when the war area roads were being reconstructed with foreign aid, including from the Asian Development Bank³¹. Karannagoda was involved in securing Chinese equipment to rebuild roads in the north under the “Uthuru Wasanthaya” (Northern Spring) programme along with the Rajapaksa family and others³². This has been described as part of the securitisation of development.

Mar 2011-2015
Sri Lankan Ambassador to Japan.

22 Feb 2019
CID names Karannagoda as a suspect³³.

Feb 2019
Files a Fundamental Rights petition in the Supreme Court seeking an interim order preventing the CID from arresting him in connection with the case.

Mar 2019
Supreme Court issued an interim order preventing the arrest.

19 Sep 2019
Promoted to Admiral of the Fleet³⁴.

2015 UN investigation into Sri Lanka also commented that, “the Sri Lankan Navy, in particular, was responsible for cases of enforced disappearances in Jaffna and Mannar” in this period³⁵.

LINKS TO GOTABAYA RAJAPAKSA

Karannagoda is known to be a close associate of former Secretary of Defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, saying in an interview that “the unwavering leadership of His Excellency the President and the Defence Secretary is the key factor” in winning the war³⁶. Karannagoda also conceded his allegiance to Gotabaya Rajapaksa in his Fundamental Rights Application (Paras 61 & 69, 2019) in which he accuses Criminal Investigation Division (CID) investigator, Nishantha de Silva, of having an agenda to “embarrass the former President and/or the Defence Secretary on the basis that the Petitioner is perceived to be a close associate of theirs”.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

As Commander of the Navy, Karannagoda attended National Security Council meetings³⁷. There were also daily briefings in the Navy Headquarters headed by the Commander of the Navy gathering about 20 top officers who were the Directors of all the branches³². As Karannagoda’s Aide de Camp (ADC), Sampath Munasinghe (see profile (d)) would attend these daily briefings and brief the top officers about information gathered though his vast network of informants. There would also be a briefing by the Director of Naval Intelligence who attended the daily briefings³⁸.
In 2009, the Trincomalee 11 abduction case was triggered when Wasantha Karannagoda made a complaint to the Police about his ADC, Sampath Munasinghe (also known as ‘Navy Sampath’). State-run media has quoted a petition by the mother of one of the Trincomalee 11 victims alleging that “Karannagoda made of the Trincomalee 11 victims not because of concern about the complaint against Munasinghe alleging that "Karannagoda made of the Trincomalee 11 victims not because of concern about the complaint against Munasinghe alleging that "Karannagoda made of the Trincomalee 11 victims not because of concern about the complaint against Munasinghe alleging that "Karannagoda made of the Trincomalee 11 victims not because of concern about the complaint against Munasinghe telling the Police that Karannagoda had questioned him about whether he had conducted an affair with his wife Ashoka Karannagoda and one of her relatives living in London called Jiniththi Gurusinhe. Sampath testified that he did have an affair with Jiniththi Gurusinhe, but not with Mrs Karannagoda but Karannagoda did not believe this and questioned his wife’s security officers and drivers. No evidence has ever been presented to substantiate the allegation of an affair with the Commander of the Navy’s wife, but the CID concluded this suspicion was the reason for Karannagoda’s original complaint. An ITJP witness alleges the accusation of the affair came from Karannagoda’s then Naval Adviser, Admiral Mohottalage Udaya Keerthi Vijaya Bandara as revenge because Sampath wouldn’t help him with a business deal involving turbines. MUKV Bandara was then appointed as part of the investigation team into Sampath Munasinghe.

Initially the accusation against Sampath Munasinghe was that he might have been working with the LTTE in some capacity - something that’s now been completely ruled out. However, in his 2019 Fundamental Rights Application, Karannagoda admits he had been told Sampath Munasinghe might have abducted some youths. Since he was busy with the war, he says he ‘directed the Naval Provost Marshal [Senaka Hanwellas] and Director of Naval Intelligence [A K Guruge] to investigate the matter’ and asked the Eastern Area commander [Susith Maliya Bandara Weerasekara] if any youths were being held at Trincomalee naval camp. However, court documents, indicate that in 2017 Karannagoda initially denied ordering any such investigation but then retracted this denial and in 2019 admitted it. What is extraordinary is that Trincomalee was not an officially gazetted detention site in 2009 so the assumption by Karannagoda that the missing abducted ‘youths’ might be detained there suggests that he already knew about the hill-top underground detention chambers at Gun Site.

Court documents show Commander Karannagoda’s naval adviser, then MUKV Bandara, did conduct the initial naval investigation into the abductions in 2009 along with the Director of Intelligence, Ananda Guruge, and the then Head of Discipline Senaka Hanwellas. The choice of investigators represents a conflict of interest given Bandara was allegedly the initial source of the complaint and Weeraskera was in charge of the naval base where the abducted men disappeared.

Karannagoda himself says he informed Gotabaya Rajapaksa of the allegations against his Personal Security Officer (PSO) Sampath Munasinghe on 23 May 2009 and recommended a Police investigation. The Colombo Crimes Division (CCD) were order to investigate, led by Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Anura Sennanayake who was later himself charged in connection with a separate murder case.

Early Police investigations into Sampath Munasinghe discovered the identity cards of disappeared youths in his quarters, as well as ammunition for weapons that were not standard issue for the Navy. The discovery of the identity cards linked Munasinghe to the disappearances of 11 people in 2008-9. He then testified that Karannagoda and other very senior naval figures knew all about the abductions and disappearances.
PREVENTING ARREST

Karannagoda says 28 September 2016 was the first time the Police asked him to make a statement in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case. In February 2019, Karannagoda filed a fundamental rights application to obtain an interim order preventing the Police arresting him in connection with this case. In March 2019, the Supreme Court granted the request on the grounds that Karannagoda was a “war hero” and would cooperate with the Police. Media reports say the Sri Lanka Police then requested Karannagoda to appear and give a statement on many occasions in 2019 and he failed to show up. At one point, Karannagoda said this was because his wife was ill and he couldn’t leave her side, but then appeared at a ceremony to promote him to Admiral of the Fleet. When the Police threatened to get a court order to compel him to appear, Karannagoda did finally give a statement in September 2019.

FAMILY BUSINESS ASSETS

Wasantha Karannagoda, who is now retired, is the director of a construction company, Vivesta Constructions Pvt Ltd (PV105507), along with three other Karannagodas. His family allegedly own a number of companies mostly connected to maritime shipping and transport. The parent company is Marine Transport Services (pvt) Ltd (PV8074) whose chairman is the former Commander of the Navy’s brother, Dushmantha Karannagoda. This includes other companies involved in trading and indenting, air freight, import of motor vehicles, freight forwarding, clearing agents and human resources, recruitment (mostly for the Middle East) and student placement (including four UK universities) licensed under the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, and two companies that build hydro power plants.

While still Ambassador to Japan in 2011, Karannagoda joined the Board of Directors of a real estate development company, Colombo Land and Development Company Ltd. His fellow board member was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s current lawyer Mohamed Sabry.

(C) COMMODORE

DKP DASSANAYAKE

STAFF NUMBER NRX 0398

CAREER

NIC: 660471510V
Passport Number: N5255215
16 Feb 1966
Date of birth.
15 Jun 1987
Training in Sri Lanka.
2 Jun - 1 Jul 2000
Training in Israel.
7 Oct 2002 - 31 Jul 2003
SIO (East) & Special Intelligence Office (SIO) (East), Trincomalee.
1 Aug - 2 Sep 2003
Officer Provost Training in India.
3 Sep 2003 - 16 May 2004
Senior Staff Officer & SIO (East), Trincomalee.
9-20 Sep 2005
On the Staff of the Commander of the Navy (CoN).
21 Sep 2005-30 Jun 2008
Senior Staff Officer, on the Staff of Director Naval Operations (DNO).
1 Jul 2008 - 23 Sep 2008
Deputy Director, Naval Operations & Media Coordinator, on Staff of Director Naval Operations (DNO).
24 Sep 2008 - 7 Jan 2009
Deputy Director, Naval Operations & Media Coordinator and A/Deputy Director Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS). On the staff of the Director General Operations. (who was JSK Colombage and then DWAS Dissanayake from 1 Aug 2008).
8 Jan 2009 - 9 Aug 2009
Director Naval Operations.
10 Aug 2009 - 3 Aug 2010
Director Naval Operations, Media Coordinator, Dep Dir SBS, RABS and A/DMSF (Director Marine Special Forces).
8 Jan 2009 - 3 Aug 2010
Media Coordinator and Deputy Director SBS and RABS and A/DMSF (Director Marine Special Forces). On the staff of the Director General Operations.
4 Aug 2010 - 20 Jul 2011
Commanding officer SLNS Shakthi.
30 Mar 2011
‘Humanitarian Operation’ medal.
21 Jul 2011 - 8 Aug 2012
Commanding officer SLNS Kelani, Western Naval Area.
9 Aug - 22 Nov 2012
Commanding officer SLNS Shilpa, Kandy - Naval Recruit Training Centre.
23 Nov 2012 - 9 Feb 2014
A/Provost Marshal.
8 Feb 2013
Awarded another Medal.

22 Jun 2013
Police request a travel ban for him.

10 Feb – 10 Sep 2014
In charge of SLNS Kanchadewa (Kayts and Velani) COMNORTH (Commander North).

11 Nov 2014 - 11 Mar 2015
Overseas training course applied for, Naval Postgraduate School, California.

16 Feb 2015
Navy Commander, SAMJ Perera, sends a letter to Police saying DKP Dassanayake will return from the USA on this date; returns to Sri Lanka.

18 Feb 2015
Police appeal to Solicitor General Suhada Gamalth (see ITJP Dossier) to stop DKP Dassanayake leaving the country; his family is in the USA. Only verbal instructions are given.

19 Feb 2015
Named by Police as an alleged perpetrator in the Trincomalee 11 court case. Police appeal to Court to give an order to stop his travel and to report to the CID.

20 Feb 2015
Police request court to stop DKP Dassanayake from going abroad by directing immigration.

9 Mar 2015
Letter from US Defence Attaché Colombo saying DKP Dassanayake has missed three weeks of coursework “due to unforeseen circumstances requiring his presence in Sri Lanka” and should be withdrawn.

11 Mar 2015
DKP Dassanayake requests permission to travel abroad.

12 Mar - 14 May 2015
On the staff of the Director General Administration, DMS Dissanayaka (no relation).

15 May - 15 Sep 2015
Captain Operation Dept, SLNS Rangalla in Colombo Harbour.

6 June 2016
Magistrate denies him permission to travel.

Captain Operation Dept, SLNS Rangalla and oversees duties of CO of SLNS Suranimita missile boat.

25 Oct 2015 - 1 Jan 2017
Director of Naval Inspectorate - on the Staff of Commander of Navy (who is RC Wijegunaratne at this time).

From 1 Aug 2016
Also Head of Cyber Security Cell.

26 Oct 2016
Designated T. Cmde.

27 Oct 2016
Awarded a Medal by President Sirisena.

2 Jan - 12 Mar 2017
Commanding Officer, SLNS Sayura Offshore Patrol Craft.

13 Mar 2017 - 10 Dec 2017
Director Coordination - for the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), on the staff of the CDS. (who is RC Wijegunaratne at this time).

12 Jul 2017
Arrested: on the charge of aiding and abetting the abduction and disappearance of 11 people in 2008 and 2009.

11 Dec 2017 - 14 Mar 2018
In Continuation for Special Duties, SLNS Parakrama.

09 Jan 2018
Released on bail.

15 Mar 2018 - 9 May 2018
Director Naval Victualling and Clothing. On the staff of DG Logistics.

10 May 2018 - 20 Aug 2019
Tri-Forces Coordinating Officer for the Disaster Management Centre.

20 Dec 2018
The CID informs court that Admiral Karannagoda and RPS Ranasinghe have been reinstated, key witness Krishantha Welagedara has received death threats and that witnesses are vulnerable as suspects can access their communications. Chief Investigator IP Nishantha de Silva told the court that he fears for his life.

03 Jul 2019
President Maithripala Sirisena grants a one-year service extension.

21 Aug 2019 - present
Appointed to the staff of Navy Commander as Director Management Logistics in SLNS Parakrama.

27 Sep 2019
Promoted to Commodore. Reports say President Sirisena had recommended him for promotion to Rear Admiral.

WAR RECORD
Commodore DKP Dassanayake is a decorated Senior Naval Intelligence officer. He joined the Navy in 1987. He distinguished himself during the civil war, leading to his appointment as Navy spokesman. In 2009 he has been described by colleagues as the senior officer in charge of the Chalai-based deployment during the final phase of combined forces operations. This means that he was commanding frontline combat in the final phase of the war in the Vanni - a role that should have precluded him from obtaining a US visa to study. Throughout the final phase of the war he held a number of Intelligence and Special Forces posts based at SLNS Parakrama Naval Headquarters in Colombo.
GUN SITE

Vice Admiral Travis Sinniah⁹⁵ - who was Commander of the Naval and Maritime Academy in Trincomalee from July 2007 to July 2009 and who is believed now to have left Sri Lanka for Australia - testified before CID that then Captain DKP Dassanayake was personal aide⁹⁶ to then Navy Commander Karannagoda (see profile b). He explained that the cells in Gun Site were controlled by Lt Cdr RPS Ranasinghe (see profile f) under DKP Dassanayake and ultimately Navy Commander Karannagoda, and that vehicles came and went without being checked under DKP Dassanayake’s supervision⁹⁷. DKP Dassanayake visited Gun Site and was fully aware that people were detained there.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS

DKP Dassanayake has also been named in court documents as the officer in charge of the two special intelligence teams headed by Lt Cdr Hettiarachchi and then Lt Cdr Ranasinghe responsible for abductions and disappearances. The intelligence units were allegedly operating under DKP Dassanayake’s direct supervision, though RPS Ranasinghe denied this to Police contradicting testimony provided by other witnesses⁹⁸. According to court documents, DKP Dassanayake ordered and has been involved directly and indirectly in the abduction and disappearance of the Trincomalee 11 ‘youths’⁹⁹. One of the victims identified him as the person in charge of his detention in ‘Chaitya Road’ at SLNS Parakrama/Navy HQ in Colombo and then Gun Site¹⁰⁰. In addition, DKP Dassanayake is also alleged to have asked for a ransom from family members of two other victims¹⁰¹.

HONOURS & PROMOTIONS

In July 2008, DKP Dassanayake was commended, together with RPS Ranasinghe (see profile (f)) and other members of his team, for his participation in intelligence operations in the Trincomalee area¹⁰².

In September 2009, he appears on another list of officers – again alongside RPS Ranasinghe (see profile f) - for outstanding performance during the so-called ‘Humanitarian Operation to defeat the LTTE’. This is estimated by the UN to have cost the lives of tens of thousands of civilians.

In 2012, Dassanayake was – ironically - appointed Acting Provost Marshal and then Provost Marshal, in charge of enforcing discipline within the Navy, before being promoted to Acting Director and then Director of Naval Inspectorate in 2015 and 2016 respectively.

While Dassanayake was jailed for 6 months he appears to have remained on the Navy payroll and on the staff of the CDS, who was Wijegunaratne at this time (see profile (a)) and then on “Special Duties”, at Navy HQ. After release he became Director of Naval Victualling and Clothing.

TRAINING

In 2014 Dassanayake was granted a visa and a place on a postgraduate naval training course in the USA. The allegations of his involvement in the 11 abductions and Gun Site may not have been public knowledge until February 2015 when he was named as a suspect, but in 2013 the Sri Lankan police had asked for a travel ban on Dassanayake and in 2012-13 there had been allegations of his involvement in human smuggling (see below). A letter (attached in court documents, dated 9 March 2015) from the US Defence Attache in Colombo proposed Dassanayake be withdrawn from the course because he’d missed classes, “due to unforeseen circumstances requiring his presence in Sri Lanka”. The Defence Attache suggested Dassanayake could resume the course at a later date. By March 2015 it was well known that Dassanayake was a suspect in the abduction and disappearances.

OTHER ALLEGATIONS

According to court documents, a Navy inquiry conducted around 2012-2013¹⁰³ found that DKP Dassanayake was directly involved in human smuggling and recommended that he be removed from his disciplinary and intelligence roles and punished¹⁰⁴.

In January 2014, DKP Dassanayake was allegedly seen at night wearing civilian clothes visiting the detention facility of SLNS Gomunu in Welisara naval base where illegal detention and torture was taking place¹⁰⁵.

THREATS

Court documents also reveal that DKP Dassanayake and RPS Ranasinghe (see profile f) made death threats against state witnesses KC Welagedara and Aluthgedara Upul Bandara after they provided information to chief investigator in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, IP Nishantha de Silva¹⁰⁶.

On 19 February 2015, IP Nishantha de Silva told the court that Lt Cdr Sampath Munasinghe (see profile d), Capt. DKP Dassanayake and Lt Cdr Prasad Chandana Hettiarachchi (see profile e) were alleged perpetrators in the case.

ARREST

DKP Dassanayake was eventually arrested by the CID on 12 July 2017 and remanded on charges of aiding and abetting in the abduction and disappearance of the Trincomalee 11 in...
2008-2009. At the time, he was the most senior officer arrested in connection with the disappearances. When arrested, he was attached to the prestigious Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). He was released on bail on 9 January 2018 with five others accused in the case pending further investigation. Four months after being bailed, he was made Tri-Forces Coordinating Officer for the Disaster Management Centre.

Since his release on bail, he was also given a service extension by President Maithripala Sirisena and appointed as Director in the Navy Commander’s office and then in 2019 promoted to the rank of permanent Commodore.

**CAREER**

16 Jan 1974
Date of birth.

2005 - 2009
Aide de Camp to Commander of the Navy.

28 May 2009
False allegations that he colluded with the LTTE.

3 Jun 2009
Court order requested to impound Munasinghe’s passport and several bank accounts.

10 June 2009
Major AM Neville Priyantha Attanayake of the Army hands over Munasinghe to CID, who arrest him under Emergency Regulations.

Police inform court regarding ammunition found in Munasinghe’s room.

7 Dec 2009
90-day Detention Order issued for possession of live non naval issue ammunition and planning to kill VIPs.

29 Apr 2010
Naval officers allege Munasinghe spends more than he earns.

7 Jun 2010
CID takes over documents found in Munasinghe’s room from CCD, including identity cards of abduction victims.

10 Jun 2010
Released on bail.

30 Mar 2011
CID officer informs court that Munasinghe is connected to Dehiwala 5 disappearances.

Mar 2015
Arrested for Raviraj MP killing in 2006.

8 Jul 2015
Police tell court Munasinghe is free on bail.

Dec 2015
Charged in Raviraj killing.

22 Dec 2016
Acquitted from Raviraj killing.

25 Feb 2019
Re-arrested under 296 (murder) of the Penal Code.

**ADC TO COMMANDER OF THE NAVY**

Lieutenant Commander (Lt Cmdr) Sampath Munasinghe is a senior Naval Intelligence officer and one of the key suspects in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case. He distinguished himself during the civil war and became close to Wasantha Karannagoda (see profile b), then Eastern Naval Commander, from around 2003-2005.

When Wasantha Karannagoda was promoted to the rank of Navy Commander in September 2005, he took Lt Cmdr Munasinghe as his Aide de Camp (ADC), which was a very important role. Indeed, the Navy later informed the Police that Munasinghe had 255 people working under him.

**INTELLIGENCE WORK**

Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe had an extended intelligence network, including civilian informants in the Colombo and Trincomalee harbours. He was also a member of the combined intelligence unit gathering top officers from the Navy, Army and Air Force, which allegedly operated from either Hotel Renuka or the Holiday Inn in Colombo. He got his nickname ‘Navy Sampath’ from there. When HMPCK Hettiarachchi started attending combined intelligence unit meetings on behalf of Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe, the nickname ‘Navy Sampath’ attached to him, which later lead the press confusingly to refer to HMPCK Hettiarachchi as ‘Navy Sampath’.

RPS Ranasinghe (see profile f) and HMPCK Hettiarachchi (see profile e), who are also both suspects in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, were junior to Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe and provided him with intelligence. Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi and Lt...
Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe’s collaboration in covert operations goes back to at least 2006.

**RAVIRAJ CASE**

Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe was an accused along with Lt Cmdr HMPCK Hettiarachchi in the court case regarding the killing of Tamil MP Nadaraja Raviraj which took place on 10 November 2006. An all Sinhalese jury in 2016 acquitted all those on trial; a decision that is being appealed.

**TRINCO 11 ACCUSED**

In 2009, Lt Cmdr Munasinghe fell out with Admiral MUKV Bandara, Naval Adviser to Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda, after allegedly refusing to help him get rid of a competitor in his business venture. It has been alleged within Navy circles that Admiral MUKV Bandara was involved in private businesses while being in government service and that he was allegedly using his rank and uniform for his own personal profit including to make money. As a result, MUKV Bandara allegedly told Navy Commander Karannagoda that Lt Cmdr Munasinghe was allegedly having an affair with his wife. Lt Cmdr Munasinghe fell into disgrace. Shortly after, on 28 May 2009, Navy Commander Admiral Karannagoda filed a written complaint against Lt Cmdr Munasinghe after four national identity cards, a mobile phone, one passport, 450 live ammunition and promissory notes were found in his room, thus triggering the commencement of an investigation by the Police which eventually brought to light the involvement of Navy officers at the highest level in illegal detentions, abductions, torture, extortion and racketeering in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case. However, it appears that Karannagoda knew about the abductions when he filed the complaint against Sampath Munasinghe but chose not to raise them in his complaint, rather accusing his ADC of being linked to the LTTE.

Lt Cmdr Munasinghe surrendered to the Police in June 2009 with the help of an Army officer (who doesn’t appear to have been interviewed by the CID). One media report alleges that Sampath accused Commander of the Navy Admiral Karannagoda of planning to assassinate Army Chief Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka. No more detail has been made public about this alleged plot but it comes against a backdrop of Navy-Army rivalry at the time.

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**E) HETTIARACHCHI MUDIYANSELAGE PRASAD CHANDANA KUMARA**

**HETTIARACHCHI STAFF NUMBER NRP 1185**

**CAREER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIC: 770402930V</td>
<td>Date of birth: 9 Feb 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Joined the Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>In charge of the intelligence obtained through the Navy platoon operating at the National Intelligence Bureau in Colombo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jun - 2 Sep 2008</td>
<td>Additional for Special Duty, on the staff of COMNORCEN (Commander North Central).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 2008 - 27 Mar 2009</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, SLNS Parakrama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar 2009 - 26 May 2009</td>
<td>Intelligence Officer, on the Staff of Contingent Commander South (CCOS), SLNS Parakrama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 2009 - 14 Sep 2010</td>
<td>Company Commander, SLNS Barana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep 2010 - 24 Feb 2011</td>
<td>For overseas training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 2011 - 2 Jul 2012</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, SLNS Rangalla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jul 2012 - 4 Jan 2013</td>
<td>A/Senior Staff Officer (Land Operation – West), SLNS Rangalla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jan 2013 - 7 Aug 2013</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, NDEP Pulmodai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 2013</td>
<td>Police request a court order to stop Hettiarachchi (and RPS Ranasinghe) going abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aug - 22 Oct 2013</td>
<td>Administrative Officer, SLNS Vijayaba.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACQUITTED IN RAVIRAJ CASE

Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi was also a co-accused with Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe in the court case regarding the killing of Tamil member of parliament, Nadaraja Raviraj, which took place on 10 November 2006. An all-Sinhalese jury in 2016 acquitted all those on trial; a decision that is being appealed in the hope of obtaining a retrial.

After his release from prison, HMPCX Hettiarachchi came back to work at SLNS Parakrama/Navy Headquarters in Colombo despite still being a suspect in the 11 Trincomalee abduction case. This suggests that he benefited from protection at the highest level given that being a suspect in a criminal case should have resulted in his suspension.

BACKGROUND ON RAVI RAJ MP CASE

Other accused in the case included a third naval officer and a Tamil paramilitary cadre from the east called Sivakanthan Vivekanandan, alias Charan, who was believed at the time to be in Switzerland. He was tried in absentia along with two others, one of whom, Inspector Fabian Royston Toussaint, was said to be a former intelligence officer last heard of running an eco-consultancy in Australia. The Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) said Interpol notices were issued for Charan and Toussaint. The UK’s Metropolitan Police Service also assisted in this case to develop DNA profiles and fingerprints from the crime scene. The IPU commented on the handling of the case, saying it failed “to understand how this matter came to trial at a time when several of the suspects had yet to be apprehended, including one located in Switzerland and who might have been able to provide critical information on the case at hand…” Media reports quote an MP saying the Police had found evidence pointing to the involvement of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) in Mr Raviraj’s assassination. Various Sri Lankan media reports allege that SIS operative, Mahil Dole, was involved in the assassination. Media reports quoted witnesses from the case alleging former Secretary of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa had ordered the assassination of the MP. Other media reports in Sinhala named a wide range of Police officers alleged to have been involved, including SIS Deputy Director National Information Unit H Division, Superintendent of Police, Dole.

NAVAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

According to court documents and other sources, then Captain DKP Dassanayake (see DKP Dassanayake’s profile) was the
officer in charge of the two special intelligence teams headed by Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi and then Lt Cmdr Ranasinghe, responsible for abductions and disappearances. HMPCK Hettiarachchi is alleged to have operated mainly from Colombo and RPS Ranasinghe from Trincomalee, though they worked between the two and collaborated on various operations. Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi is alleged to be the one who usually transported people in vans from Colombo to Trincomalee. In Colombo, Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi worked closely with Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe (see Sampath Munasinghe’s profile), aide-de-camp to Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda (see WKJ Karannagoda’s profile). SLNS Parakrama/Navy Headquarters then Commander, Karunanayakage Jayantha Karunanayake and then Director Intelligence Captain Ananda Guruge both have said that they did not supervise HMPCK Hettiarachchi. However, another witness Captain Nishantha Amarosa said that Hettiarachchi was last under the command of AK Guruge.

ABDUCTIONS

In 2008-2009, Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi and his team are alleged to have been directly involved in the abduction of the Trincomalee 11 and court documents reveal that victims were held in SLNS Parakrama/Navy Headquarters under Lt Cmdr Sampath Munasinghe, Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi and then Captain DKP Dassanayake. A naval witness said Hettiarachchi gave him money to buy food for the detainees. Another saw the Dehiwela 5 victims being put in a van to be sent to Trincomalee to RPS Ranasinghe. Court documents quote the disappeared youth Rajeev Naganathan calling his father in February 2009 and alleging Hettiarachchi had brought Ali Anver to Chaitya Road Naval HQ and had him suspended and beaten. In March, the Naganathan family received an SMS saying Hettiarachchi had moved their son and other prisoners to Trincomalee.

ABScondING and ARREST

On 3 May 2017, chief investigator IP Nishantha de Silva requested an arrest warrant for Lt Cmdr Hettiarachchi. In 18 Jan 2018 he requested an international arrest warrant and on 31 Jan 2018 the Police issued a public appeal calling him ‘Navy Sampath’. HMPCK Hettiarachchi appears to have hidden ‘in plain view’ in SLNS Parakrama/Navy Headquarters (HQ) whilst being called for questioning by the CID since March 2017, when according to his naval service records he surrendered. There is no indication the Navy took disciplinary action against him for failing to show up for duty or failing to appear before CID. The CID wrote twice to Naval Command to ask them to hand over suspect HMPCK Hettiarachchi. Naval Command’s response was thatLt Cmdr Hettiarachchi was not in Naval HQ, which transpired to be a lie as his presence in Naval HQ at the time was confirmed by various witnesses, including his wife and other women who visited him in his quarters in Naval HQ during that time, and logs from the officers’ mess bar and for food rations. In fact, HMPCK Hettiarachchi absconded for more than a year under the protection of the Navy Commander Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne (see profile a). It appears that Admiral Wijegunaratne also gave 500,000 rupees (about US$5,000 at the time) to HMPCK Hettiarachchi through his secretary Rear Admiral HAUD Hettiarachchi (unrelated to HMPCK Hettiarachchi) to help him flee, possibly to Malaysia, to avoid arrest.

PROTECTED BY THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

In a dramatic turn of events, on 25 November 2018 Admiral Wijegunaratne – who by then had been promoted to Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the highest military position in the entire armed forces in Sri Lanka - and one of his Private Security Officers - tried to abduct from Navy HQ a senior naval officer and key witness in the Trincomalee abduction case, chasing him with a gun, because he had confirmed to the CID that the Navy Commander protected suspect HMPCK Hettiarachchi and had helped him avoid arrest.

BUSINESS INTERESTS

As a side legitimate business, HMPCK Hettiarachchi is alleged to have owned two containers - that he could not have bought on a standard officer’s salary - in the Colombo harbour, which he rented out. He was arrested while attending to his container business. Media reports quoting Police say that when Hettiarachchi received arrears of pay after being acquitted from the Raviraj killing case he used the money to purchase a container lorry.
(F) COMMANDER RANASINGHE PEDIGE SUMITH RANASINGHE (STAFF NUMBER NRP 1186)

Career:
NIC: 763300536V
Passport Number: N3426272

25 Nov 1976
Date of birth.

Cadet training and additional training.

2001
Deployed in Thiriyaya and Nilaweli, heading intelligence gathering teams, alongside Sampath Munasinghe.

2001-2002
Recovering from claymore attack injury.

Sri Lanka Telecom technical course.

20 Aug 2003 – 4 Oct 2004
Company Commander.

5 Oct 2004 – 6 Jul 2005
Special Intelligence Officer (SIO).

7 Jul – 9 Oct 2005
Junior Naval Staff course at Trincomalee Naval Maritime Academy.

SIO on the staff of CCON, SLNS Vijabaya.

30 Jun 2006 – 28 Apr 2007
Special duty on the staff of COMEAST, SLN Dockyard.

29 Apr – 16 Nov 2007
UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti.

Staff Officer (SO) Land Operations (LO) [E] COMEAST.

24 Jan 2008
Awarded the Rana Sura Padakkama medal by President Rajapaksa.

Staff Office (SO) (LO) [E] & SIO [E] on the staff of COMEAST.

June 2009
RPS Ranasinghe is first alleged to be involved in Gun Site.

14 July 2009
Wasantha Karannagoda writes him a letter of commendation, praising his commitment to crush the LTTE.

29 Sep 2009 – 23 Apr 2010
Training in India, young officer infantry course.

14 Feb & 6 Apr 2010
Letters of commendation from Navy Commander TSG Samarasinghe regarding weapon recovery.

24 Apr 2010 – 30 Sep 2012
SIO East on the staff of COMEAST. (Under Admiral Jayanath SK Colombage).

2011 - 2012
Works on countering human smuggling vessels in east.

1 – 10 Oct 2012
Personal Security Officer to Commander of Navy (for Admiral Jayanath SK Colombage).

11 Oct 2012 – 30 May 2013
Personal Security Officer to Commander of Navy and Special Intelligence Officer (international network).

31 May -28 Aug 2013
Special Duties.

July 2013
Police ask for a court order to stop RPS Ranasinghe going abroad.

29 Aug – 31 Dec 2013
Security Officer, SLNS Lanka.

23 Oct 2013
Statement has been recorded by Police from RPS Ranasinghe.

27 Aug – 31 Dec 2013
Security Officer.

1 Jan 2014 – 7 Jan 2016
Staff Officer, Land Operations (South East).

2 – 14 Jul 2014
Overseas training.

12 Nov 2015
CID tells court RPS Ranasinghe commanded Gun Site.

8 Jan – 4 May 2016
Senior Staff Officer, Land Operations (West) & Area Public Relations Officer (West), SLNS Rangalla.

27 Oct 2016
Awarded the Rana Sura Padakkama medal by President Sirisena.

09 Feb 2017
Colombo Magistrate Lanka Jayaratne directs state counsel to compile necessary extracts and hand them over to CID to arrest 10, including Ranasinghe.

2 Mar 2017
Arrested.

8 May 2017 – 25 Feb 2018
Administrative Officer, SLNS Rangalla.
EARLY CAREER AND INJURY

Commander RPS Ranasinghe is a senior Naval Intelligence officer of the naval Special Intelligence Unit. He joined the Navy in 1997 as part of the 29th intake. He is one of the prime suspects in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case; his name first emerged as the officer in charge of the illegal detention site in June 2009 in the testimony of his deputy KC Welagedara.

In 2001, RPS Ranasinghe was badly injured by a LTTE claymore attack which targeted him directly in Thambalagamuwa on the outskirts of Trincomalee. Reports indicate that 17 people were killed in this incident. RPS Ranasinghe survived but he spent a year in hospital where he underwent major surgery and was left with a visible scar on his face and a thirst for revenge.

From June 2006 to April 2007, RPS Ranasinghe was appointed to ‘Special Duties’ on the Staff of Eastern Commander, Thisara SG Samarasinghe, conducting covert operations in the east. RPS Ranasinghe was involved in at least two attacks on the LTTE in Muttur in July 2006, weeks before the killing in Muttur of 17 aid workers from NGO Action Contre la Faim on 4 August 2006.

According to court documents, RPS Ranasinghe was the Office in Charge (OIC) of the Special Intelligence Unit in Trincomalee (established mid-2006) and SDSS Dayananda was his Second in Command. The reports say members of the Special Intelligence Unit participated in a number of covert and overt attacks.

KARUNA GROUP

RPS Ranasinghe distinguished himself within the Naval Intelligence special unit operating in the east by hunting individuals affiliated with the LTTE in covert operations, often collaborating with cadres of the Karuna group, to whom he would provide food, weapons and ammunition, and who sometimes wore Navy uniforms for special operations. During that time, he also developed a vast network of informants, the payment of which his unit had to self-finance.

RPS Ranasinghe was allegedly protected and considered to be facto untouchable thanks to his connections at the highest political level and the payment of bribes to officials within the criminal justice system, including allegedly the Eastern Province Deputy Inspector General, Edison Gunathilake, who would allegedly turn a blind eye to his criminal money-making schemes.

UN PEACEKEEPER

RPS Ranasinghe was deployed on a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti from April to November 2007. At the time Sri Lankan peacekeepers from the 8th battalion were repatriated in November 2007, more than 130 Sri Lankans had been involved in sexual exploitation and abuse of children as young as 12 years old as part of a child sex ring in operation from 2004-2007.

Lt Cmdr RPS Ranasinghe was then mainly based in SLNS Tissa in Trincomalee naval base from November 2007 to September 2012, except for a period of 7 months (September 2009-April 2010) during which he went to India for training. In May 2008, he was commended for his role in an intelligence operation that recovered four suicide jackets in Trincomalee town, along with several other Naval Intelligence officers who are suspects or witnesses in the Trincomalee 11 abduction court case.

GUN SITE

RPS Ranasinghe’s official duties included intelligence gathering and surveillance but he also allegedly had parallel duties involving abductions, interrogations, torture and killings. He was in charge of the illegal detention site at Gun Site in Trincomalee and prisoners held there were under his custody. Victims held at Gun Site from 2009-2012 have in particular identified him by name and from photographs as the intelligence officer in charge of their detention and torture. He was provided with rented Toyota Dolphin and Toyota Hiace vans for intelligence work. He himself has acknowledged that he was in charge.
RPS Ranasinghe allegedly had a direct line of communication to the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who visited Trincomalee naval base on several occasions including the area where Gun Site was located on at least one occasion. He has been photographed with Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Several witnesses referred to Gun Site as ‘Gota’s camp’, after the Defence Secretary. Lt Cmdr KC Welagedara was RPS Ranasinghe’s deputy in Trincomalee naval base in 2009 and the officer in charge of Gun Site’s prisoners whilst RPS Ranasinghe was away or too busy. During his time at SLNS Tissa, RPS Ranasinghe allegedly raped a mother and her two daughters before killing them.

From 2007-2008, then Lt Cmdr RPS Ranasinghe worked closely with batchmate and other key suspect in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case Chandana Prasad Hettiarchchi (profile e) and aide-de-camp to Navy Commander, Wasantha Karannagoda, Sampath Munasinghe, (profile d) in Navy Intelligence between Trincomalee Naval base and Colombo.

Extraordinarily RPS Ranasinghe was named as the person in charge of Gun Site as early as 2009 and again in 2015 but from Jan-May 2016 he was chosen to work as a public relations officer for the Navy.

COMMAND

RPS Ranasinghe’s duties fell under Eastern Commander, SMB Weerasekera, and then JSK Colombage, Naval Intelligence Directors, then Cmdr (now Rear Admiral) AK Guruge and Cmdr Mohotti, and Deputy Director Naval Operations DKP Dassanayake, also a suspect in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case. RPS Ranasinghe is alleged to have been directly involved in the abduction of some of the Trincomalee 11 victims under orders of Sampath Munasinghe.

Vice Admiral JSK Colombage was made Commander of the Navy in late 2012, and appointed RPS Ranasinghe as his Personal Security Officer (PSO). Four years later in 2016 Colombage was accused of corruption (though the charges were dropped in 2019) in the Avant Garde Floating Armoury case.

ANTI-HUMAN SMUGGLING

From 2011-12 court documents show RPS Ranasinghe’s Special Intelligence Unit worked on countering human smuggling in the Eastern Naval Area by infiltrating the networks. In 2011 and 2012 RPS Ranasinghe lists 23 human smuggling vessels that they apprehended, carrying 1013 passengers, the vast majority of whom were Tamil.

MEDALS

RPS Ranasinghe is a highly decorated intelligence officer, whose contributions have been applauded 13 times across his career. He was in particular awarded the Rana Sura Padakkama medal in 2008 by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, a promotion recommended by Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda in 2009. The same Rana Sura Padakkama medal was again awarded to him in 2016 by President Maithripala Sirisena, incidentally while Admiral RC Wijegunaratne – who helped Hettiarchchi abscond and attempted to abduct a key witness in the case – was Commander of the Navy.

DEATH THREATS

Court documents allege that from 2015, RPS Ranasinghe and DKP Dassanayake made death threats against state witnesses, KC Welagedara and Aluthgedara Upul Bandara, after they provided information to the Chief Investigator in the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, IP Nishantha de Silva.

ARREST

RPS Ranasinghe was arrested by the CID on 2 March 2017 for his role in the abduction of the 11 people in the Colombo area. He was accused of offences punishable under Article 2 of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. He was granted bail on 9 January 2018.

PROMOTIONS

Since then, RPS Ranasinghe has allegedly been reinstated and appointed Director of the Directorate of Naval Land Operations (DNLO). All security personnel assigned to protect Lt Cmrd Welagadara will now report directly to RPS Ranasinghe as Director of DNLO. As Commanding Officer at DNLO, RPS Ranasinghe will now have access to information about all movements of Welagadara and other witnesses in the case and can listen to their communications, sparking fears about the safety of the witnesses.
ANNEXURE 2: BIOGRAPHIES OF NAVAL OFFICERS
A. ROHAN AMARASINGHE

2001-FEB 2003
Captain-Director, Naval Intelligence.

2004-5
SLNS Sayura.

2006
A/ Director, Naval Weapons.

2007-8
Rapid Action Boat Squadron - first Director.

2007-9
Deputy Area Commander, Northern Naval Area.

UNKNOWN
Director, Naval Operations.

14 AUG 2009
Director General., Personnel & Training.

2010
Commander, North Central Naval Command.

JAN-31 MAY 2012
North Central Naval Area Commander.

17 DEC 2012
A/ Commandant, Volunteer Naval Force.

JUN 2012-MAR 2013
Commander, Western Naval Area.

31 MAR 2013-END 2014
Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

2014
Retired.

2017
Died.

N. P. S. ATTYGALLE

10 FEB-18 AUG 2010
Director, Naval Project & Plans.

AUG 2011
Director, Naval Personnel.

10 MAR 2012-22 MAY 2014
Director, Naval Operations; Director, Naval Foreign Cooperation; Director, Naval Marine Special Forces.

28 AUG 2015
Commander, North Western Naval Area.

2016
Commander, North Western Naval Area.

2018
Director General, Operations.

2018
Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

MOHOTTALAGE UDAYA KEERTHI VUAYA BANDARA (RETIRED)

He was an adviser to Wasantha Karannagoda and told police that he was informed by Captain Jagath Jayantha Ranasinghe that Sampath Munasinghe had abducted five students from Dehiwela and demanded a ransom of one million rupees from each of the families to release these students. Court documents say Commander Mohottalie Udya Keerthi Wijaya Bandara, Director Intelligence Ananda Guruge and then Head of Discipline Senaka Hanwella reportedly investigated the abductions.

Bandara also sent a Letter of Demand to Navy Commander Sinniah demanding Rs.500 million over a statement made to the CID over the same allegations.

1 JAN 2008-21 SEP 2009
Naval Assistant.

1 JAN 2009-14 JUL 2009
Director, Engineering Services.

15 JAN 2011-1 MAR 2012
Naval Assistant.

1 JAN 2014-26 JUN 2016
Director General, Training.

2016
Retired.

2016, BUT NOT NOW
Sioera Capital Ltd.

TRAINED:
India.

HEWA RATHNAPPULIGE OMAL CHAMINDA, NRP 1526

UNKNOWN
SLNS Wijayaba, Nilaveli.

2017
Statement recorded from him by CID.

SEDILILAGE DON SUMEDHA SAMPATH DAYANANDA, NRP 1281

Special Intelligence Unit, Talaimannar.
Also operated in Welisara Camp.

It is alleged in court documents that the mobile phone of Loganathan (who disappeared) was used by SDSS Dayananda four days after he had disappeared. Although Dayananda was asked to report to the Colombo Crimes Division (CCD) of the police to give a statement, he absconded for several days. When interviewed he claimed he had picked up the phone from a bus he was travelling in and since he could not find out the owner he had made use of the phone.

It was at this time that CCD discovered that the mobile phone used by Loganathan’s companion Rathnaswamy (also disappeared) was being used with a SIM card registered to the Secretary to the Commander of the Navy at his official address. The then CCD chief Anura Sennanayake (accused in another emblematic case) did not order further investigations.

Dayananda reportedly told his contemporaries in the Navy that he would never be questioned or arrested because Ravi Wijegunawardene was looking after his interests.

MID 2006
He is second in command to RPS Ranasinghe in the Special Intelligence Unit operating out of Trincomalee (court documents).

2018-19
Arrested by police and remanded in custody.
Court documents allege Dasanayake ordered and was involved directly and indirectly in the crimes. The relatives of two abducted reportedly came to meet Dassanayake and requested their help. He said he would try to find them. D. P. K. Dasanayake was abroad on a postgraduate degree in US for some years during the investigation in the magistrate’s case; his lawyer said he’d gone for foreign training to prepare to be Navy Commander. His family is based in the US.

2007-9
Navy spokesman.

2008-9
A/ Director, Marine Special Force.

1 JAN 2008-7 JAN 2009
Deputy Director, Operations.

10 AUG 2009- 3 AUG 2010
Director Naval Weapons

8 JAN 2009-9 AUG 2009
Director, Naval Operations: Director, Naval Weapons; Director, Special Boat Squadron & Rapid Action Boat Squadron.

1 JAN 2010-3 AUG 2010
Director, Marine Special Force.

2013
A/Provost Marshal

2012-14
Provost Marshal.

20 OCT -31 DEC 2015
A/ Director Naval Inspectorate

2015-17
Director Naval Inspectorate

12 JUL 2017
Arrested.

2018
Released on bail.

In 2009 the family of disappeared student Rajeev Naganathan spoke to the then Fisheries Minister Felix Perera who contacted Commodore Shemal Perera. The family said in an interview: “When Commodore Perera was told how the children were abducted and under whom they were, Commodore Perera was taken aback. From his expressions we knew that he too was well aware about our children. Despite Minister Felix Perera’s several requests, Commodore Perera never took any step to get the children released, although he confirmed that our children are in the Navy custody”.

NB It appears this media reference mistakenly calls the Commodore Perera instead of Fernando. Karannagoda stated in his Fundamental Rights application of March 2019 “that on or about 18th September 2018, Rear Admiral KJCS (Shemal) Fernando of the Navy had provided a statement to the 1st Respondent [CID] that the Petitioner had failed to take proper steps in respect of the five youth referred to by Hon. Felix Perera.”

2003
Degree from Kotelawala Defence University.

15 JUN 2004-17 FEB 2010
Secretary to the Commander of the Navy.

1 JAN 2010-18 FEB 2010
Director, Naval Victualling & Clothing.

20 JUL 2011-END 2011
Director General, Logistics.

1 JAN 2012-30 NOV 2013
Naval Secretary.

ATTENDED
Attended Naval War College in US (class 45).

DATE
Director General, Budget and Finance; Director, Naval Logistics; Commodore Superintendent of Logistics; Captain Logistics, Department of the Eastern and Western Naval Commands.

1982
Joined Navy.

1985
Degree, Colombo University.

2007
Masters Degree, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University.

AUG 2010-END 2012
Commandant, Naval & Maritime Academy in Trinco.

2014
National Defence University (NDU), Pakistan.

24 JUL 2014-2015
Commander, North Central Naval Area.

25 JUL 2016
Director General, Training.

2018
Additional Director General, Civil Security Dept.

20 APR 2018
Retired.

TRAINED:
China, India, Pakistan.
Reports say Hanwella took part in a raid carried out on Sampath Munasinghe’s quarters on 26 May 2009 on Karanangoda’s instructions.

JUN 1998–NOV 1999
Executive Officer, SLNS Thammanna, Mannar.

JUN 2004–JUL 2005
Executive Officer, Naval Recruit Training Centre.

2004–8
Masters at Kotelawala Defence University.

JUL 2005–(DATE RETIRED)
Provost Marshal (Navy Police Director) – Principal Adviser to Navy chief on all disciplinary matters in the Navy.

2018
CBL Exports, Assistant General Manager.

SEP 2009
Promotion from Wasantha Karannagoda, (court documents).

26 DEC 2013–14 JUL 2015
Director, Naval Intelligence.

2015–17
Defence Adviser to the Sri Lankan High Commission in New Delhi.

ARAMBADUGE KALANAMITHRA JINADASA

12 JAN 2007
HQ Senior Staff Officer, Operations.

11 JAN 2008–9 MAR 2009
Deputy Director, Operations.

MAR 2009
Deputy Director, Weapons; Director, Naval Investigation Unit.

JUN–AUG 2009
Trinco Dockyard Navy Weapons Officer.

ARAMBADUGE KALANAMITHRA JINADASA

23 JUL 2015–30 AUG 2017
Director, Naval Operations; Director, Naval Foreign Cooperation; Director, Naval Marine Special Forces.

2011
Northern Command.

19 MAR 2018–2019
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy.

SISIRA JAYAKODY

2008/9 APPROXIMATELY
Deputy Area Commander; Commander, SLNS Tissa.

1 JAN–22 MAY 2009
Director, Naval Training.

23 JUN 2011–8 AUG 2011
Director, Naval Personnel.

2013
Commander, North Central Naval Area.

6 JAN 2014–END 2014
Commander, Southern Naval Area.

1 JAN 2015–END 2016
Director, Naval Personnel.

31 AUG 2017
Retired; was Director General, Personnel and Chief Hydrography Officer.

ARAMBADUGE KALANAMITHRA JINADASA

10 MAR–30 NOV 2009
Deputy Director, Naval Project and Plans.

2012
Commander, SLNS Samudra.

2014
Commandant of the Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.

KARUNANAYAKAGE JAYANTHA KARUNANAYAKE

2009
SLNS Parakrama Commander.

GOTABAYA PAUL KASSAPA (NAMES REVERSED SOMETIMES), NRX 0465

(Court documents say he produced a report on human smuggling in Sri Lankan Navy with Rear Admiral Thilak Senaratne.)

2009
Court documents say Kassapa had been the Commanding Officer of the Dockyard.

2009–11
MA International Relations, Colombo University.

2010–11
Commanding Officer, Naval Dockyard, Trincomalee.

2011–12
Deputy Director, Naval Administration.

2011–12
Captain, Operations Department, Naval Dockyard Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.

MAY–JUL 2012
Deputy Director, Naval Welfare.

2012–2013
Naval Officer in charge Trincomalee South.
OCT 2013-OCT 2014
Director Naval Victualling and Clothing; Director Naval Inspectorate.
2014
CID records statement.

OCT 2014-MAR 2016
Deputy Area Commander, Western Naval Command; Principle Adviser to
Commander Western Naval Area; Deputy Area Commander.

MAR-AUG 2016
Deputy Director General, Sri Lanka Coastguard.

AUG 2016-JUL 2017
National Defence University, Islamabad.

JUL 2017-MAR 2018
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee.

MAY 2018
Director General, Administration.

2019
Commander, Southern Naval Area - met UK Delegation, 10 July.

TRAINED:
Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government; Pakistan.

1981
Joined Navy.

2006-7
Sir John Kotalawala Defence University.

JAN 2008-FEB 2009
1st secretary, Sri Lankan Embassy in Thailand.

16 FEB 2012
Deputy Area Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

AUG 2012-2014
Director, Disaster Management Centre

OCT 2015-14 OCT 2016
Retired as Director General, Naval and Air Operations, at Office of the
Chief of Defence Staff.

2018
DGM Human Resources and Administration, State Pharmaceuticals
Manufacturing Corporation of Sri Lanka.

NMJD NISSANKA (NRX 0496)

4 NOV 2015-2016
Director Naval Intelligence.

2018
SLNS Sagara.

2009
Director of Intelligence, Welisara Navy Camp (court documents).

2017
Released on bail.

2003
Commanding Officer of SLNS Tissa.

7 JUL 2010-15 FEB 2011
Director, Sports.

6 JAN 2013
Commander, North Western Naval Area.

2 AUG 2014
Commander, Western Naval Area & Commandant Volunteer Naval Force.

10 SEP 2015-15 AUG 2016
Flag Officer.

22 AUG 2016-6 OCT 2016
Director General, Services.

2018
Medal from President Sirisena.

12 OCT 2007-6 AUG 2009
Director Naval Administration

2012
Commander, North Western Naval Area.

5 JAN 2013
Commander, North Western Naval Area.

10 JAN 2013-8 NOV 2014
Director General, Services.

1 JAN-29 MAY 2015
Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

2015
Retired.
Ranasinghe is said to have informed the Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda on 10 May 2009 about the abducted youth. A statement by Jayantha who recorded a statement from Raman Prabhakaran revealed that Raman had overheard a call from Rajeev to Govindasamy Naganathan in May 2009. Rajeev Naganathan said that he was in the Trinco naval base and Cmndr. Dassanayake was in charge of him.

16 MAY 2011-END 2011
Director, Naval Training.

25 AUG 2012-END 2012
Director, Naval Projects and Plans.

7 JAN 2014-24 FEB 2015
Commander, South Eastern Naval Area.

1 JAN 2016-21 FEB 2016
Navy Commander Southern Naval Area.

11 NOV 2018
Deputy Chief of Staff.

2018
Vice Chancellor, Sir John Kotelawala Defence University.

2019
Chief of Staff.

The police have asked for a copy of an investigation into the abductions said to have been conducted in 2009 by Guruge with Commander Karannagoda’s Naval Adviser, Mohottalage Udaya Keerthi Wijaya Bandara, and Senaka Hanwella (then Head of Discipline), but they have been given conflicting reports as to whether such an investigation took place. Guruge has denied doing this. He’s also alleged to have ordered his subordinates to give false testimony.

Susantha, Petty officer XC 30543, has testified that Guruge knew of the abductions because they had discussed them in his office.

1 JAN 2008-20 MAR 2010
Director of Intelligence.

29 MAY 2015
Deputy Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

13 MAY 2016-22 FEB 2018
Director, Navy Personnel.

FEB 2018
Flag Officer, Commanding Naval Fleet.

29 AUG 2019
Retired.

Ranasinghe is said to have informed the Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda on 10 May 2009 about the abducted youth. A statement by Jayantha who recorded a statement from Raman Prabhakaran revealed that Raman had overheard a call from Rajeev to Govindasamy Naganathan in May 2009. Rajeev Naganathan said that he was in the Trinco naval base and Cmndr. Dassanayake was in charge of him.

16 MAY 2011-END 2011
Director, Naval Training.

25 AUG 2012-END 2012
Director, Naval Projects and Plans.

7 JAN 2014-24 FEB 2015
Commander, South Eastern Naval Area.

1 JAN 2016-21 FEB 2016
Navy Commander Southern Naval Area.

11 NOV 2018
Deputy Chief of Staff.

2018
Vice Chancellor, Sir John Kotelawala Defence University.

2019
Chief of Staff.

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Susantha, Petty officer XC 30543, has testified that Guruge knew of the abductions because they had discussed them in his office.

1 JAN 2008-20 MAR 2010
Director of Intelligence.

29 MAY 2015
Deputy Commander, Eastern Naval Area.

13 MAY 2016-22 FEB 2018
Director, Navy Personnel.

FEB 2018
Flag Officer, Commanding Naval Fleet.

29 AUG 2019
Retired.
Court documents say Rear Admiral Ulugetenna complained about D. K. P. Dassanayake, alleging he was involved in a human smuggling racket.

The report on the inquiry by Rear Admiral Thilak Senaratne and Cmdr. Gotabaya Paul Kassapa was requested by the police investigation. The Navy sent (with the title in English) “Misunderstanding/Dispute among SLN personnel WRT human smuggling activities and investigation conducted by police office (Matara)”. This was not the relevant file.

1 JAN 2011-END 2011
Director, Naval Intelligence & Director, Naval Weapons.

1 JAN 2011-25 DEC 2013
Director, Naval intelligence.

6 JUL 2015-END 2015
Director General, Services.

22 AUG 2017
Southern Naval Command Headquarters.

8 MAR 2018
Commander, Western Naval Area.

2018
Deputy Chief of Staff

2019
Chief of Staff

1982
Married Kumudini Weerasekara, the first female officer of SLA.

APR 2002-FEB 2004
Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy.

FEB 2004-JAN 2005
Deputy Area Commander (West).
ANNEXURE 3: THE AVANT GARDE GROUP

“MY ADVISORY BOARD CONSISTS OF TWO CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF AND FOUR EX-NAVY COMMANDERS, ONE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AND MANY MAJOR GENERALS, REAR ADMIRALS AND SENIOR DIG’S OF POLICE... WE ARE PROUD TO SAY THAT THESE SENIOR OFFICERS WERE INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF SRI LANKA.”

AGMS CHAIRMAN

SUMMARY

a. Timeline of Events
b. The Avant Garde Group Companies
c. Panama Papers
d. Multiple Allegations
e. Earnings
f. Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Limited (RALL)
g. Charges and Arrests

INTRODUCTION

ITJP’s investigation has revealed that naval personnel, including very senior commanders, have allegedly been involved in various financial ventures and schemes, both legal and illegal, generating important gains. These include, in particular, the transfer of government-owned weapons and ammunitions, and lucrative government procurement contracts alleged to have diverted millions of dollars of government profits to privately owned companies involving former military and naval commanders.

Three former Navy commanders involved in the Avant Garde company were also allegedly complicit in the illegal detention, torture and disappearances described in this report. They are:

Admiral JSK Colombage (COMEAST 2010-12, DG Operations 2007-8 when his next in command was R.C. Wijegunaratne – see profile Annexure 1).

Admiral SAMJ Perera (DG Operations 2009-13)

Admiral DWAS Dissanayake (DG Operations 2008-9).

Colombage was in charge of the Trincomalee base for three years, during which scores of former LTTE cadres were detained and tortured.

In the Navy command structure, intelligence operatives...
offshores subsidiaries, including in Panama, Singapore and the British Virgin Islands. This was an extremely profitable private group set up post-war by ex-military officials and granted by the Ministry of Defence a monopoly on maritime security services, full government endorsement and access to Navy weapons, staff and premises. It was under investigation after the Government changed in 2015.

Incorporation: Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pvt) Ltd (AGMS) was incorporated in Sri Lanka on 24 June 2011 and is a subsidiary of Avant Garde Security Services (Pvt) Ltd (AGSS). The AGSS website boasts it is the largest security company in Sri Lanka, employing over 6,500 personnel (six and half times bigger than the Sri Lanka Coast Guard).

Floating Armoury: The seas around Sri Lanka contain some of the busiest shopping routes in the world. From 2005 piracy became a serious issue along the coast of Somalia into the Gulf of Aden. Commercial shipping companies increasingly turned to private security contractors to protect their vessels. Countries in the high-risk areas did not want huge stockpiles of weapons on their territory so the trend moved to storing weapons on commercially owned vessels anchored in international waters. It was a rapidly growing new business area and Sri Lanka quickly became a leader because, as the Guardian newspaper alleged, Sri Lankan armouries “are partly run by the country’s Navy”. However, the bulk of the profits went to a private company.

AGMS: The Avant Garde group Chairman, Nissanka Senadhipathi, said he sent his proposal for floating armours to then Secretary of Defence Mr Gotabaya Rajapaksa in December 2010 and again in March 2011. He was initially rejected because, remarkably, he had not at that point obtained a shipping licence. Senadhipathi said his research had shown pirates used RPGs and T56. He deployed weapons with twice their effective range, such as Light Machine Guns with large quantities of ammunition to keep pirates away. His idea was “to overpower the pirates before they could even come close”. He began by offering piracy protection to fishing trawlers. Senadhipathi alleges the 24 Sri Lankan maritime security companies that operated before he came on the scene had broken the law because these companies did not have a place to store the weapons once they left Sri Lanka. His business model would supposedly save the reputation of Sri Lanka.

Lack of Regulation: Indeed, a UN report stated that, “...In 2011, the Sri Lankan Government reportedly lost track of hundreds of government-owned weapons that it had rented out to PMSCs (private maritime security contractors).” However, regulation for the floating armours globally was also problematic. In 2014, a report identified “a worrying lack of regulation regarding the operation and use of floating armours”.

Monopoly: In mid-2012 AGMS took over all maritime armoury services from the Navy for the Government of Sri Lanka and ran them as a monopoly for just over two years until early 2015. AGMS had entered into a joint venture supposed to last until 2019 with a government-owned business run by the Ministry of Defence, Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd (RALL). A circular from the Ministry of Defence dated 18 September 2012 informed all private maritime security companies that from 16 October 2012 they could no longer store arms at the Land Based Naval Armours in Galle and Colombo as these services would cease to function. The Ministry said it had decided to deploy a floating armoury off the coast of Galle for which the Navy would provide monitoring and security. AGMS, it added, would provide the operating procedures for the transfer of sea marshals and weapons and specify the information needed from private maritime security companies for them to get approval for their weapons. Although AGMS was a privately-owned company, the MOD circular indicated it had government endorsement. A Sri Lankan newspaper commented in 2015: “Here is an instance where a private company has been delegated a role that should be played by the Navy and that too for commercial gain.”

Infrastructure: AGMS at its peak operated the following floating armours:

- MV Mahanuwara, off the coast of Sri Lanka.
- MV Sinbad in the Gulf of Oman (registered in Mongolia).
- MV Avant Garde in the Red Sea. [This was a vessel called MV Merou chartered by AGMS from the Sri Lanka Shipping Company for two years. It was returned in December 2016 under court order and sent to India to be scrapped].

Senadhipathi said he also established and maintained seven land-based armours in littoral states, spending about US $800,000 monthly.
United Kingdom: Just six months after the floating armoury began, the UK was discussing using the services of Avant Garde. The UK parliamentary committee on Arms Export Controls in 2013 said that during 2012 eight Maritime Anti-Piracy companies were found to be non-compliant with the terms of their licence from the UK. It said: “These breaches occurred as a result of a change in policy by the Sri Lankan Government which forced all private security companies operating from Sri Lanka to use a ‘floating armoury’ outside their territorial waters rather than land-based armouries for the storage of weapons. The use of floating armouries was not, at that time, permitted by the licence. We believe, however, that the companies concerned retained sufficient controls over the goods whilst located on these particular armouries such that there was no increased risk of loss or diversion.” This appeared to be incorrect when inspections were later done.

Scale: The AGMS Chairman boasted of 800-1000 movements off the armouries a month. He said there were “thousands of weapons” on his company’s ships. AGMS charged US $25 a day to store the weapons and ammunition.

Private Armouries in Naval Base: After the change of government in Sri Lanka in 2015, it was alleged that AGMS held three container loads of arms and ammunition in the Sri Lanka Navy Camp ‘SLNS Dakshina’ in Kaluwela, Galle – in other words a private company held a private armoury inside a military camp. Reports said Major General Palitha Fernando (see below) had authorised this and that the Naval Area Commander was not authorised to inspect or conduct regular checks. Without checking it would be impossible for the Navy to know how many clients AGMS had issued weapons to and therefore what fees were due. Media reports alleged a similar situation existed in “a secret armoury” held by RALL at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall in Colombo for some years. When a Police raid was conducted, only 152 weapons were found; a total of government-owned 3,322 weapons had gone missing, according to the report.

Resignations: Prior to receiving his portfolio, the Law and Order and Prisons Reform Minister Tilak Marapana had legally represented AGMS Chairperson, Nissanka Senadhpathi. In November 2015 Marapana resigned as Minister because of concerns raised with respect of a conflict of interest.

Seizures: When the Avant Garde Maritime Services ships were seized by the Police and Navy after the Rajapaksa family lost power, an audit of the weapons on board was done. The MV Avant Garde was found to have an unregistered Ukrainian captain, Gennadiy Gavrylov, on board who has been prevented from leaving Sri Lanka since June 2016 while others accused in the court case have been granted permission to travel.

Inquiry: The Presidential Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate and inquire into Serious Acts of Fraud, Corruption and Abuse of Power, State Resources and Privileges

Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MV Mahanuwara</th>
<th>Audit of weapons</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,154 weapons</td>
<td>747,859 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MV Avant Garde (Ukrainian captain)</th>
<th>Audit of weapons</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>813 weapons</td>
<td>202,674 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(of which only 203 issued by RALL)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>613 “alien” weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Licence for 100 weapons on board</th>
<th>Audit of weapons</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230 automatic weapons missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RALL Armoury</td>
<td>3,473 weapons issued but of those 3,384 lacked permits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RALL COMPANY</th>
<th>Audit of weapons</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(PRECIFAC) reported that Avant Garde company owed 919 million rupees (over US $5 million) to RALL. The new management of RALL took action to sack its general manager, retired Major General Gamini Jayasundera, following allegations that he gave false evidence at the presidential inquiry. AGMS and RALL became involved in arbitration with AGMS claiming US $20 million in liquidated damages.

Court Case: The Presidential Commission investigated 13 individuals and recommended legal action be taken against seven of them for corruption under Section 70 of the Bribery Act. In 2016 it filed a case at the Colombo Magistrate Court against former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Avant Garde Chairman Nissanka Senadhipathi and other suspects on charges of corruption under the Bribery Act. That case was dropped in 2019 based on a revision petition filed by lawyers for the defendants and charges reframed against only some of the same suspects.

(B) THE AVANT GARDE GROUP COMPANIES

AVANT GARDE SECURITY SERVICES
AGSS (PARENT COMPANY)

AGSS’s directors and senior management are, as listed on its website:

- Yapa Hetti Pathirannahalage Nissanka Yapa Senadhipathi (Senadhipathi), Chairman.
- Senarath Bandara Dissanayake (Dissanayake), Deputy Chairman.
- YH Kithsiri Manjula Kumara Yapa (Manjula Yapa), Managing Director.
- YHPSV Kumarihamy, Finance Director.
- YHPO Yapa, Director.
- SS Senaratne, Director.

AVANT GARDEN MARITIME SERVICES (AGMS)

According to its website, AGMS’s directors, senior management and advisors are:

- Senadhipathi, Chairman.
- Manjula Yapa, Managing Director and Board Director.
- Dissanayake, CEO.
- Wishwajith Nandana Diyabalanage (Diyabalanage), Head of Commercial Vessel Protection.
- Daya Dharmapriya, Executive.
- Major General VR Silva, Executive.
- Lakshman TB Illangakoon, Executive.
- Sudharman Silva, Executive.
- RWMC Ranawana, Executive.
- Prasanna Athanasius Sirimevan Rajaratne (Rajarathne), Advisor.
- Major General Chandrawansa, Advisor.
- George Chen, Advisor.

AGSS/AGMS AFFILIATES

Of the overseas affiliates, Senadhipathi is the sole shareholder of the Cyprus entity, majority shareholder of the Singaporean entity, and a shareholder of the British Virgin Islands entity.

1. Avant-Garde Emirates LLC, part of AGSS which was established as a facilities management company (precise date unknown but at least in 2010).


- Senadhipathi, shareholder (percentage unknown).
- Dissanayake, shareholder (percentage unknown).
- Manjula Yapa, shareholder (percentage unknown).
- Rajaratne, shareholder (percentage unknown).


- Senadhipathi, Director and President.
- Dissanayake, Director.
- Manjula Yapa, Director.
- Carla Elena Peralta, subscriber and Panamanian lawyer.
- Massiel Robinson De Arauz, subscriber with numerous corporate affiliations in Panama.
- Torrijos & Asociados, agent.


- Senadhipathi, 100 per cent shareholder and Director.
- Edinadura Kuvera Esuru De Zoysa (De Zoysa), Director.
- Noraini Binte Noor Mohamed Abdul Latif, Director.

A lawyer and member of the President’s Counsel, De Zoysa represented AGMS in litigation against the Sri Lankan Navy in 2016.

- Edinadura Kuvera Esuru De Zoysa (De Zoysa), Director.
- Noraini Binte Noor Mohamed Abdul Latif, Director.

A Singaporean national who serves as secretary to several companies.
5. Tulip Agro Holdings Private Limited (Tulip Agro), described as being under the Avant Garde Group of Companies. Tulip Agro is registered to the same address as AGSS/AGMS and reports to be an agricultural food producer and supplier.

- Dissanayake states that he is a director of the company. Rohan Munasinghe (head of IT at AGMS) authors a blog post on its website.

- Tulip Agro has a minimal public profile comprising self-reported information on its website; it is listed in the Sri Lankan corporate registry. In 2017, it supplied food to the canteen of the Sri Lankan Welfare Association of the Department of Immigration & Emigration.

6. Tulip Leisure Holidays Private Limited (Tulip Leisure), described as a sister company to AGMS in Sri Lanka. Dissanayake reports to be its General Manager. Tulip Leisure has almost no online profile but it is listed in the Sri Lankan corporate registry.

7. Avant Leisure (Pvt) Ltd, an adventure sports organisation, was identified as having the same address as AGSS/AGMS.

(C) PANAMA PAPERS

- The leaked Panama Papers named four Avant Garde officials as having offshore accounts: Sanadhipathi, VHP Kithsiri Manjula Kumara Yapa, who is a retired Police Chief Inspector who served as Managing Director of AGS, Senerath Bandara Dissanayake and Prasanna Athanasius Sirimevan Rajaratne.

- Senadhipathi and his three Avant Garde colleagues appear to have incorporated the offshore company in August 2012, using Mossack Fonseca’s Singapore office as an intermediary.

- As the Sri Lankan Financial Times reported: “Sri Lankan citizens are permitted to hold and invest monies offshore but the incorporations must be registered with the Inland Revenue Department. Offshore investors must also submit a balance sheet of all entities incorporated overseas to the Exchange Controls Department and bring any dividends back to the country. If any of the offshore entities are not registered with Inland Revenue and the Exchange Controls Department of the Central Bank, individuals and corporations would be found to be in violation of Sri Lankan Exchange Control laws.” It is not clear whether this regulation was complied with.

(D) MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS

Nigeria: When a new Sri Lankan Government came to power in 2015 it said it was investigating allegations that AGMS had been supplying weapons to the Nigerian group, Boko Haram. At the same time a high-level military delegation representing AGMS had visited Nigeria to meet the Government there to secure contracts.

Senadhipathi later said that he had started operations in the Gulf of Guinea, with the Government of Nigeria he would have brought in US $75 million a month. He also says he signed a contract with the Nigerian Navy to supply Arrow Boats manufactured by the Sri Lankan Navy. It is unclear why a private company would be selling boats manufactured by the Navy.

Fomenting Unrest: A Sri Lankan minister alleged AGMS was involved in unrest in the Maldives. Senadhipathi had served as Maritime Security Advisor to the President of Maldives. Allegations of corruption were levied by the then Finance Minister of Sri Lanka: an Avant Garde company official denied any such payments were made.

Provenance of Weapons: One allegation is that some weapons found on board the ships had belonged to the LTTE - or alternatively to Police stations in Sri Lanka. Former Defence Ministry Additional Secretary Damayanthi Jayaratne told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Large Scale Corruption and Fraud that the procedure followed in giving weapons to RALL was illegal. “Weapons were issued without permits, contravening the accepted rules,” he testified.

Documentation: The Sri Lankan Police said an AGMS vessel had made an illegal journey from a Red Sea port without proper documents for its cargo of weapons and ammunition.

Personnel: RALL and Avant Garde together allegedly had more than a division of men (over 10,000 highly trained combatants) who were not under the command of the Army.

Electioneering: there have been allegations that 500 of the RALL personnel were used for election campaigning.

Bribery: A Sri Lankan Government minister alleged he had been offered a bribe of Rs. 20 million per month to cover up the AGMS issue.

2019: Allegations of offences under the Firearms Ordinance, conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
**E) Earnings (USD) According to AGMS Chairman**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGMS Earnings 2012-15</td>
<td>$65 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From which RALL was paid</td>
<td>$10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From which Navy was paid</td>
<td>$10 million in 26 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-12 Navy earned</td>
<td>$10 million in 4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGMS Revenue</td>
<td>$60 million per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGMS Current Revenue</td>
<td>$12 million per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGMS Revenue if Nigerian deal went ahead</td>
<td>$2 billion in three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; If Malacca Straits operations went ahead</td>
<td>$50 million per month - $600 million per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**F) RAKNA ARAKSHAKA LANKA LIMITED (RALL)**

This is a wholly Sri Lanka Government owned company acting in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence established in October 2006. Media reports said RALL was the brainchild of former Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Its CEO was retired Rear Admiral Dissanayake Mudiyanelage Sarath Dissanayake, who was awarded a medal in 2018. Other reports indicate the former Chief Justice Mohan Pieris was on the board of directors.

RALL also operates catering services and restaurants competing with the private sector. Its strength is said to be 4,000 personnel. RALL was also in charge of security for universities which caused concern in some quarters.

The Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises said RALL was registered with the Registrar of Companies and not answerable to Parliament while being a Government undertaking. Its report said: “The Committee enquired about the category of personnel who were recruited to the Company. It was stated that the ex-security personnel, those who have retired or legally resigned from the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and Police Service were recruited and they were being paid a salary in addition to their pensions.”

In 2016 a cabinet decision appears to have removed RALL from Ministry of Defence control and its services put under the Civil Defence Force and Navy. Another proposal in 2016 was to liquidate the company. Staff were to be placed under another Government-run private security company, LRDC Services (Pvt) Limited.

**G) Charges and Arrests**

The Bribery Commission had alleged that Gotabaya Rajapaksa as Secretary of Defence had given permission to AGMS to operate a floating armoury between 7 August 2012 and 8 January 2015, in violation of Sri Lankan laws by providing unlawful income to this private company amounting to Rs.11.4 billion. In September 2019, the charges against him were dropped after his lawyers filed a revision petition at the Appeal Court.

The charges were then reframed and several of the other defendants were indicted. The new lawsuit is thought to be a legal record in Sri Lanka with 7,573 charges, including unlawful possession of automatic firearms and live ammunition rounds, laid against the 11 accused individuals (plus two companies) who are:

- AGMS
- RALL
- Navy
- LRDC Services (Pvt) Limited
1. YAPA HETTI P NISSANKA PATHIRANNEHELAGE NISSANKA YAPA SENADHIPATHI

AGMS CHAIRMAN.

ARREST WARRANT ISSUED JULY 2019; ARRESTED 17 OCTOBER 2019.

Senadhipathi is believed to have fled Sri Lanka in early July 2019 for Singapore just before arrest warrants were issued. Media reports said the travel ban on him was lifted and he returned to Sri Lanka on 17 October and was arrested at the airport, reportedly for violating the travel ban. A former Commando in the Army, he is said to be close to the former Secretary of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa. From 2012-14 he was appointed Maritime Security Advisor to the President of Maldives and from 2013 Honorary Counsel of the Republic of Yemen to Sri Lanka. In January 2009 he accompanied Gotabaya Rajapaksa to Indonesia. In June 2009, Fernando was in charge of the military’s welfare organisation, Ranaviru Seva Authority. It is worth noting the AGMS Chairperson had said he was asked by Gotabaya Rajapaksa to pay the salaries of disabled soldiers and had done so. Fernando was also named in a US Embassy Telex in 2008 where Washington questioned a purchase of US night vision equipment for the Air Force and Navy on the grounds that the end-user had an irregular licensing history and there might be possible unauthorized brokering activity. The end user certificate was signed off by Major General WPP Fernando USP, Military Liaison Officer, MOD, dated 26/12/2007.

2. MAJOR GENERAL WADUGE PALITHA PIYASITI FERNANDO,

FORMER COORDINATING SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

ARRESTED JULY 2019, REMANDED.

Major General W. P. P. Fernando retired on 31 Dec 2001. He was Army Spokesman in 2000 and after retirement, and Military Liaison Officer in the Ministry of Defence from 2008 to at least 2011. In January 2009 he accompanied Gotabaya Rajapaksa to Indonesia. In June 2009, Fernando was in charge of the military’s welfare organisation, Ranaviru Seva Authority. It is worth noting the AGMS Chairperson had said he was asked by Gotabaya Rajapaksa to pay the salaries of disabled soldiers and had done so. Fernando was also named in a US Embassy Telex in 2008 where Washington questioned a purchase of US night vision equipment for the Air Force and Navy on the grounds that the end-user had an irregular licensing history and there might be possible unauthorized brokering activity. The end user certificate was signed off by Major General WPP Fernando USP, Military Liaison Officer, MOD, dated 26/12/2007.

3. EX MAJOR KARUNARATNE BANDA ADHIKARI EGODAMELA

CHAIRMAN OF RAKNA ARAKSHAKA LANKA LIMITED (RALL).


He says he was in the Army for 33 years (including as Military Secretary) and then became CEO of Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Limited (RALL) in February 2007 until May 2015, at the same time as being a Director of LRDCS security services. From 2017 he’s been CEO of Smart Metro (Pvt) Ltd. He was trained in Pakistan, India, US (Fort Benning) and China.

4. DISSANAYAKE MUDIYANSELAGE SUJATHA DAMAYANTHI JAYARATNE

FORMER ADDITIONAL SECRETARY (POLICE AND CIVIL SECURITY) TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

PREIFAC also recommended legal action for Acts of Corruption under the Bribery Act against Jayaratne in connection with the Welisara Gunpowder Storage and Sale of Dynamite Before Expiry case.

ARREST WARRANT ISSUED JULY 2019, ABSCONDING.

Jayaratne is reported to have been in New Zealand since 2015 with her family, having been granted leave by the Government.
She is alleged to have had five accounts at the People’s Bank, nine accounts at the Sampath Bank, and an account at the Bank of Ceylon as well. In 2010, Jayaratne worked in the Department of Immigration and Emigration. In the visa section.

7. NILUPUL DE COSTA

OPERATIONS MANAGER FOR AVANT GARDE MARITIME SERVICES

Media reports say his full name is Millaniyage Samudra Nilupul de Costa of Wanawasala, Kelaniya. Costa was reportedly injured in 2000. No other information available.

8. SAMAN DISSANAYAKE

FORMER MINISTRY OF DEFENCE – THEN SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION.


It is alleged that Dissanayake, the then Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, had authorised the illegal transfer of weapons to Avant Garde.

9. GENNADILY GAVRYLOV

UKRAINIAN SHIP CAPTAIN.

INDICTED SEP 2019.

10. DON ALBERT THILAKARATNE

RAKNA LANKA REPRESENTATIVE IN MV AVANT GARDE

INDICTED SEP 2019.

11. PONNUTHURAI BALASUNDARAM PREMACANDRA

GENERAL MANAGER OF RAKNA LANKA’S OCEAN SECURITY UNIT.

INDICTED SEP 2019.

CHARGES DROPPED AS OF 23 SEPTEMBER 2019 AGAINST:

1. Gotabaya Rajapaksa – former Secretary of Defence.
2. DWA Somathilaka Dissanayake – ex Navy Commander.
5. Gamini Jayaratna – ex General Manager of Rakna Lanka.
6. Retired Air Vice Marshal P. B. Premachandra – believed to have fled the country in 2019. He is the former Chief of Staff of the Sri Lankan Air Force.

5. RETIRED COMMODORE VISHWAJITH NANDANA DIYABALANAGE

DIRECTOR OF AGMS IN CYPRUS.


His name is given as the AGMS contact person. No career history available online.

6. PERCY VICTOR SAMARWEERA

EX-CHAIRMAN OF RAKNA LANKA SECURITY COMPANY


Interestingly, he was only appointed to head RALL by President Sirisena in April 2015.
ANNEXURE 4: HUMAN SMUGGLING BY SEA

SUMMARY:

Human smuggling and trafficking by sea of people out of Sri Lanka peaked post-war in 2011-12 with large numbers heading for Australia and it continues to this day. Despite numerous allegations linking smuggling and trafficking to the Sri Lankan Navy and the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, this connection has not been properly investigated. The human smuggling investigation and the Gun Site investigation seem to have run on two separate tracks, despite the obvious overlap. Some of the suspects in the disappearance case were also allegedly involved in human smuggling, while other suspects like RPS Ranasinghe (see profile in Annexure 1) were, according to their career records submitted to court, engaged in combatting human smuggling by sea post-war. If the allegations are correct, it also appears that at one point the Australian Government unwittingly hired a smuggler as an anti-smuggling consultant while the Sri Lankan Navy put a Naval officer now accused of involvement in illegal detention, enforced disappearance, ransom demands and torture in charge of naval discipline.

TRINCOMALEE 11 ABDUCTION LINK

According to the court documents for the Trincomalee 11 abduction case, in 2012 a naval officer called Bandu Kumar was sacked for human smuggling. He was found with local currency equivalent to US $20,000 in his bank account. Bandu Kumar (alias Heshan) is also named as one of the sailors who rang the parents of abduction victim, Rajeev Naganathan, in February, April and May 2009 (according to court documents) allegedly to ask for a ransom payment.

NAVY OFFICERS INVOLVED IN HUMAN SMUGGLING

In 2013, four members of the Sri Lankan Navy (signal branch) were arrested for allegedly trying to smuggle more than one hundred people into Australia. It emerged that the ringleader was a decorated Sri Lankan Naval Officer, Lieutenant Commander Sanjeewa Annatugoda, who had been based at Trincomalee naval base. Ironically, he had also been an adviser to Australia on how to stop human trafficking and in 2012 had met the Australian High Commissioner and Border Protection Chief. Media reports say Annatugoda may have been trained as well as paid by Australia. The Sri Lankan Police said the smugglers put young Tamil men on boats from Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa and Trincomalee to Australia. Annatugoda’s alleged role was to warn the smugglers and to advise them on how to evade the patrols. Navy spokesperson, Kosala Warnakulasuriya, said in 2013 that an internal investigation began into human smuggling by sea. There is no public information available as to the outcome of that investigation.

DISAPPEARED NAVY INVESTIGATION INTO HUMAN SMUGGLING & ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF TRINCOMALEE 11 SUSPECT

The Trincomalee 11 abduction court documents indicate that an internal naval inquiry into smuggling was conducted by Rear Admiral Thilak Senaratne and Commander Gotabhaya Paul Kassapa. This may be the same 2013 inquiry referred to above by the Navy spokesperson.

The Sri Lankan CID investigators asked for a copy of the report but did not receive it. According to court documents, Rear Admiral (then Captain) Ulugetenna had complained that DKP Dassanayake (see profile Annexure 1) was allegedly involved in human smuggling. Ironically in Jan-Feb 2014, DKP Dassanayake was Provost Marshal of the Navy (in charge of all discipline) and throughout 2013 he was Acting Provost Marshal. The court documents stated that the inquiry had recommended
that DKP Dassanayake be removed from his role in charge of discipline and intelligence and punished along with another officer, referred to only as a Lt. Jayakody. At this period the DG Legal Services and Judge Advocate General was WWJ Shavinda Fernando, who served in the same role for eight years, from Jan 2008-Dec 2015 and later appeared for the Attorney General’s department in the Trincomalee 11 case.

Although court documents say Bandu Kumar (alias Heshan) was sacked for human smuggling in 2012, nothing appears to have happened to DKP Dassanayake at the time. The two were already linked in terms of Bandu Kumar negotiating ransoms in 2009 on behalf of Lt Com Hettiarachchi (see profile in Annexure 1) who was under DKP Dassanayake’s command.

Even after the smuggling inquiry was initiated in 2013, which allegedly implicated DKP Dassanayake in smuggling, he remained Provost Marshal until Feb 2014. However, in June 2013, the Police had requested the Navy Commander through the courts not to allow Dassanayake to travel abroad – but this does not appear to be connected to the smuggling inquiry, only the Gun Site investigation. At the time the Navy Commander was JSK Colombage whose personal security officer was RPS Ranasinghe (see Profile in Annexure 1), who was Dassanayake’s alleged accomplice.
ANNEXURE 5: LIST OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION WITH THE SRI LANKAN NAVY

10 July 2019: Sri Lanka negotiates a new military cooperation deal with the US, while Ranil Wickremesinghe discusses a replacement for the 1995 Status of Forces arrangement allowing the two states to access each other’s ports and airports with fewer formalities325.

17 May 2019: US Naval Admiral Philip Davidson terms Sri Lanka a “significant strategic opportunity in the Indian Ocean” noting that increasing the bilateral engagement will be a USINDOPACOM (US Indo Pacific Command) focus in 2019326.

12 May 2019: Decommissioned US Naval Cutter, formerly known as the USCGC Sherman, is formally transferred to the Sri Lankan naval service327.

22 April 2019: CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) exercise is cancelled in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday bombings328.

20 April 2019: CARAT Exercise carried out with the US at the Hambantota port in order to demonstrate Sri Lankan control over the China-managed port329.

18 April 2019: US naval ships USNS Millinocket and USS Spruance arrive at Hambantota to participate in the CARAT naval exercise330.

28 March 2019: As Sri Lanka remains a significant strategic opportunity in the Indian Ocean for the US, the American Navy pursues further military cooperation and engagement with Sri Lanka’s Navy in a bid for a “Free and Open Indo Pacific” says Admiral Davidson, US Naval Commander of the Indo Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).


19 – 21 February 2019: The sailors assigned to the Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1 and 15 Sri Lankan Navy Sailors engage in a three-day diving evolution exercise at the US naval base in Guam. Training is in preparation for CARAT333.

27 January 2019: As part of a temporary cargo transfer initiative in Sri Lanka, debate has been ongoing about allowing aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis to receive supplies through the Bandaranaike International Airport which would allegedly bring 25 million rupees into the Sri Lankan economy334 the US embassy says335.

27 January 2019: Third cargo transfer out of Bandaranaike airport involving two C-2 Greyhound carrier-borne transport aircraft and a US Navy C-40 transport aircraft to fly in supplies to US aircraft Carrier USS John C Stennis336.

21 January 2019: As a part of
17 January 2019: Visits by US Seventh Fleet Vessels to Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee Port show that the nation is being integrated into Washington’s defence plan238.

18 December 2018: Amid the political turmoil of the sacking of Ranil Wickremesinghe, US announces a logistical hub in Sri Lanka to secure support, supplies and services239.

9 October 2018: Assisted by the US Navy, the Sri Lankan Navy rescues seven fisherman who were in distress in the southern seas, following an engine failure340.

28 August 2018: United States amphibious ship from the Seventh Fleet participates in and conducts a joint exercise with the Sri Lankan Navy341.

27 August 2018: US Coast Guard Cutter Sherman transferred to Sri Lankan Navy in a Honolulu ceremony, making it the largest vessel in the nation’s fleet342.

2 August 2018: US Naval Special Warfare forces take part in a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise with the Sri Lankan military at the Navy base in Trincomalee343.

30 May 2018: The US Navy’s 26th Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise takes place. This involves Sri Lanka as one of the 26 nations in this exercise344. It is announced that China is excluded345 and that this is Sri Lanka’s first time in the naval military exercise344.


13 September 2017: US and Sri Lankan Navy divers conclude a Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) on the US naval base in Guam350. The training programme consists of two modules - Train the Trainer and Tactical Combat Casualty Care Training - in which 70 naval personnel belonging to the Marine Battalion, Special Boat Squadron, Rapid Action Boat Squadron and Medical Branch take part352.


OTHER INSTANCES OF SRI LANKAN – AMERICAN NAVAL COLLABORATION


25 August 2018: The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Essex Amphibious Ready Group conduct a theatre security co-operation exercise with the Sri Lankan Navy and Marines at Trincomalee357.

24 August 2018: An amphibious transport dock named the USS Anchorage with the embarked 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrives in Trincomalee358.

13 August 2018: US service members join forces with the Sri Lankan military, multinational partners and non-governmental organisations for the health services’ outreach portion of Pacific Angel (PAC ANGEL) 18 – 4 in Vavunlya359.


3 May 2018: In Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, the US and partner nation service members participating in Pacific Partnership 2018 host both civilian and Sri Lankan Navy dentists and orthodontists aboard Military Sealift Command Hospital ship USNS Mercy (T – AH 19) for a dental subject matter expert exchange (SMEE) symposium on May 1361.

25 April 2018: Arriving at Trincomalee, the US and partner nation service members participating in Pacific Partnership 2018 aboard the U.S Navy Hospital ship USNS Mercy (T – AH 19)362.
12 June 2017: Sailors assigned to the USS Lake Erie work with Sri Lankan marines in flood relief assistance at Matara.

28 March 2017: Comstock and the 11th Marine expeditionary Unit exchange knowledge on a variety of naval related topics with the Sri Lankan Navy.

27 March 2017: In Colombo, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrive to participate in a Theatre Security Cooperation engagement.


23 November 2016: US Naval Ship USS Somerset arrives at the Port of Trincomalee on a training visit.

22 November 2016: The Sri Lankan Marine Corps drew 241 years of experience from the Marines and Sailors of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) after embarking on the USS Somerset (LPD 25) to participate in a Theatre Security Cooperation Exchange, training side by side with the recently inaugurated Sri Lankan Marine Corps at Sri Lanka Naval Base, Trincomalee.

30 September 2016: The Sri Lanka Navy assist USS Hopper (DDG 70) with an emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) when a sailor needs medical attention in the waters off the coast of Sri Lanka.

29 August 2016: Submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS 40) arrives in Colombo for a scheduled port visit.

22 August 2016: Operation Pacific Angel, in which a multinational team led by US Pacific Command conduct a week-long assistance program in Jaffna, is concluded.

24 July 2016: USS New Orleans (LPD 16) arrives in Colombo for a port visit with 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.


29 March 2016: Aboard the US 7th Fleet’s flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) at Colombo Port, sixteen Sri Lankan officials attend a bilateral meeting hosted by the US 7th fleet.

28 March 2016: The US Navy’s fleet flagship ‘Blue Ridge’ arrives at the Port of Colombo on a “goodwill visit.”

28 September 2015: The United States provides people across the Eastern Province with better water for drinking and farming through three separate projects this week in Batticaloa and Ampara through its development arm, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).


17 January 2008: Admiral Robert F Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, visits Sri Lanka as part of a regional trip to meet Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda. Admiral Willard reviews ongoing maritime co-operation, including naval training and exchanges between the United States and Sri Lanka. He also visits Trincomalee to discuss “US-Sri Lankan co-operation against LTTE terrorism.”

RUSSO – LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONSHIP

20 December 2017: A group of the Russian Pacific Fleet’s ships, including the Order of Nakhimov, guard guided missile cruiser Varyag; the large antisubmarine ship Admiral Panteleyev and the large sea tanker Boris Butoma enter the port of Colombo.

14 June 2017: Russian Ship Nadezda arrives at Colombo Port on a “goodwill visit.”
SINO-LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONSHIP

31 July 2018: China donates a warship to Sri Lanka.

24 July 2018: China continues to provide various training courses for tri-forces of Sri Lanka and to make preparations to hand over a gift of a frigate to the Sri Lanka Navy.

2 November 2014: Sri Lanka allows a Chinese submarine Changzeng-2 and warship Chang Xing Dao to dock at its port in the capital Colombo, officials say on Sunday, despite concerns raised by India about China’s warming relations with the Indian Ocean island nation.

2 November 2007: China funds Hambantota Port development project.

INDO-LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONSHIP

30 November 2018: The Indian Coast Guard ships ICGS Samar and Aryaman reach Colombo on a week-long visit.

8 October 2018: SLNS Sagara and Suranima, commanded by Captain NMJD Nissanka, RWP, RSP and Captain MHCJ Silva respectively, visits Kochi.

7 September 2018: Navies of Sri Lanka and India begin a joint naval exercise. Indian naval ships Kirch, Sumitra and Cora Divh enter Trincomalee to participate in the sixth edition of the SLINEX 2018 with the Sri Lankan Navy.

17 March 2018: Sri Lankan Navy Commander holds talks with Indian Navy in Visakhapatnam, India.

27 May 2017: The Indian Naval Ship Kirch arrives in Colombo and hands over relief resources to the Sri Lankan delegation.

29 January 2017: Vice Admiral RC Wijegunaratne, Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, officially visits India where he holds bilateral discussions with Admiral Sunil Lamba.

10 October 2016: The Indian Coast Guard Ship Samudra Paheredar arrives at the Port of Colombo.

21 January 2016: The Indian naval ships, Vikramaditya and Mysore, officially visit Colombo.

27 November 2015: Admiral Sunil Lamba visits Sri Lanka on a bilateral visit to discuss Maritime cooperation and to attend the Galle Dialogue.

31 August 2015: India officially gives Sri Lanka a Coast Guard ship.

JAPANESE-LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONSHIP

1 October 2018: Japanese warship visits Sri Lanka.

13 June 2014: Sri Lanka and Japan enhance Maritime Cooperation.

PAKISTAN-SRI LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONS

13 August 2018: Pakistan’s Navy maritime ship Kashmir arrives at Colombo Port on a four day ‘goodwill’ visit.

5 November 2017: Pakistan naval ship Saif arrives at the Colombo port on ‘goodwill’ visit.

30 May 2017: Pakistani ship Zulfiquar arrives at the Port of Colombo to assist in relief operations.

4 May 2017: PNS Zulfiquar arrives at the Port of Colombo on ‘goodwill’ visit.

3 May 2017: PMSS Dasht arrives at the Port of Colombo on ‘goodwill’ visit.

27 October 2013: PNS NASR and PNS Khaiber arrive at Colombo port on ‘goodwill’ visit.

AUSTRALIAN-SRI LANKAN NAVAL RELATIONS

30 August 2018: The Sri Lankan naval ship Sindurala departs from Trincomalee to participate in the Australian-hosted biennial naval exercise “KAKADU 2018”.


23 November 2017: HMAS Newcastle stops at Colombo Port.

10 July 2017: HMAS Arunta arrives at the port of Colombo on a ‘goodwill’ visit.

22 September 2015: HMAS Melbourne arrives at the port of Colombo.

24 April 2014: Patrol Boat SLNS Mihikatha given to the Sri Lankan Navy by the Australian Navy.

25 April 2014: Patrol Boat Rathnadeepa given to the Sri Lankan Navy by the Australian Navy.


http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Vice_Admiral_Ravindra_Wijegunaratne_assumes_duties_as_the_20th_Commander_of_the_Nav_20150711_01


8 Admiral Wijegunaratne is described as the senior most Special Forces naval officer who was instrumental in forming the Sri Lanka Navy’s Special Forces element known as the Special Boat Squadron.


12 http://www.defence.lk/main_abt.asp?fname=CDSS


14 http://www.defence.lk/main_abt.asp?fname=CDSS

15 Chief of Defense Staff Act, N° 35 of 2009, Articles 2, 5 and 6.


18 The four Navy fighting units are the following: (a) Executive branch; (b) Patromlen branch, in charge of land operations; (c) Special Boat Squadron and (d) Marine branch, set up around 2017.

19 The illegality of the detention site has been established by the Police investigation - the investigator said conditions were so poor as to constitute torture. [10 Aug 2017, Nishantha de Silva to court].


21 UN OHCHR report para 39 mentioned 28 Nov 2018 but other witnesses say 27 Nov 2018.


24 22 Jul 2017: Ramaiah Kanageshwaran Statement to CID that a group of Army and Navy officers is planning to assassinate Nishantha de Silva. Ramaiah came to know this when he was under treatment in the prison hospital. He overheard the Navy officers plotting. (B report, 10 Aug 2017).


26 22 Jul 2017: Ramaiah Kanageshwaran Statement to CID that a group of Army and Navy officers is planning to assassinate Nishantha de Silva. Ramaiah came to know this when he was under treatment in the prison hospital. He overheard the Navy officers plotting. (B report, 10 Aug 2017).

27 Official biography, Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda (Retd.) to become first Sri Lankan Admiral of
28 Vice Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne assumes duties as the 20th Commander of the Navy; Navy site cached because original entry now deleted.


Navy Commander: Vice Admiral WKJ Karannagoda (1 Jan 2008 – 31 Dec 2008)


30 https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Wy9ZKmTFXsCCg=PA413&dq=wkj+karannagoda+source=bl&ots=3oL8V1uA3fks1g=ACfUsU1UPoveEGi8kPg6SQ70T2Rc2Pggd1=em6esa=Xvseed=2ahUKElwn6-mN2ujAhUQUDVXckcBoxQBAEwAnECakOQA#v=onepage&q=wkj%20karannagoda&f=false


33 “The Ambassador for the Republic of China, Yang Xiu Ping handed over the equipment to Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa and Army Commander, Lt General Jagath Jayasuriya. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Minister of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, Richard Bathiudeen, Governor for Northern Province, Major General (Retd) G A Chandrasiri, and Secretary, Ministry of Highways and Road Development, Admiral (Retd) Wasantha Karannagoda, were also present at this occasion.” http://www.businesstoday.lk/cover-page.php?article=1955&issue=208


36 He was the first officer to become a 4-star Admiral [his Fundamental Rights Petition 2019] and then the first to become a 5-star Admiral of the Fleet.

37 OISL, Para 122, “SLN provided support to the Army through naval gunfire support to land operations”; also “intercepting LTTE supply routes, as well as boats leaving the Vanni, including civilians fleeing from LTTE-controlled areas.” Para 342 Navy Commander was instructed on the rights of detainees.

38 OISL Para 951, 971, 1002, 1004, 1007.

39 OISL para 878.

40 OISL 412; and Para 418-419 on victims of Navy enforced disappearance; 493 also. Para 546 cites torture in “a Navy base near Mannar” and Para 588 cites sexual violence perpetrated by naval officers.


42 OISL Para 109.

43 ITJP witness testimony.

44 According to his official Navy biography, during his career Wasantha Karannagoda commanded the four Operational Naval Commands on seven occasions - Northern, Eastern and Western Commands twice each and North Central once. He was also the first Director General of Operations - the role in charge of naval intelligence.

45 Karannagoda’s Fundamental Rights petition 2019 says, “On the 10th of May 2009, when the war was almost reaching its final stages, the Petitioner received notice of an allegation that his security officer Lt. Cdr. Sampath had abducted certain youth and detained them within Navy premises in Trincomalee.”

46 Sampath Munasinghe is interchangably referred to as ADC and PSO but we chose to use Aide de Camp (ADC) as he commanded a lot more influence than a bodyguard.


48 10 Aug 2017, Court Documents cited by Nishantha de Silva.

49 She is said to be a close friend of Shiranthi Rajapakse – the former first lady. In 2008 Asoka Karannagoda was President of the Navy (welfare) Seva Vanitha Unit.

50 The following website makes similar allegations: “It is a well-known fact that Admiral MUKV Bandara is involved in private businesses while being in government service.” http://www.lankaenews.com/news/315/en


52 Karannagoda writes to Director CID: “The Navy commander does not have such an investigation report. When inquired from Cmdr AK Guruge, he has informed that he did not conduct such an investigation”. (B report. 7 Jun 2017).

53 “Commander Karannagoda’s naval adviser then Cmdr. Mohottalage Udaya Keerthi Wijaya Bandara, Director Intelligence Ananda Guruge and then Head of Discipline Senaka Hanwella conducted investigations into the abductions”. 10 Aug 2017, Nishantha de Silva to Court.

54 In 2018, while in retirement, MUKV Bandara received a medal from the President. Fifty senior officers receive VSV medals from President, 26 May 2018, http://island.lk/index.php?page_cat-article-details&spage=article-details&code_title=185290


56 Writes to Navy Commander Karannagoda requesting record of investigation by Cmdr Guruge. (B report. 7 Jun 2017).

58 13 Jul 2017, Nishantha de Silva to court.

59 Para 34, Fundamental Rights application, 2019.

60 Copy with ITJP.

61 “...the petition was taken up in the SC that he is a war hero and that he should not be arrested”. MA Sumanthiran, TNA, Continuing culture of impunity: The Karannagoda case, 17 Mar 2018, http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/03/17/opinion/continuing-culture-impunity-karannagoda-case. https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1105701391547465728

62 He claimed to have cooperated with the Police: “The Petitioner further pleads that at all times the Petitioner has presented himself for questioning when required by the Police. The Petitioner has never avoided such a questioning.” (Para 80-1, FR application, Mar 2019).

63 Karannagoda uncooperative with investigations – CID, 29 Sep 2019, Sunday Observer.


66 http://www.vivesta-constructions.com/profile.html

67 Details from company website http://www.marineintshipping.com/Marine-Group.php


69 Navik International Trading (Pvt) Ltd.


71 Marine Logistics (Pvt) Ltd.

72 Merosa International (Pvt) Ltd.

73 http://www.megaone lk/?page_id=915

74 Rivinmo Hydro (Pvt) Ltd PV102725 Chairman: Dushantha Karannagoda Director: SK Karannagoda Director: Air Vice Marshal MH Karannagoda There were environmental concerns - 6 Sep 2016, http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/opinion/Mini-hydro-power-plants-money-spinner-for-few-disaster-for-nature/172-115321 - “According to a research conducted by the Environmental Foundation Limited (EFL) the implementation of such less or unviable projects would lead to the irreversible damage of the environment”. another mini hydro which will be constructed under the supervision of Rivinmo Hydro (Private) Limited, a company run by former Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda. The project is planned to be constructed within close proximity to Pundalu Oya, which belongs to the Kotmale Divisional Secretariat.” Vidulmo Hydro (Pvt) Ltd PV 93995 Chairman: Dushantha Karannagoda Director: SK Karannagoda Director: Air Vice Marshal MH Karannagoda. 75 “Ambassador Admiral (Rtd) Wasantha Kumara Jayadewa Karannagoda is a decorated Naval officer who was Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy from 2005 to 2009. He currently serves as the Sri Lankan Ambassador to Japan”. – from Company report 2011 http://colomboand.com/downloads/Colombo%20Land%20ARM%202011.pdf


77 From the affidavit dated 3 Jul 2017 by DKP Dissanayake seeking the lifting of the foreign travel ban so that he can go to the US for a National Defence Course. It is not clear is this is another course, aside from the 2015 one he enrolled in but missed.

78 The SBS consists of elite naval troops trained for clandestine and special operations.

79 The RASB was formed in 2007 to provide expertise in small boat operations in support of littoral operations, amphibious and riverine activities.

80 Navy reports to Parliament give conflicting dates for this post. They have DKP Dissanayake’s predecessor in this position until 1 Apr 2009 but say DKP Dissanayake started on 8 Jan. We chose the date 8 Jan 2009 because it matches with the rest of DKP Dissanayake’s service record.

81 In total he has been awarded 19 medals or commendation badges: the most recent (2) in 2008, (2) in 2011, and 2013 and 2016.

82 Request by IP Ranjith Munasinghe.

83 B report 19 February 2015.

84 http://www.itjpsl.com/reports/witness-protection.

85 B report 19 February 2015.

86 B report 19 February 2015.

87 B report 19 February 2015, IP Nishantha de Silva informs court.

88 B report 13 Mar 2015.

89 Thought to be temporary Commodore but not confirmed. Described in his career history as the reference date. Ref. NG261539.


91 Page 26 of the Dec 2017 report on Sri Lanka by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance shows the organisational structure, https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=BE0-xGuAgA93Oqportalid0. Page 33 shows the DMC has a training function. Page 34 spells out the assistance from USAID and UN agencies: ‘The
UN is facilitating the Ministry of Defense in obtaining International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) certification for global recognition for these SAR teams'.


93 He received five awards since the war ended.


95 Travis Sinniah was appointed as Navy Commander for two months from 18 Aug 2017 - 26 Oct 2017.

96 The statement by Sinniah to the CID does not elaborate on whether this was an official role; it says ‘…he did not have such authority, but he wielded such power because he was the personal aide of NO Karannagoda’.


98 DKP Dassanayake was not my overseeing officer. [Statement by Sumith Ranasinghe in Court documents].

99 According to court documents, KC Welegedara, Upul Bandara, Mahesh Bandara and suspect Kithsiri confirmed that Hettiarachchi and his team was operated by DKP Dassanayake.

100 On 20 Jun 2017, the Police informed the court there is an English handwritten note by the mother of Rajeev Naganathan on information given over the phone by Rajeev saying that they are held in Chaithya (Wrongly spelt Charitha) road under DKP Dassanayake and Hettiarachchi.

101 Case 732/09. 3 Mar 2017 B report 'Statement by Captain Jagath Jayantha who recorded statement of Raman Prabhakaran revealed that Raman had overheard a call from Rajeev to Govindasamy Naganathan in May 2009. Rajeev has said that he is in the Trincomalee naval base and Cadr. Dassanayake is in charge. Prabha has told "Rajeev son, tell that uncle that your father knows Captain JJ Ranasinghe and Minister Felix Perera".'

[Raman Prabhakaran is a businessman who is a friend of the Naganathans]. 13 Mar 2017 B report on Lyons: ‘Francis Xavier Lyon says that he inquired via Anton who resides in Negombo and found out that these two are in the custody of Navy and Mr Dassanayake of the Navy is requesting Rs. 900,000 for their release, but the deal could not be finalised because Mr…Dassanayake has gone abroad for a training.’

102 Inter alia: RPS Ranasinghe, M.A.T. Mendis and KA Gamini [court documents].

103 According to the B report [Statement recorded from Kassapa Paul] the documents were requested by the CID, but the Navy gave a different file. The complaint about human smuggling had been made by then (no date) Director of Intelligence, former captain, presently Rear Admiral Ulugetenna. Investigations were carried out by Rear Admiral Senaratne and Commodore Kassapa Gotabaya Paul. The investigation committee had found that DKP Dassanayake was directly involved in human smuggling. The date is narrowed down by the fact that Ulugetenna was Director of Intelligence only from 2011-13 and from 2012-13 Paill was the Naval Officer in charge of Trincomalee South. In addition, human smuggling peaked in 2012-13 so a report would likely be during this period.

104 25 Sep 2017, B report.

105 ITJP witness statement.


107 The Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) is the most senior appointment in the Sri Lankan armed forces.


109 Some versions say NRX.

110 OIC Colombo Crimes Division (CCD) MA Jayatilake. The case handled by the Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) under Art 125 of Criminal Code was handed over to the SIU of CID by IGP HASSK Wickramaratne.

111 Note that the Major has not been interviewed by CID to our knowledge.

112 Detained: 10 Jun - 7 Sep 2009 under Emergency Regulations

8 Sep - 6 Dec 2009 Detention Order

7 Dec 2009 - a 90-day Detention Order issued.

113 Signed by Mahinda Rapakasa.

114 His lawyer Mr Chinthaka Amarasinghe told the court on 1 Mar 2019 that Munasinghe had been in remand prison from 10 Jun 2009 -10 Jun 2010.


118 ITJP witness statement 316 §21.


120 For example in court documents a witness is cited [Wijekoon Mudiyanselage Chandrakumar Leading seaman XS 37614 Puttlam Camp] who worked for Navy intelligence and described being sent in mid-2008 to Pesalai (in Mannar) on orders from Sampath Munasinghe with an informer. Ref: 14 Aug 2018

121 ITPJ witness testimony.

122 ITJP witness testimony.


125 ITJP witness testimony. Court Documents, 10 Aug 2017. Munasinghe Statement to Police confirms their poor relationship and
Munasinghe also alleged Cmdr Bandara threatened him.


127 The complaint was made by Karannagoda to IGP HASJK Wickramaratne. He handed over the case to DIG (Crime Investigations) Anura Senanayake who in turn handed the case to CCD Director SDIG Vaas Gunawardena who initiated investigations. The Complaint alleged the suspect Sampath Munasinghe was connected to terrorists, which subsequently proved untrue. Because of the terrorism allegation Sampath Munasinghe was initially arrested under the Emergency Regulations and detained by CID special investigation unit. On 29 Jun 2009 a report by Special Unit OIC IP Munasinghe (no relative), said there was no adequate information to say that the suspect had links to terrorists. Sampath Munasinghe therefore was released on bail.


130 This is done by IP Ranjith Munasinghe according to the court documents of this date.

131 16 Aug 2018 court documents: He has travelled to Malaysia by obtaining a fake passport by using the fake ID.... 17 Jul 2019 court documents: Travel ban against Laksiri Samarasinghe extended until next court day. He is accused of helping Hettiarachchi go to Malaysia.

132 Court documents on 17 May 2018.


134 Case No. 8331/16


136 ITJP witness testimony.


139 “The suspects Prasad Hettiarachchi, Gaminiseneviratne and Pradeep Chaminda are in the remand custody while three others Palana Sami Suresh, Sivakanthan Vivekanandan and Fabian Royston Toussaint are missing.” http://www.dailymirror.lk/115204/-Raviraj-killing-Trial-to-begin-in-absence-of-suspectsAND http://www.dinamina.lk/2017/04/01/rez/32068 “The state witness for the prosecution in the trial in connection with the murder of former TNA Jaffna district MP Nadaraja Raviraj yesterday affirmed Court that the members of ex-LTTE cadres affiliated to the Karuna faction and officers attached to the Naval intelligence camp in Laundry Watta in Gangaramaya involved in committing the murder of Raviraj...

He further affirmed that he met several other accused including Palana Sami Suresh and Fabian Royston Tusen when he was at the Naval intelligence camp in Laundry Watta Matha Road in Narahenpita. The Colombo Chief Magistrate has issued an arrest warrant on Sivakanthan Vivekanandan alias Charan, who had migrated to Switzerland, and plans are underway to have him urgently extradited on the basis of his serious involvement in the killing of TNA Parliamentarian, Nadarajah Raviraj”. http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2015/11/01/po101.asp

140 Also spelt Fabian Roiston Christopher (alias "Thusain") by the Inter Parliamentary Union. https://www.smh.com.au/national/ former-sri-lankan-cop-wanted-over-assassination-linked-to-austria-eccosulence-business-20151322-g138n.html http://www.jds.lanka.org/index.php/news-features/politics-a-current-affairs/654-sri-lanka-delivers-shocking-verdict-on-assassination-of-tamil-mp “formerly an intelligence officer attached to the state intelligence service and is believed to be currently living in an unknown foreign country; he is also yet to be arrested” according to the IPU report, http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/commit152/SRI49.pdf


143 See IPU - SRI LANKA Case no SR1/S3 Nadarajah Raviraj, http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/181/sr153.htm

144 “In a confession, Navy Sampath said that Raviraj was murdered on the orders of the then state intelligence service’s deputy director SSP Maheel Doole, who had told him, “This is an order by the boss (Gotabhaya).” Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is directly involved in the murder of MP Nadaraja Raviraj? 28 Aug 2015, http://www.uktamilnews.com/?p=15654 “According to the statements by these suspects, the murder contract was given them by the then director of the State Intelligence

175 From confidential source.


177 ITJP witness statement.

178 Ref 9 Jun 2009, 13 Jul 2016 and 13 Jul 2017 B report. “In the dockyard, there were people held under the full command of Ranasinghe. Officers under this officer have been used for the security of these detainees.”


180 On 19 Jul 2006 on an LTTE Route Clearing Party at Kuchchaveli Area at 1300 hours in which 12 LTTE were reportedly killed. On 18 Jul 2006 an attack at LP Point at Arbanagar Muthur Area at 2210 hours in which 8 LTTE cadres were reportedly killed. On 18 Jul 2006 an attack at LP Point at Arbanagar Muthur Area at 2210 hours in which 8 LTTE cadres were reportedly killed.

181 Note: RPS Ransinghe was appointed Special Intelligence Officer in Oct 2004.

182 These are former LTTE cadres from the East under Colonel Karuna who split in April 2004 and joined government forces.

183 Director of Naval Land Operations UI Serasinghe recommended that RPS Ranasinghe take a key role in handling the Karuna cadres.

184 ITJP witness statement.


In 2009 he was Eastern Regional Deputy Inspector General of Police, according to https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=28701 and http://www.sundaytimes.lk/090705/News/sundaytimesnews_16.html. He was also among those found to be involved in enforced disappearance by the Central Zone Commission on Disappearances in the late 1980’s during the crushing of the JVP uprising. Credible material indicating his responsibility for such incidents was found, according to those involved in the Commission’s work. He was known as ‘Gadafi’ during the JVP uprising in 1987-1989 and there are many Sinhala media reports on his role then in violence, especially in the North West Province, where many hundreds were killed extrajudicially. https://www.academia.edu/12316304/Deeper_Hegemony_The_Populist_Politics_of_Sinhala_Nationalist_Discontent_and_the_Janatha_Vinukthi_Peramuna_in_Sri_Lanka_Deeper_Hegemony_The_Populist_Politics_of_Sinhala_Nationalist_Discontent_and_the_Janatha_Vinukthi_Peramuna_in_Sri_Lanka.


187 Inter alia: DKP Dasanayake, Mat Mendis, KA Gaminii (court documents).

188 ITJP witness statement.

189 According to witnesses, KC Welagedara, RPS Ranasinghe’s deputy, had delegated authority over Gun Site for at least 18 months from around April 2009 to end of 2010. After that, RPS Ranasinghe resumed his regular visits to Gun Site several times per month. In a confession to Fort Magistrate Ranga Dissanayake on 20 February 2019, Able Seamen Somadasa and Kotage both admitted that they abducted persons as ordered by RPS Ranasinghe, Hettiarachchi and Dassanayake at various stages and handed them over. Extracts of their statements to CID submitted to court confirm this. Also Lt. Cmdr. K.C. Welagedara told CID that Ali Anver (disappeared) told him near a cell between 25 and 27 March 2009 that a group including RPS Ranasinghe had assaulted him severely. Welagedara further said he saw blood trickling from a bad wound in Anver’s head.

190 IP Nishantha de Silva, 24 Aug 2017 to court.

191 Statement to CID produced in court 24 Aug 2017. RPS Ranasinghe is quoted in the B report saying, ‘LTTE members who surrendered to the Navy were held with permission from the Defence Ministry, in the underground cells of Gun Site under his control, which were situated at the Trincomalee Naval and Maritime Academy, to be later rehabilitated and released into society.’ These detainees were never produced before a magistrate, a Police station, the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission (HRCSL) or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

192 ITJP witness statements. The ITJP is also in possession of a photograph of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and RPS Ranasinghe (in uniform) together during the war.

193 KC Welagedara testified to the CID that RPS Ranasinghe held people in Gun Site, including Ali Anver, Rajeev Naganathan and John Reed, Ref 9 Jun 2009, 13 Jul 2016 and 13 Jul 2017 B reports.

194 ITJP witness statement.

195 11 Jul 2017, in court documents the Police say DKP Dassanayake directly supervised the intelligence units. However, Ranasinghe’s statement says his overseers were the Eastern Region Commanders and the directors of naval intelligence Cmdr Guruge and Cmdr Mohotti and not DKP Dassanayake. Court documents say Guruge and Karannagoda had knowledge of the
underground detention sites. (13 Jul 2017 Nishantha de Silva informs court). KC Welagedara testified that he told Guruge about the detention site. Court documents also allege two witnnesses Aluthgedara Upul Bandara and Laksman Udaya Kumara were instructed by Guruge to give false evidence implicating Sampath Munasinghe in the abduction. Guruge is also reported to have conducted an investigation (with Commander Karanagoda’s naval adviser then Cmdr Mohottalage Udaya Keerthi Wijaya Bandara, and then Head of Discipline Senaka Hanwella), a copy of which the Police requested, but which Guruge denies all knowledge of now (Ref 7 Jun 2017 B report). Guruge also failed on a number of occasions to appear in front of CID to give a statement.


197 From 2001 to 2016 RPS Ranasinghe received 13 medals, six of which were received between 2008-2012.


199 On 2 Mar 2017 according to court documents. His lawyer’s submission on 24 Mar 2017 to court requesting bail says so.

200 Ref 6 Apr 2017 and 3 May 2017 B report.

201 “Last Monday the Navy Commander ordered the immediate transfer of Commander Sumith Ranasinghe back to Naval HQ, Colombo. Commander Ranasinghe has been appointed Director of the Directorate of Naval Land Operations (DNLO), highly placed sources told Daily FT.” After the ‘coup’; Justice on a knife’s edge?, 23 Nov 2018, FT Lanka. http://www.ft.lk/news/After-the-coup---Justice-on-a-knife’s-edge/-56-667415.

202 http://www.jdslanka.org/index.php/news-features/politics-a-current-affairs/843-sri-lanka-Navy-top-brass-in-sinister-plot-against-investigators-and-witness; « A key witness speaking to JDS under strict condition of anonymity said that the admiral and several other officers who have access to sophisticated surveillance equipment and lethal weapons pose a grave threat. “One suspect Sumith Ranasinghe was promoted to the post of commodore after his release. Although he is in charge of land operations, former Navy commander Sirimevan Ranasinghe by a confidential letter has requested directors loyal to him to deploy Ranasinghe in intelligence. He is given an armed security and has the facility to spy on telephone conversations of Navy officers who gave evidence against him.”

203 There was for example controversy about the decision to purchase from JSC Rosoboronexport a Russian warship at the enormous price of US $200 million. There was debate about whether Sri Lanka actually needs such a vessel. Media speculation suggested Travis Sinniah, who is now believed to have left the country, was forced to retire as Navy Commander because he opposed the deal. Admiral Revinda Wijegeneratne replaced Sinniah as Navy Commander, and he is reported to have approved of the purchase. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/russian-warship-deal-resurfaces-due-to-sirisenas-unusual-intervention-to-protect-ravi http://srilkabrief.org/2017/12/president-sirisenas-195-m-russian-roulette/
The Navy owns the Malina Hotel chain of 15 hotels. One is Sober Island Resort - a hotel inside the Trincomalee dockyard opened by the Navy Commander D. W. A. S. Dissanyake and the Commander Eastern Naval Area, J. S. K. Colombage, on 18 September 2012. Another is Fort Hammenheil, which was a detention centre during the JVP period and then later for sailors. There are concerns that military involvement in businesses detracts from the local population’s ability to recover from the war, especially in the former conflict areas, and underpins the continued militarisation of the areas.

204 In one case, 3 Kalashnikov-pattern semi-automatic rifles, leased or sub-leased to a UK-registered PMSC...were taken on board the Finnish-flagged bulk carrier ‘Alppila’ at Galle (Sri Lanka) on 3 September 2011, for escort to Gibraltar. When the Sri Lankan government custodian accompanying the weapons flew back to Sri Lanka from Gibraltar on 22 October 2011, the weapons were abandoned in Gibraltar... and ostensibly ‘disappeared’ until the Alppila reached its next Port of Call, Police in Poland, where they were found and seized by the authorities on 8 November 2011.” https://omegaressearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/Floating%20Armouries.pdf

205 Omega research defined them as “Floating armouries are vessels used to store weapons, ammunition, and related equipment such as body armour and night vision goggles. They also provide other logistics support including accommodation, food and medical supplies storage for PMSCs engaged in vessel protection. They are typically commercially owned vessels, often anchored in international waters.” https://omegaressearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/Floating%20Armouries.pdf

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208 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/10/pirate-weapons-floating-armouries


210 "In one case, 3 Kalashnikov-pattern semi-automatic rifles, leased or sub-leased to a UK-registered PMSC...were taken on board the Finnish-flagged bulk carrier ‘Alppila’ at Galle (Sri Lanka) on 3 September 2011, for escort to Gibraltar. When the Sri Lankan government custodian accompanying the weapons flew back to Sri Lanka from Gibraltar on 22 October 2011, the weapons were abandoned in Gibraltar... and ostensibly ‘disappeared’ until the Alppila reached its next Port of Call, Police in Poland, where they were found and seized by the authorities on 8 November 2011.” https://omegaressearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/Floating%20Armouries.pdf

211 After AGMS was established, Senadhipathi says Gotabaya Rajapaksa asked him to pay the salaries of disabled soldiers, which he says he did.

212 Omega research defined them as “Floating armouries are vessels used to store weapons, ammunition, and related equipment such as body armour and night vision goggles. They also provide other logistics support including accommodation, food and medical supplies storage for PMSCs engaged in vessel protection. They are typically commercially owned vessels, often anchored in international waters.” https://omegaressearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/Floating%20Armouries.pdf
234 103

224 http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/43932
226 http://www.themorning.lk/clock-ticks-for-ukrainian-captain/
227 Numbers given here are 549 T-56 weapons, 264 84-S weapons, and 204,674, http://www.themorning.lk/clock-ticks-for-ukrainian-captain/
228 "weapons and equipment authorised to be carried" on board the vessel were two Light Machine Guns (LMGs) made in China, (serial numbers were given), eight drums (ammunition), one T-56 automatic rifle made in China (serial number given) and 2,000 rounds of (7.62 30 mm) ammunition. However, the Navy raid on the vessel revealed that there were 816 rifles of different types and 202,674 rounds of live ammunition.
229 https://economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_Navy_offers_new_evidence_in_Avant_Garde_arms_scandal-3-3267-.html
230 http://www.uktamilnews.com/?p=17667
233 http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10A/May24_1558717809CH.php
234 1. Karunaratne Banda Adhikari Egodawela
2. Major General Palitha Fernando
3. Nandasena Gotabhaya Rajapaksa
4. Manneldura Rohanaweera De Soysa
5. Achchi Maddumage Don Hasala Dhanasiri Amaratunga
6. Arumaduru Lorenz Romello Duminda Silva
7. Ranawaka Archchige Don Janaka
8. Hewanathrage Upali Kodikara
9. Chandrasekara Rohitha Bandara Bogollagama
10. Disanayake Mudiyanseleka Sujatha Damayanthi Jayaratne
11. Jayanath Sirikumara Kolambage
12. Samarasinghe Archchige Maximas Jayantha Perera
13. YMP Nissanka Yapa Senadhopathi

235 The earliest reference to this company is on archived pages of the website in 2010 https://web.archive.org/web/20100612110524/https://avantgarde.lk/about_us.html
236 https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10209946
237 https://www.linkedin.com/in/carla-eleina-perialta-34b1b228
238 https://ohuiginn.net/panama/person/MASSIEL%20ROBINSON%20DE%20ARAUZ
239 http://www.torrrijos-asiacios.com/
240 According to official Singaporean records.
243 https://lk.linkedin.com/in/seneerath-bandara-dissanayake-bb5902129
246 https://www.linkedin.com/in/
Navy states that there isn’t enough evidence to support the claims.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/1k/150115/columns/avant-garde-loses- monopoly-Navy-takes-over-weapons-171843.html

Minister Rajitha Senaratne hints at 253 cope-chairmanship-photos-reveal/
eyadasa-corrupt-since-time-of-wijcom/index.php/justice-minister-
https://www.colombotelegraph.org/article/541338/Avant-Garde-features-heavily-in

The vessel MV Avant Garde had unrest in Maldives. According to
“Minister Rajitha Senaratne hints at 252 that AVGMS was a government
http://www.uktamilnews.com/?p=17743

 Investigators had informed De Livera that the duo had bolted and is now
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/article/1106410/avant-garde-arrests-one-

Roar Timeline: 12 November 2015 255 http://offshoreleaks.icj.org/
nodes/12099759

256 Fifty senior officers receive VSV medals from President, 26 May 2018, The Island.

http://www.adaderana.lk/news/348-avant-garde-arrests-one-
down-seven-more-to-go

http://www.adaderana.lk/news/57897/gotabaya-released-from-
avant-garde-case

http://www.avantgarde.lk/about-

http://www.tulipagro.com/author/- the post contains no
evidence to support the claims”


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According to company website. Sri Lankan Passport Number: 633420173 V

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avant-garde-case

http://www.tulipagro.com/author/- the post contains no

sundaytimes.lk/article/1106582/

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http://www.avantgarde.lk/about_

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http://www.avantgarde.lk/about_

http://www.avantgarde.lk/about_us.html

His wife has a bio linked to Avant Garde https://www.linkedin.
in/shanika-sonali-madam-

http://www.tulipagro.com/author/- the post contains no

Senadhipathi served on the boards of Lanka Logistics and Rakna Araksha Lanka Limited, both companies incorporated under the auspices of the Defence Ministry with the Defence Secretary at their helm.” The end game, 17 Jan 2013, Colombo Gazette.


262 “For example, in September 2011 a group of academics issued a statement protesting a decision by the Higher Education Ministry to hand over the security of universities to Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd, a government-owned commercial security venture established under the Ministry of Defense and under the direct supervision of the defense secretary”. https://www.refworld.org/docid/517e6dd6f.html

US State Department Human Rights report 2012

http://www.adaderana.lk/news/2448-rakna-lanka-marshals-to-

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272 “Senadipathi is a strong supporter of the UPFA and campaigned for former President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the January 8 presidential election. He is also considered a close confidant of former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa”. http://www.sundaytimes.lk/150125/columns/shocking-revelations-of-deep-security-state-within-the-state-131923.html

273 https://www.mfa.gov.lk/ta/4164-yemen/


285 https://wikileaks.org/plsusb/cables/08STATE18013_a.html


289 https://www.facebook.com/kbegodawele and Linked In. He was Gemini Watch regiment.

290 One of the key suspects in the Avant Garde floating armoury fraud is, then right-hand woman of @GotabayaR, Mrs. Damayanthi Jayaratne. How come there is no effort to seek her arrest/expiration. No Interpol Red notice? Cos of her connections to officialup honchos? Signed the circular http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/DownloadAsset.aspx?uid=351 She holds a passport bearing number OL 5652285.


292 Also against Bandula Herath (also charged under Sections 113 (a) & 102 of the Penal Code) and K. M. P. Chaminda Perera (also charged under Sections 113 (a) & 102 of the Explosive Act). https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PRECIFAC-34-CASES-1.pdf


294 http://www.uktamilnews.com/?p=20212

295 “: In addition to Landinfo’s own experience, the following is based on a conversation with Controller Visa Section, Damayanthi Jayaratne, Department of Immigration and Emigration in Colombo on May 18, 2010.”Damayanthi Jayaratne, Department of Immigration and Emigration i Colombo den 18. mai 2010. https://landinfo.no/asset/1279/1/1279_1.pdf


300 https://www.newsfirst.lk/2019/09/07/avant-garde-case-4-suspects-remanded/

301 http://tel.org/?p=86482

302 https://www.facebook.com/rohanmlk?fref=pb&hc_location=friends_tab His Facebook gives his details as of No 15/5, Keppitipola Mawatha, Kolonnawa, Colombo, Sri Lanka. msndecosta (Skype). DOB: 2 July and 43 years old in 2018 according to media reports. In Feb 2017 he went to Egypt.


304 “He also suffered several injuries due to the war and is today, completely blind in his right eye. He also has permanent injuries on his left foot and hand that have left him with impaired movement and sensitivity.” A battle of courage By Shezna Shums http://www.thesundayleader.lk/archive/20040523/news-8.htm

306 “The whereabouts of Saman Dissanayake yet another suspect and the current Secretary to the National Police Commission is also unclear. According to a Local English weekend newspaper, Dissanayake had visited the NPC on Friday but had left in a hurry. He has been unreachable on his mobile since. Rumours had been floating that Dissanayake had fled the country as well.” https://english.thelawyer.lk/news/348-avant-garde-arrests-one-down-seven-more-to-go


311 “...the former Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Vice Admiral D. W. A. S. Dissanayake who is now appointed as the Adviser on Maritime Affairs to His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka is being placed as advisor on the Advisory Board of Avant Garde Maritime Services private limited”. http://www.slirankanaguardian.org/2012/11/ deployment-of-floating-armouries-rakna.html

His passport was impounded in 2015 https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/exclusive-ranil-prevents-gota-arrest/


https://www.adaderana.lk/news/53468/gotabayas-avant-garde-case-postponed

313 http://www.hirunews.lk/120866/four-named-respondents-in-rakna-lanka-probe

314 Named in the MOD circular as a contact point along with Sudharman Silva and Nandana Diyabalanage, From the Navy: http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/DownloadAsset.aspx?uId=351


316 Air Vice Marshal Premachandra graduated from the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA in 1996. In 2004 he attended National Defence College, New Delhi, India. During his career in the service he has undergone a number of Overseas training Courses including Flight Safety Officers Course and Junior Command and Staff Course, Pakistan, Strategic & Security Studies at both NESA Centre - National Defense University, Washington and Asia Pacific Centre, Hawaii. His biography says, “since 1982, he has actively participated in Air Operations in the North and East”. https://www.airforce.lk/news.php?news=164.


Daughter was UN Volunteer and now in USA. https://www.linkedin.com/in/pathanchali-premachandra-a4639892/

317 In the Spring of 2011, the brother of an ITJP witness (Witness 136) from a fisherman’s family was arrested in Sri Lanka because of his involvement in human smuggling by boat. W136’s brother’s role was to source Tamil clients, collect fees and negotiate pay-offs to the Navy. The boats would leave from an island in the North and could carry about 50 people. The business flourished until the Navy demanded more money; W136’s brother refused to pay and his ship was then intercepted and he was arrested along with the passengers and charged with terrorism.

318 In May 2019 the Australians complained of an “uptick” in smuggling boats coming from Sri Lanka, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfp9D4mZVnw

In addition, the ITJP has documented accounts of torture survivors who have fled Sri Lanka around or after the end of the civil war – approximately 80% leave by air but the others left in the following years, normally by fishing boat from Mannar to India. None reported any issues with naval patrols intercepting them but by definition they are the people who made it abroad.

2017 2
2016 10
2015 4
2009-2014 28
Total 44

319 https://www.pressreader.com/sangam.org/case-involving-Navy-abductions-takes-dramatic-turn/ Court Documents: Calls to say; Lt Cmnd Hettiarachchi is the one who brought the boys. I can arrange for them to talk with you. Calls another time to request SLR 500,000 for the release. (Ref 13 Mar 2017 B report)


324 https://navaltoday.com/2012/05/01/sri-lanka-Navy-commander-opens-new-naval-legal-services-office-complex/


Established in 2013, the ITJP is the main body that has extensively investigated and documented unlawful detentions, torture and sexual violence in Sri Lanka. The research group is led by South African transitional justice expert, Yasmin Sooka, and employs international investigators who have worked for tribunals, the United Nations, and the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative.